毛主席逝世50周年纪念集双语版 bilingual Commemorative Collection

《毛席逝世50周年纪念集》双语版 bilingual ——Chinese and English  

Commemorative Collection Marking the 50th Anniversary of Chairman Mao's Passing

https://blog.creaders.net/user_blog_diary.php?did=NTY1MjI5

【编者的话】

一九四九年十月一日，毛主席站在天安门城楼上宣告：中华人民共和国成立了，中国人民从此站起来了！

主席的话，瞬间，让全中国人民感到无比的荣耀和自尊。作为中华人民共和国领导人的第一天，主席完成了一项宏伟的任务：让全中国人民听到学到人类第一文明大国应有何等的精神面貌，让全中国人心中都产生应有的民族意识和国家尊严。

毛主席建立了劳动人民的新中国，领导全国人民走工农当家做主的新道路。文化大革命是毛主席明白指出的群众路线，知青下乡是毛主席重点制订的接代政策。

在毛主席逝世五十周年的今天，纪念毛主席，我们从那影响万众斗争激烈的知青下乡运动说起。一名亲历了政治斗争的下乡知青描述他“万念俱灰”的一刻，是为本纪念集的第一篇。

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一、老闲：九九思念——写在主席逝世五十周年纪念日

二、韩东屏：难忘一九七六年九月九日

三、韩东屏：毛主席建立了人类历史至今为止的最先进的社会制度

四、老董：历史的见证

（附件）此气无计可消除，弯下膝头，献上缠头——评朱镕基访美

五、无套裤汉：对老牌修正主义的回顾与前瞻

六、文平：兩件事的啓思

七、叶先扬：怀念敬仰毛主席

八、花俊雄：毛泽东的外交战略和外交智慧

九、黄哲操：紀念毛泽东主席逝世50週年

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2026年9月14日

一、

九九思念——写在主席逝世五十周年纪念日

老闲

岁月流逝，一晃之间主席离开我们已经有五十年了，可当年的情景仍历历在目。当收音机里哀乐响起，一时间失魂落魄，顿感万念俱灰。

我是68年底下乡插队的上海老知青，那时主席关于“知识青年到农村去，接受贫下中农再教育”的指示还没有发出，我们是奔着彻底改变农村落后面貌去的。主席早在延安发表的《青年运动的方向》中就提出了知识分子必须与工农相结合，走与工农相结合的道路。新中国成立后，主席又在亲自编撰的《中国农村的社会主义高潮》一书中写下按语：“农村是一个广阔的天地，在那里是可以大有作为的。”随之，邢燕子、董加耕等一大批先进标兵涌现，“到农村去，到边疆去，到祖国最需要的地方去”的口号充分体现了当年青年的热血与使命担当。66年大串联时，就有上海的中学生在途经的农村扎下了根；67年上海的中学里又掀起过一阵要求到农村去的风潮；到68年底我们就成为上海首批去农村插队落户的知青，都是主动要求争抢的名额。

主席的“接受再教育”指示下达后，情况有了变化，上海的68、69、70三届中学毕业生全部下乡，号称“一片红”。事后来分析，这项政策基础是有问题的。我们首批知青下放时，当地的老乡们担心上海学生会不会很难弄，各生产队曾经是互相推托的。我们的集体户，就只能放在大队支书自家的生产队里。下放农村不久就是春节，我们提出抓住农闲为来年增产挑村前那口塘的塘泥。当年的抽水机十分笨重，为了把进水管在塘里竖直，我们几个男知青在那寒冬腊月只穿着短裤下了水。恰好县里的一条主要公路在村前塘边穿过，春节期间来往人员不绝，都看到了我们热火朝天的场面。顿时，上海学生的美名一下子传遍了全县。“上海学生真是棒！”于是69年3月上海第二批知青下放时，各生产队都抢着要。谁料到“一片红”下来的思想基础大不一样，痛哭想家的，打架斗殴的，偷鸡摸狗的，都出现了。尽管大部分知青在各级领导和老乡的关心爱护下，在我们的帮助带动下，渐渐地安定下来。但是那些下放到更偏远更落后地区的知青，问题比较严重了，一时造成了社会上的种种不满。甚至“变相劳改”也引起了不少共鸣。后来就有了主席给李庆霖同志的复信。在统筹解决中，部分知青上调回城，伴随着的是普遍的人心浮动。

对于那些坚守初心的知青，摆在面前的问题就是上山下乡这条路怎么走下去？75年从上海来了一个方案，上海常驻慰问团开始做当地领导和知青的工作，推行知青队的成立。当时苏南一带借助长三角的工业资源，社队企业有了很大的发展，农民就地转化，亦工亦农，以工养农，已经先富了起来，华西大队就是一个典型。上海方面准备借鉴苏南模式来解决知青问题。具体办法就是以公社为单位，集中上海知青成立知青生产队，上海用产业升级淘汰的机器，来支持队办企业的发展，使知青们也能够先富起来。我被指定担任知青队筹备小组组长。当时我十分高兴，因为从中看到了主席在“五七指示”中预示的共产主义前景，能够在缩小工农差别、城乡差别方面先走一步，也就是后来南街的王宏斌所谓的建设共产主义小社区。因此，在筹备小组中我再三强调不能脱离周围农村，我们要通过以工养农，加速农业机械化的实现，推广科学技术和农林牧副各业的全面发展，成为一个他们看得见，摸得着的样板，启发和引导他们一起进步，才能彻底改变落后面貌。

令人遗憾的是我们的设想在公社领导那里碰了壁，他们并不看好知青的前景，因而只想做一个临时的安排。更让人燥心的是74年以来的回潮，令我产生了公社会解体的预感。好在主席这棵大树还在，我们还有希望。

正在准备作最后的努力时，主席去世了。我退出了筹备小组。77年我被抽调参加公社集中的杂交水稻制种工作，为第二年大规模推广杂交水稻奠定了基础。年底我参加了高考，78年初回到了上海。在大学期间，同学给我一份《中国青年报》，官方正式否定了上山下乡。又过了一段时间，传来了小岗的红手印。唯一让我高兴的是当年生产队传来的消息：杂交水稻获得了大丰收，亩产跨纲要超千斤。当年的分红，一个工达到了两元。县领导十分满意，奖励每户一张自行车票。十年奋战，终于达到亩产跨纲要的目标，止不住我喜极而泣。可惜的是，大好的集体生产形势和干部群众的反对仍然没能阻止公社被解散。

五十年过去了，令人欣慰的是，一批又一批的大学生下乡支农支教，直到今天大量的大学生村官奋斗在脱贫建设新农村的道路上，从中我多少看到了自己当年的影子。

二、

难忘一九七六年九月九日

韩东屏

一九七六年我二十一岁， 是我们村办工厂的厂长。九月九日那天下午三点五十分，我正在外出回厂的路上。 路过县城里唯一的一条十字路口，喇叭中响起了哀乐， 一丝不祥的感觉涌上心头。然后广播里传出那个永远忘却不了的中国政府的讣告，告诉全国人民，中国人民的伟大领袖毛主席那天凌晨在北京去世。 在那一刻，周围一片哭声。 今天我已经不记得那天我是怎么走回家的了。

我回到家里的时候，爸爸妈妈还没有回来。妈妈在生产队里干活，爸爸还在工厂上班。 他在我们县最大的国营企业，即墨农业机械厂上班。 爸爸在他父亲，我的爷爷去世时都没有哭过。可那天爸爸是一路哭着回到家的。 他回家后的第一件事，就是把正在哭的全家人召集在一起开会。 他说：今天我们穷人的天塌了。 明天会是什么样子，没有人能够预料。但我要求你们永远记住毛主席的恩情。 没有毛主席共产党，就没有我们家。你们以后如果做任何对不起毛主席的事情，就不是我的子孙。

爸爸一九二八年出生。 他的家族本来是河北保定一带的望族。 家里从石家庄到北京的每个县城都有买卖和大车店。但他的父亲，我的爷爷，跟他的继母合不来，在他十六岁的时候就偷偷的拿了家里的钱和两匹马，骑着一匹，牵着一匹，离家出走。 他跟朋友在海参崴办了一家铁工厂。后来俄国发生十月革命，他的工厂被没收。 他又跟朋友到满洲里办了一家工厂。 他赚钱后就回家跟我祖母结婚。 祖母也是当地的富户。我爸爸和姑姑过年收到的压岁钱，就够买三亩地。 在我大姑四岁，爸爸二岁，叔叔刚几个月大的时候，我爷爷回家把一家人接到了满洲里。 

爷爷是个生意人。 那个时候的生意人，吃喝嫖赌样样都不啦。祖母见爷爷每天出去吃喝嫖赌，不是一个靠得住的人。 就偷偷的拿了家里的一些钱，雇了一辆马车，带着三个孩子回了河北老家。她不敢跟家里人说她是偷着跑回来的，因为她知道如果家里知道她是一个人偷着跑回来的，就会被家里人遗弃。 而家里的太奶奶，还盼着她的孙子会带礼物给她，而奶奶却什么也没有带回来，让太奶奶对她非常不满。我爷爷后来告诉我母亲，他们走的时候他一点不知道，怎么能带礼物给太奶奶。 后来家里分家，什么家产都没有分给我奶奶，说我爷爷在满洲里的厂子就算我们家应得的那一份。 奶奶全靠当年用孩子的压岁钱买的三亩地，艰难的过日子。她没有得到大家族的任何照拂。 所有三个孩子都没有机会上学。大姑八岁就去给人家做童养媳。 爸爸十二岁就离家到青岛做童工，而他离家后的第二年，他的母亲就因病去世，他却一点都不知道。 直到一九四九年，解放了，铁路通了，他想回家看望母亲。 他的姑姑才告诉他，他的妈妈早就不在了。

爸爸后来告诉我，解放前的大家族里，勾心斗角，毫无亲情可言。他十二岁到姑姑家在青岛开的一家翻砂厂学徒。 只管吃管住，没有工钱。 一天只能睡六个小时，其他十八个小时在车间里干活，在厨房打杂，给老板端尿盆，帮老板娘看孩子。 一年三百六十五天没有休息。 过年的时候，他的姑父给他两块钱，说不要告诉别人，只给他一个人，因为他帮姑姑看孩子。后来爸爸发现其实每个童工都有两元。 吃不饱，穿不暖，年纪轻轻就得了肺结核。他说没有共产党毛主席，就没有我们家，是实实在在的实话。如果不是共产党解放了他，他大概活不到三十岁。

一九四九年解放后，他的生活立刻得到改善，一天工作八个小时，一个星期休息一天。 免费医疗，免费教育。 当时厂里办了夜校，他是班上最用功的学生。 那个时候他已经二十一岁， 老师问他为什么小的时候不上学。 他说自己命不好。老师问他为啥命不好。 他说自己上辈子做了坏事。 老师说，没有人能改变你的上一辈子，没有人能改变你的命，为什么你现在能免费上学，每天只工作八小时，每星期还有一天休息，过年过节还放假。这跟你的上辈子，跟你的命没有任何关系。 从那以后，爸爸再也不信命了，只信共产党，只信毛主席。

爸爸后来夜校毕业，达到高中毕业水平，后来厂里又送他去山东工学院进修。他努力工作。 成了我们县的人大代表。每年过年放假，他都要求去护厂。 那个时候，他有肺结核病，冬天感冒，呼吸困难。 我要求替他去。 他不同意。 让我跟他一起去。 他说他自己不去不放心。 爸爸爱厂如家，不是无缘无故的。工厂也爱护他。 过年过节，他从来不去看望厂里的领导，都是厂长书记等领导们来看望他。 他生病的时候，厂里派厂里的医生来家里给他看病， 派厂里的大卡车送他到市里的大医院看病。 厂里的领导真心实意的关心着工人的生活。

爸爸在毛主席逝世时说，穷人的天塌了。对我这个没有经历过旧社会的二十一岁的人来说，当时没法想象问题会有那么严重。 毛主席不在了。 还有共产党。 天塌不了。 可是不幸的事真发生了。 毛主席去世后不久，爸爸工作了一辈子的工厂就被走资派卖给了台湾的一个资本家。这个台湾资本家把厂里的几百台车床和其他设备统统卖掉，把工人解雇，利用厂区开发房地产，大赚了一笔。 而厂里的两千多工人都成了下岗职工。 即墨县在毛泽东时代，在没有任何工业的基础上建了三十六家国营企业，农业机械厂，轻工业机械厂，化肥厂，糖厂，粮油加工厂，肉联厂，糕点厂，白酒厂，黄酒厂，白铁厂，五金厂，锚链厂，花边厂，被服厂，麻袋长，鞋厂，锁厂等。 走资派在短短几年里，将所有这些厂子全部私有化，现在像全国其他县一样，即墨已经没有一家国营企业了。

三、

毛主席建立了人类历史至今为止的最先进的社会制度

韩东屏

谨以此文纪念中国人民的伟大领袖毛泽东主席逝世五十周年

一九七六年九月九日，中国人民的伟大领袖，全世界被压迫民族的导师，毛泽东主席逝世。中国人陷于巨大的悲痛之中。 后来的统计中显示，大部分中国人都记得他们听到这个消息的时间和地点，以及当时在做什么。 一九七七年的高考的作文题目“难忘的一天”，全国百分之九十五的考生，写的就是毛主席去世的这一天。

但谁能想到，华国锋这个看上去的老实人，声称毛主席对他说过“你办事，我放心”，并以此作为自己是毛主席亲自选定为接班人的政治骗子，居然伙同汪东兴，动用二十四名专门保护中央领导人的警卫部队，逮捕毛主席的夫人江青，毛主席的侄儿，烈士毛泽民的儿子，毛远新，毛主席信任的其他所谓四人帮成员，张春桥，王洪文，姚文元。 然后，在全国各地大力抓捕所谓的与四人帮有关联的干部，如谢静宜， 迟群，孙玉国等，成千上万的毛主席的好干部被杀，被判刑关押，被开除党籍，开除公职。

华国锋和汪东兴为了掩盖他们背叛毛主席的事实，抛出所谓的两个“凡是”：凡是毛主席作出的决策，我们都坚决拥护，凡是毛主席的指示，我们都始终不渝的遵循。这完全是华国锋和汪东兴用来欺骗中国人民的虚伪伎俩。 如果真如他们声称的那样，他们就不会抓捕江青和毛远新，也不会抓捕其他忠于毛主席的好干部。 他们的所作所为，完全出于个人私利，完全是为了争夺国家最高权力的阴谋。 华国锋恬不知耻的把自己标榜为“英明领袖”，但他的所作所为却是自毁长城，愚蠢至极，他的虚伪很快暴露无遗，也很快让对手抓住把柄。 邓小平推出“实践是检验真理唯一标准的大辩论这样的一个伪命题，就让华国锋和汪东兴阵脚大乱，不到两年，汪东兴，陈锡联，吴德，纪登奎，陈永贵等政治局委员，被迫辞职，彻底退出政治舞台。 华国锋则成了名副其实的孤家寡人。他还幼稚地以为他让邓小平复出有功，因此邓会让其继续在那个位置上做下去。 他完全低估了政治斗争的残酷性，很快便被邓小平踢出政治舞台。

邓小平等走资派掌控了中国的政治局面后，便开始对所谓三种人进行了长达八年的大清洗。加上华国锋七六年开始的清算所谓的与四人帮有关联的人进行的大清洗，前后共达十年，几千万毛泽东时代的干部和群众被杀，被关, 被开除党籍，被开除公职。于此同时，那些在毛泽东时代受过处分的人，都一个个官复原职，重新登上高位。其实他们大都是没有改造好的投机分子，走资派，有些人就是还乡团，是得志便猖狂的中山狼。他们上台以后，对以前批判过他们的人民群众进行了疯狂的打击报复，借清理“三种人”的机会，把以前批判过他们的造反派，往死里整。 本人一九八五年春研究生毕业，到郑州大学任教。 就曾参与核实山东医学院前院长，污蔑我校一位教师，山东医学院的前教师的经历。郑州大学外语系的桑姓教师，文革前是山东医学院的外语系青年教师，文革中曾经批判过这位院长大人。 现在这位前院长官复原职，声称这位教师是杀人犯，必须枪毙。我受学校派遣，亲赴济南调查走访，查无实据，拒绝了他的要求。 但他一直纠缠不休，说我偏袒该教教师，学校不得不再派人去调查。第二次调查的结果和第一次一样。 该老干部坚持要处分该位老师。 但我们是河南省，他没有管控能力，最后只能不了了之。

邓小平上台后，大搞腐败，为不同级别的所谓老干部加工资。 三七年以前参加革命的老干部，涨三级工资，每年发十五个月工资，医保全免，每年一次旅游，由国家出资雇保姆。一九四五年前参加工资的涨两级工资，每年发十四个月的工资，医保全免，每年一次旅游，国家出资雇保姆。一九四九年建国前参加工作的涨一级工资，发十三个月工资，医保全免，每年一次旅游，国家雇保姆。 并提拔这些高级干部子女到重要重要职位。 各级政府专门成立老干部局，专门为这些老干部服务。 这些走资派完全背叛了共产党人没有私利的革命原则。 大搞有权不使，过期作废那一套，充分利用自己职权，为自己和家族谋取私利，搞官倒腐败，搞得天怒人怨，社会风气败坏，世风日下。

毛泽东时代，中国社会学雷锋，工业学大庆，农业学大寨，全国学人民解放军， 英雄辈出，风清气正，好人好事层出不穷。 犯罪率是人类历史从来没有的低，十万人只有零点五六的犯罪率。 一个百万人口的县， 一年不过五六七起罪案。 一个县的公安局编制只有三十多人，而且大多数是文职人员。 我曾经调查过山东，河南，安徽，河北的十几个县的二十几个农村，这些村子在文革当中几乎没有发生过一起罪案，基本实现了路不拾遗，夜不闭户的理想状态。 邓小平上台后，解散人民公社，鼓励个人发家致富，造成农村盗贼蜂起，各种犯罪活动猖獗。一九七八年到一九八三年，公安局编制大增近十倍，犯罪率则翻了二十倍。 从一九八三年九月开始，邓小平治下的中国政府，不得不施行三次所谓的严打，仅第一严打，就抓人上百万，枪毙数万。 所谓的严打，就是罔顾法律，完全按照邓小平的个人意志，草菅人命。 我考察过的一个河南村子，就有两个农民因为偷了两袋化肥被处决。我山东老家的一个少年，就因为抢了一个女孩的围巾被枪毙。 

毛泽东时代，中国人搞计划生育，通过组织教育农民，卓有成效，晚婚晚育，一对夫妇一对孩，被联合国公认为最成功的计划生育样板。 邓小平解散人民公社，失信于民。 搞计划生育没人买账。不得不采取极端的法西斯手段，强迫农民堕胎，结扎，农民不服，就断水，断电，拉牲口，搬家具，年轻人跑了，就抓父母，殴打上刑，逼迫年轻人就范。 这种用法西斯手段推行的独生子女政策，撕裂了中国社会，从一九八零年到一九一六年，超过四亿胎儿被堕掉，中国社会男女性比例失衡。 邓小平的独生子女政策对中华民族的造成的极端伤害，是任何外部的敌人都做不到的。 其造成的恶劣后果才刚刚开始显现，今天的中国年轻人不愿意结婚，不愿意生孩子，其实都是独生子女政策后遗症之一。 

毛泽东时代，解放军是一所大学校，为中国社会的各行各业，培养了无数的基层骨干。 从农村的党支部书记，到工矿企业的保卫部门，解放军的退伍军人是中国社会的组织者和守卫者。 邓小平让军队经商，军队开始腐败，军队干部开始腐败，农村子弟参军，要花十几万元人民币打点才能当上兵。 邓小平对美国搞投降主义，让大量美国的特务以外教的身份渗透中国大学和中国社会，最终酿成八九六四的惨剧，不得不动用解放军镇压。 邓小平动用人民解放军，对反对自己的大学生开枪，实际上已经宣布了其政策的破产。 邓小平对人民军队造成的伤害，也是任何外敌都没法做到的。 如果不是张爱萍将军抵制，力挽狂澜，以壮士断腕的雷霆手段，结束了军队经商的政策，人民军队的命运就会断送在邓贼手中。 今天中国军队高级将领大面积腐败的问题，也是邓小平让军队经商的恶政的后果之一。对这个问题绝不能掉以轻心。 中共中央应该旗帜鲜明的清算邓小平的流毒。 

二零二六年八月十二日去世的朱镕基，可以说是邓小平时代的典型代表。毛泽东时代他被打成右派，尽管他的讣告里没有提到这一点，他也是被走资派吹捧比较多的人之一。 他活到九十八岁。 老百姓应该问一下，他是怎么做到的，无非是享受无上限的医疗保障，无上限的安全食品保障，和其他无上限的健康安全保障。 而正是因为这位所谓铁面无私的总理推动的企业改革政策， 造成大量国营企业破产，超过五千万国营企业职工下岗，失去谋生的工作，许多人家庭妻离子散，无家可归，好多国营企业的下岗女工，沦为卖淫女，成千上万的妇女儿童被拐卖，毒品泛滥，黑社会泛滥。 这位总理推行的房地产改革，造成房价暴涨，房地产业发展失衡，占用大量的农地，许多烂尾工程，沦为建筑垃圾，危害中国未来发展的前途。 这位总理推行的医疗改革，结果让中国人民看不起病，吃不起药，医生要红包，病人家属送红包，这种违反医德的社会风气。这位总理推行的教育改革，关闭了大量的农村高中，初中，小学，让农民的子弟，上不起学，由于大量的农村高中，初中，小学被关闭，农民不得不背乡离井，搬到县城去，以便孩子能就近上学，其后果是大部分农民离开农村，大量农村房子被遗弃，大量农田被抛荒。

朱镕基当年有一句口号，要准备一百口棺材，九十九口给贪官，一口留给自己。结果是他任命的所有的银行行长，包括他们的跟班们，都进了监狱。 这些人都是大贪，几个亿几十亿的大贪，但没有一个被杀，可见朱镕基对贪官们是手下留情的。 我认识新加坡中国银行的前副行长，多次在新加坡接待过中国银行业的高管，也到中国的上海，北京，跟朱镕基提拔培养的中国各大银行的行长们接触过。 朱氏培养的这些行长们及其手下的贪腐，让我这位新加坡朋友惊诧不已。 投资赚了是自己的，赔了是国家的。接待外宾时放淫秽电影，招待规格无比奢华。还有这位前总理的公子，朱云松亚成为亚洲首富，这跟邓小平何其相似奈尔？中国的老百姓，应该问一下邓小平家族，温家宝家族，朱镕基家族，是如何变成超级富豪的。

         毛泽东时代敢对贪官下狠手。 为什么？首先毛泽东本人及其战友的家人带头清廉，不占国家和人民的便宜。 连在人民大会堂开会时喝一杯绿茶，都要按规定缴纳两毛钱。 毛主席住的房子，用的家具，都按规定缴纳租金，占去他的工资的四分之一还多，他每月工资四百多元，他的房租和家具的租金却高达一百一十多元。为了防止腐败，毛主席在一九五一年开展三反运动，高级干部刘青山，张子善，原天津地委书记和专员贪污腐败被揭发，尽管有许多人为他们求情，毛主席还是毫不犹豫的于一九五二年二月十日对其执行死刑。 正如毛主席所说，杀他们以挽救成千上万的干部。为了防止干部脱离群众，搞贪污腐败，毛主席采取了一系列的措施，干部参加劳动，与人民群众实现三同，同吃同住同劳动。 干部要定期下乡跟农民施行三同。 文化大革命中，每个党政机关都设立了“五七干校”，各级干部轮流到干校锻炼，连他自己的小女儿李讷也不例外。 这些措施保护了成千上万的国家干部。 我们国家的开国将帅一千六百一百一十四人，没有一人因为贪污腐败出问题。 

邓小平上台以来，中国官员几乎无官不贪。 我在农村考察时采访过的县长，乡镇，自己都坦白说，按照毛主席的标准，自己应该被枪毙一百回。有些农民说，如果把所有的官员都枪毙，一百人当中可能会冤枉一两个。 但如果隔一个枪毙一个，那就会让大量贪官逃脱。 中国社会的各种乱象，如毒食品，毒酒，毒烟，毒品，黑社会泛滥，娼妓泛滥，等诸多涉及民生的问题，都跟贪官污吏分不开的。 毛主席曾经说过，治国就是治吏。一个国家不能管住官吏，一个国家就不可能治理好。毛泽东时代之所以是人类历史上最成功，最美好的社会，就是因为国家干部治理的好。 官员不敢贪，不想贪，没有机会贪。 他们生活在群众之间，一样的房子，一样的社区，孩子上同样的学校。 他们的一言一行，他们的子女的穿戴用度，一言一行，都在群众的监督之下。

习近平总书记二零一二年上位以来，高举反贪的大旗。每年有大量的干部因贪污腐败被调查，被判刑。 但是腐败问题不但没有解决，而且有越来越严重的趋势，人数越来越多，涉及的金额越来越高。 仅二零二五年一年，就有上百万官员被处分，其中有大量的中管干部和高级将领，据有人估计，这些贪官污吏盗窃国家的资产在二十二万亿美元以上，其中大量的财富已被转移境外。 这些贪官污吏的存在永远是一个不安定的因素，特别是军队高级将领的腐败，对中国社会的长治久安是一个严重的潜在威胁。据统计，反贪运动以来，被处置的上将已经高达五十七位之多。 这是多么可怕的一个数字。  中国政府和中国人民对这个问题的严重性不能掉以轻心。

邓小平当年信誓旦旦的说，实践是检验真理的标准。 现在经过四十多年的社会实践的检验，邓小平的所谓的改革开放，已经彻底破产。即使按邓小平自己定下的标准，他的改革开放也是一条邪路，一条死路。他的摸着石头过河的胡乱改革，造成贫富分化，导致贪官污吏的大量出现，使黑社会泛滥，让已经灭绝三十多年的卖淫嫖娼，毒品泛滥再次出现，被新中国消灭了的拐卖儿童妇女的罪恶，因为邓小平的改革再次泛滥成灾。 

四十多年的社会实践，彻底的教育了中国人民。邓小平的倒行逆施证明了毛主席的正确。 以习近平为首的中共中央，应该及时的把握历史时机， 及时的总结历史经验， 对过去四十多年的历史作出一个令人信服的历史决议，为中国今后的发展指出一条光明大道。 这是习近平为首党中央的历史责任，也是包括全球华人在内的中国人民的呼声。 

四、

历史的见证

老董

毛主席逝世半个世纪后，资本主义空前鼎盛，美国强权霸主肆无忌惮为所欲为，猖狂不可一世，全球被压迫的弱势国家和人民眼中注视中国，因为中国是唯一能制衡美国的力量。

但今天的中国，已不是毛主席的中国，今天的社会，已变成一个金权的社会。中国今天之所以能强大，是毛主席的遗产；中国今天之所以仍为众望所归，还是依靠毛主席的余荫。

恰恰在今年，美国的艾伦·格林斯潘和中国的朱镕基同时去世。这二人在了解世纪之交的全球金融霸权资本的兴衰上是别无他选的代表人物。格林斯潘在美国金融霸权资本历史演变上所扮演的是头牌主角，成也萧何，败也萧何。这已经是西方主流经济的公认：格林斯潘是2008次贷危机的罪魁祸首；朱镕基在中国资本化的过程中，所扮演的角色，也是独一无二的。他是1999年签署加入世界贸易组织完成彻底出卖国家经济主权的条约的中方经手者。

换句话说，朱镕基是美国霸权征服全球表态最后也最大的中国的投降条约的当事者。这个条约的签订，以中国等于说是二十世纪结束人类历史上第一个全球一统霸权的加冕皇冠，让华尔街的经融买办得意忘形，大发特发，让当时美联储头子格林斯潘上升到全球经济最高一人的地位。

今年去世的朱镕基，他所扮演的则是现代李鸿章的角色，亦即卖国投降协定的签署人。如果所签协定能够得到贯彻，那今天的中国金融市场，就全是美元折算，人民币变成美元的地区货币。

朱镕基自以为毕生荣幸的，一是当时在白宫南草坪受到的最高待遇；一是能有资格和格林斯潘对话。在朱当政期间，华尔街金融对中国的要求，最重要的管道就是格-朱直线。白宫南草坪的接待。如果不是中国换了总理，又加上2008年的美元投机下的全球金融危机，那今天的中国早已失去经济主权，后果是不堪设想的。

谨以当年发表的一篇谴责朱镕基的旧文，作为历史的见证。

（以下附件1999年5月以笔名秦潼发表）

此气无计可消除，弯下膝头，献上缠头 －－评朱镕基访美

秦潼

一、消气有术

在科索沃硝烟弥漫，在美国国内就间谍、捐款、人权、贸易差等的反

华气氛下，中国总理朱镕基依然如期反美。临行之前，朱向记者解释，此行旨

在给美国人消消气。此语一出，让人莫名其妙：中美到底是什么关系，为何受

气的中国的总理需要躬身前去给出气的美国消气？莫非朱一时说漏了嘴？但看

来也不象，因为他一说再说，甚至把消气说成他访美的主要目的。为了向海外

华人释疑，朱特别说明，美方对中国有气，半是误会，半是天方夜谭。似乎，

凭朱鼓如簧之舌，定可教美国"误会"冰释，"怒气"烟消。难道，朱会天真如此

？非也。朱确有"下情上禀"的诚意，但这只是朱的明招。私下里，朱腰缠重礼

，到时相机献上。"万金博一笑"，这是朱的暗招。一明一暗，何愁美方不转嗔

为笑。当然，朱也可入宝山而不空手，带一纸世贸入关许可荣归。

一个消气，换回一个入关，朱镕基访美成竹在胸。且看，朱镕基总理

从四月六日至十四日的六城九天奔波，是否不虚此行。

二、入关谈判

     中国要求入世贸关（前身为国际关税协约）长达十三年。这期间的入

关谈判尽显出中国政府对外政策的近视和官员的颟顸。中国入关图的只是眼前

的好处：最惠国待遇，而毫不考虑入关规则、条件、协议、条文在战略和结构

上的长远影响。事实上，中国本身，不论政治经济，不论内政外交，除了一个

成长指标外，根本就没有任何长期的战略部署和策略运用。中国的紧追最惠国

待遇不舍，早已被美国看透。美国用最惠国待遇，牢牢钓住中国，每年国会重

新通过。中国为求一劳永逸，一次入关取得永远最惠国待遇，因此将入关视为

国家的首要目标。中国自己诉苦，为了入关，一再降低关税、开放进口，每次

都以为可以入关，每次被唬弄。最严重的是1993、94年的知识产权谈判。以吴

仪作为中方代表，同以肯特、白西芙为首的美方签下了一个十足的丧权卖国条

约：专利、软件、光碟、电影和录象完全依从美国定的规则；中国政府承认并

维护美方在华的知识产权；中国地方政府有义务按美方规定，协同美方在华代

表，定期和突击检查非法翻盗软件、光碟、录像等“侵”权行为；美方通过中

方代理有权照会当地，执行搜查、起诉、销毁等等。此一协议，中方所让出的

知识权益，为国际所未有，远远超过欧洲、日本。今天，知识产权的重要性远

超过物资产权。中国的让步，所出卖的民族利益之大，难以估计。而签约的吴

仪，却在中国被称为“铁娘子”，只是因为她在公开场合说了一两句硬话。一

个卖国的官员，却被捧为外交上的硬派里手，中国官员颟顸无能到何地步！

     中国一而再地上当，直到1997，98年，入关热才少冷。曾几何时，又

突然急不及待。何以故？

     很能说明问题的，是朱镕基启程赴美之前，接受华尔街日报访问时的

谈话。他表示，中国让步已经够多，但不是乞讨入世贸。争取了十三年没入，

还不是过得好好的。如果照中国国内对官方报道的解读方式，“不是乞讨”应

读为“是乞讨”；“让得够多”应读为“让得不够”；“过得好好”应读为“

过得不好”。事实上，美方的谈判对手就是如此理解的，他们这样理解是有原

因的：早在一月，朱镕基写信给美国联邦储备银行总裁格林斯潘，提出中国将

以农业、电讯、银行、保险等方面的大幅度开放（并列举了细节）换取进入世

贸。希望格林斯潘促成此事。美方一接信息，贸易代表白西芙立即飞赴北京，

进行谈判。从一月到四月，进展惊人。所以，到底谁急，彼此心中有数。中国

冷了不过一年，又着急如此，美方当然得寸进尺，无限提价。至于说，中国急

些什么，说到底，还是继续奋斗，锲而不舍，不入关誓不罢休，外冷内热，沉

不住气。但是，还有客观情况的变化，其中包括中国面临的经济问题、美国的

心战和朱本人打的算盘。中国的经济动力，逐年倒向外贸、外资，内部启动马

力日小，效率日低。去年经济停滞，大量资金外逃，贬值压力最大时，一个月

资金外流四百亿，相当全年的外来投资。政府一年的举债，超过以前五年总和

。等到今年一月结算，98年出口零增长，外资到位逐月递减时，整个中央慌了

手脚。同时，西方的金融市场，为报复广信倒债事件，有意降低中国的信用，

基本上停止了发行中方债券、股票。同时，西方经济学家众口一致断定中国金

融危机严重，一发将不可收拾。一群颟顸的领导手足无措时，手掌经济大权的

朱镕基，作为亲西方买办势力的当然代表，抓住时机，推销入关，请国际资本

集团的救兵。等到朱镕基向格林斯潘发出信息，美国官方一见鱼儿上钩，更放

出空气，世贸的入会，将改为五年一审，今年不入，要再等五年，台湾也可能

先入世贸；接着，美国国内大炒间谍、人权，给中国加压。压力越大，朱镕基

正可藉此向中央增加价码，双方更易成交。事实上，朱确是如此做的，据他自

己说，他是等到江泽民、钱其琛出国访问回来，由中央谈好底线后，才赴美谈

判的。所以，一般人认为最不合适的情况，却是对朱最有利的时候，这就无怪

朱力排众议，坚持访美了。

一分厚礼，几番周折

     根据朱访美的日程安排，4月6日抵洛杉矶，8日华盛顿先同克林顿谈判

好入关，以后的六天到丹佛、芝加哥、纽约和波士顿，飞加拿大。朱动身之前

，中方代表龙永图先来，与美方代表白西芙进行最后阶段谈判。朱一下飞机，

就给加州州长一分厚礼：中国开放美国西太平洋岸的小麦、橘类水果的进口。

从日程安排来看，朱把世贸谈判放在最前，是估计谈判成功后可宽心游览。美

国的舆论，以纽约时报为代表，也已指出让中国进入世贸组织的战略意义：使

中国纳入全球经济及一个监管全球贸易的法律规则组织，并帮助树立朱镕基的

权威。所以，朱镕基从洛杉矶启程飞华盛顿的那天，新华社以阳光灿烂的春天

来预示朱谈判的成功。

     但是，4月8日朱镕基在华盛顿谈判的这天，却是以朱的气急败坏、面

无人色，愁云密布的景象出现，克林顿宣布谈判不成。朱当时沮丧以极，连呼"bad day!"

。而让朱更下不了台的是，美国单方公布了谈判的内容和中国让步的程度。美

国的商界、学界和舆论界都一致表示，中国的让步让人吃惊。特别是在电子通

讯方面，容许美国公司在中国可直接进入行动电话、因特网市场，中国连最敏

感的政治监控都不在考虑之中了。如此，朱镕基的底牌曝光，当初何以信心十

足，现在何以如丧考妣也就昭然若揭。原来，朱的算盘，是打在他的让步条件

上。这就是美国人作生意时常说的：条件好到对方无法拒绝。朱的口袋里装的

全是美方梦寐之所求，到最后一分钟由他本人拿出，焉得不成？但始料不及，

美方居然还嫌不够。算盘落空，条件又被公开，朱何以交代！朱立即指责美方

不应单方发布未通过的条文。为了照顾朱的处境，克林顿同朱镕基发表了一个

一般性没有具体内容的联合声明。朱在极端沮丧之下，乞求资本家救兵。朱本

是资本家众望所归，让步确实已经到底。要求过分，激起中国国内反响，连现

在这样条件都不可能。于是，美国的商界、此次谈判中获利最大的高科技、保

险业等，向白宫施加压力。谈判又有了转机。垂头丧气了两天的朱镕基，脸上

又浮起笑容。到了离美前夕，他声称，协议已完成了百分之九十九，克林顿总

统和他电话长谈，问他愿意现在立即签约，还是回北京签。他答说，北京签。

这时，朱摆出的是胜利凯旋的高姿态。几番周折，朱的访美宣告圆满成功。但

是，一个多月过去了，双方在北京仍继续“谈判”，使人怀疑，朱当初又怎么

能“立即签约”？

新二十一条

     朱到底让步到何地步？美方何以仍嫌不足？

     协议没有完成，没有最后定案。美方公布的内容，是向国内商界交代的，

注明那些已定，那些未定；中方除了抗议美方擅自发布外，并不否认任何一项

。根据公布的内容来看，这是继知识产权协议后，中国政府进一步在重大的经

济领域中，实行民族利益和主权的整批出卖。这个出卖，并不只是关税的大幅

度降低、进口保护的放松和取消，而且还涵盖检验的标准、规则的判定、范畴的定义、执行的方式方法、市场的完全和直接开放、相关行业的开放、销售网络的开放、非市场经济成分，包括国营企业、国家股份企业等，有关反保护的界定，这些涉及国家更根本的经济主权、政治主权。从经济的战略领域来说，中国国民立足的农业，现代尖端工业的电子、通讯、网络、高科技，和资本主义的最高领域的金融业中的银行保险结汇，均拱手让人。如果把上次的知识产权协议合在一起，美国基本上除了股市外已实现打入中国的战略设计。事实上，如果不是亚洲金融危机，中国早已决定开放股市。朱镕基无法让国内同意部分开放股市，是不能谈成的一大原因。克林顿内阁最重要的成员，财政部长鲁宾最初几天表现冷淡，说明了此一情况。朱到纽约，立即同时拜访格林斯潘和鲁宾，大概达成了一些谅解，克林顿也改变了态度。朱在离美前，还特意说：我几年前，就提议开放股票、银行、保险，当时国内还有人骂我是卖国贼。这当然是向华尔街保证，朱是坚决主张股市开放的，等过了风头，他的支票还是会兑现的。

     如此出卖国家民族利益的行为，无怪乎被中国留学生称为新二十一条

。如果我们考虑时代的背景，1999年朱镕基谈判的协议，其严重性不下于1914

年袁士凯的二十一条。

     袁的二十一条出卖民族经济利益，除了旅顺、大连的99年租借权外，

就是汉冶萍公司的中日合办，以及铁路承建权和开矿权。汉冶萍是当时中国唯

一的钢铁、焦炭国营公司，是中国洋务运动的最大投资，中国工业的命脉，中

日合办就是让日本控制中国的基础工业；铁路承建是让日本掌握中国运输动脉

；开矿权当然是夺取中国的自然资源。

     朱镕基在谈判中出让的电子通讯业和金融业，却是中国为国家必须掌

握的最尖端的信息工业，其重要性超出袁世凯时代的钢铁、煤矿工业；行动电

话和网络被称为信息超级公路；其重要性更远较当时的铁路为大。说到汽车、

高科技关税的让步，和小麦、肉类的开放，在旧二十一条中还无相当者。袁的

让步是为了取得日本的支持，朱的让步除了由于中共领导颟顸之外，不能不令

人感觉，朱也是为了取得美国的支持。这一点，美方从不隐瞒其意图。以如此

大的国家民族利益，用来交换进入世贸，朱当然以为美方收此厚礼，必定怒气

化为乌有了。

三、奴颜婢膝

     厚礼已经献上，朱又是如何兑现他消除“误会”的支票的？

     朱镕基访美期间两次接受电视访问，一次PBS，一次CNN，另外还在 MIT

发表重要演说。这三场可说是朱以国家总理代表中国面向美国人民的主要对话

。三次谈话，内容相差无几，主要是谈科索沃，间谍，政治捐款，人权，贸易

差几项。让我们看看，朱镕基总理是如何应对的：

科索沃事件

     科索沃的轰炸，是赤裸裸的武力干预内政。美国同北约的借口，也是

最不成其为理由的。美国的根据，是在法国仑布列举行的会议。会议由美国出

面，协调南斯拉夫政府同科索沃的科索沃解放军（简称科解）停火并商讨科索

沃恢复自治的事项。南斯拉夫未出席，科解出席但未未签字。这是一个没有当

事人参与的“协议”，直到美内部已作出动武打算后，才又让科解签字，从而

胁迫南斯拉夫遵守。南斯拉夫政府怎会遵守一个自己没有签字的协议？北约却

藉此轰炸，既不经联合国通过，也不要求俄国或其他国家协商调解，擅自行动

。此一轰炸，将国际关系倒退到二次大战前的帝国主义强权时代。国际上一片

反对之声。对中国而言，这表示美国口说“战略伙伴”，实际在国际大事上根

本无视世界第一人口大国的存在，而且，此例一开，互不干涉内政的国际基本

原则受到破坏，岂不是任何国家国内的民族分离运动都可向美国要求干预？科

索沃事件上其他国家都看着中国的态度，台湾，西藏的分离分子也注意中国是

否敢同美国相抗。因此，中国必须在美国同南斯拉夫双方有所选择，明确表态

，不容许丝毫立场模糊暧昧不清。

照说，中国的第一步行动，就是取消朱的访美，表示中国的不满。中

国内部确有此种意见，海外的中国学生学者也提出同样建议。但是，朱却坚持

访美。既然要来，也就应作好准备，以有力的论证，令人信服的资料，说明中

国的立场，争取美国人民的了解。在电视上谈话，一方面作为国家总理不能失

去立场，另一方面，面对美国人民，摆事实讲道理。但朱是怎么回答记者的问

题的：

中国的态度：“国内因科索沃事反对我来，我同他们说我要来”；

中国为什么反对美国？“江泽民主席已说过了，不应干涉他国内政。”

中国是否站在南斯拉夫方面反对北约？“我们只是就事论事。”

中国知道南斯拉夫在科索沃实行“种族清洗”吗？“我不知道到底发生了什么

事。我看到的有两种说法：一种是讲武装冲突；一种是讲南斯拉夫镇压科索沃

的阿尔巴尼亚少数民族。我无法判断那种说法正确。”

科索沃传来的报道，你认为可靠吗？“欧布莱特国务卿说要给我材料看，我还

未看到，不能判断。”

为何反对武装干预？“所有的战争都没有好结果”

     以上这些问题照说是很好的机会，朱可以藉此指出：中国反对北约的

擅自出兵，是因为这破坏了国际间对联合国的不尊重，中国一向反对国家或集

团自封国际警察；中国一向主张，互不侵犯互不干涉内政的原则是国际间唯一

可以用来建立国际秩序，维持国际和平的基础，只能在这一基础上，通过第三

者、区域组织和联合国等国际公认的组织以协商、谈判、仲裁、制裁等步骤促

成解决。经济和军事制裁更需谨慎，因为受害者是当地无辜的平民。朱可以引

用许多材料，例如联合国农粮组织报告地数据：对伊拉克禁运造成当地妇孺因

营养不良、医药短缺每年十多万的数字作为人民受害的佐证；朱可以用中国受

列强干预的惨痛历史，说明中国人民对外力干涉内政的坚决反对。对于“种族

清洗”，朱应指出，这不能任意定义，任意用作干涉他国的借口。朱可以引用

国际上的许多材料，例如中国和其他非当事者在科的采访报道，表示并不认为

南斯拉夫在科实行了种族清洗政策；朱还可以引用著名的孵婴器事件（科威特

驻美大使的女儿，在美国国会，伪称是科威特的医院工作者，亲眼看到伊拉克

占据科威特时，在医院将孵婴器的幼儿拿出害死。此一作证导致美国会通过出

兵伊拉克），说明个别见证并不见得可靠。朱可就西方对不同国家的种族问题

，前后不一致的作法，指出“种族清洗”并不能解释当前现象，而是有其他利

害考虑；朱还可就当前的世界现实，说明武装干预不但不能消弭纷争，反使纷

争扩大，对当事者不利，对世界和平不利。这次北约出兵，连政治解决的途径

都未用完，只有更加激怒南斯拉夫的人民，让问题更难解，仇恨更加深，中国

当然反对。

     美国师出无名，根本站不住脚。而朱的访问回答，却理不直气不壮，

那里象一个大国的总理，反倒象二流的推销员，生怕得罪了顾客，进世贸会受

阻。因此，一方面是国内的严正声明，官方报道的南斯拉夫反侵略士气如虹；

另一方面则是朱总理的“我不知道，材料不够”。中国到底有没有立场？为何

首鼠两端，又不喜美国的跋扈，又怕得罪美国；又口说南斯拉夫人民同仇敌忾

，又担心北约得逞后自己不好下台。乡愿到“只是就事论事”！也难怪，连在

国内的南斯拉夫问题专家，也批评中国总理朱镕基在访美时太少发表中国对科

索沃问题的看法。内外言行的不一致，中国被认为是一个见人说人话，见鬼说

鬼话，在国际上软弱无能到了极点的“大国”。如果中国真心想减少当地人民

的受战祸之苦，就应该以大国的身份积极参与国际事务，抵制美国霸权，主动

寻求各种外交途径，联合其他国家，找出反对北约出兵、缓解科索沃冲突的其

他方案。中国应该检讨，自己并不是没有力量在国际上有所作为，如果海湾战

争时，中国能顶住压力，不让安理会通过授权美国出兵，今天伊拉克也不会让

美国任意轰炸；如果中国能争取开放食品、医疗不得禁运，又可以活多少生命

。正是听任美国为所欲为，才使其得寸进尺，公然踢开联合国，以北约为世界

警察。

     过去一向将政府同人民分开的中国，今天的总理，看不到，在美国的

官、商、媒体之外，还有美国人民。去年美国因检查伊拉克生化武器而出兵时

，政府的三大要员：国务卿、国防部长、国家安全会顾问在俄亥俄州作公关，

被大学生质问得下不了台，从此国家官员不敢在校园辩论政策。正是在朱访美

之际，美国的各大校园，展开对科索沃问题的讨论。坚决反对北约动武的乔姆

斯机和萨以在纽约哥大演讲时，因满场而无法入内的学生一直不散。美国人民

中的有识之士并不赞成政府的作法。这正是中国重新争取美国人民的机会，而

朱总理，害怕得罪的是那样的美国人民？

     科索沃事件是是当前国际政治上最重要的事件，也是中国恢复国际地

位的转机。朱镕基此时访美，已经是对北约侵略的默许，而他面对着美国民众

，柔弱无骨，含糊暧昧，又一次表现中国的口是心非，丧失了中国总理的立场

。美国的报界自然对朱击节赞赏：朱有兴趣的是经济，他同江泽民不同，江多

少还要就政治、意识形态等辩解，朱是完全实际，所有这些都避免不谈。

间谍事件

     国家同国家之间，彼此收集情报，或公开或秘密，彼此心照不宣。古

已有之，于今为烈。欧美国家歌颂特务间谍，已成为文化的组成部分。自己国

家的失密，是极不光彩之事。不论真假，彼此指控彼此否认，你来我往。美国

近来最有名的间谍案是中央情报局机要人员 Pollard长期提供国家绝密情报给

以色列。有意思的是，去年克林顿邀请巴勒斯坦的阿拉法特和以色列的那坦亚

乎到大卫营谈判时，那坦亚乎居然以释放 Pollard作为谈判的条件，克林顿虽

未答应，但同意考虑。这么大一个间谍案，并未造成反以色列风潮，反而是以

色列向美国讨价。

     对于中国，美国却在一个李文和事件上大作文章。这个事件，李唯一

的“罪状”，就是违反能源部规章，大概早在八十年代有那么一次，到中国去

后，未提出报告。李文和已被监视几年，没有发现任何不轨行为，李被利福摩

实验室以违章开除，至今也未被起诉。美国约于95年，根据潜伏在中国的间谍

的报告，发现中国已有能力制造核子微型弹头，就硬指中国的技术，来自李所

提供的美国W88最先进机密。70-80年代的技术，中国到95年能做到，有什么稀

奇？中国当年也不过四年的时间，就自己作出了当时最先进技术的原子弹。现

在反而说偷了情报，还要十多年才作出来微型弹头！所以，无论就事实就道理

，都十分不通。美国的指控，来源于中国内部美方间谍，表示美国在中国从事

间谍活动是实，却反指中国在美国从事间谍活动。美国如此大闹，含有多重目

的，除开内部两派斗争，以及反华势力借题发挥外，还藉此增加世贸谈判的价

码，但最恶劣的用心，是把中国的成果，宣传为从美国的剽窃。正象50年代，

把苏联的原子弹设计说成是间谍 Rosenberg夫妇提供的，其栽诬手法无异指鹿

为马，但Rosenberg夫妇因此丧命。

     所以，对中国而言，间谍指控是变相侮辱，事关国家尊严，没有任何

解释答辩的必要。作为国家总理，应该反驳说：你们国家内部自己调查的事，

我们无意过问。如果涉及我们中国，应当循正当的外交途径提出照会。中国将

根据照会向美方答复。既未照会，而媒体却大事渲染中国窃密，是很不负责很

不礼貌的行为。另外，把我们中国的成就说成是向别国的剽窃，这已构成对我

们国家的侮辱。美中友好关系的基础在于彼此的尊重，希望美方注意这一点。

     而朱镕基，他是如此回答这个问题的：我不知道，我确实不知道；我

特别问过江泽民，他也毫不知情；江还问过军方，军方也不知情；我们愿意同

美方合作，协助美方调查清楚；如果美国同意让我们调查，我们也同意让美方

调查；中国根本没有窃取美国情报的间谍活动；美国科技这么先进，还可能泄

密？我当了四十年的总工程师，我的工厂的高级技术没有一件是美国的；我现

在一听到？？就怕，等等。

     朱镕基自作聪明，作无力的辩解：我不知道，江不知道，军方不知道

。这样的解说是什么意思？这是典型的官僚推卸责任的手法，给人的印象是：

他在逃避问题。朱还怕解释不够，更进一步答应协助美方调查。有谁听说过，

国家的总理居然自动要同对方国家合作，调查本国盗窃他国情报事？意思是说

，上面没偷，要偷是下面擅自作的！朱镕基协助调查，到底是作中国的官，还

是美国的官？协助调查正是彻头彻尾的丧权辱国。如果说，这只是外交辞令，

把国家的主权儿戏，并给人以口是心非之感，这岂不是丧失国格吗！朱镕基越

说越荒唐，最后，索性说中国没有任何对美间谍活动，表明清白无辜。朱要美

国人相信，中国根本不收集美国情报。如果你国家不收集外国的情报，发生大

事如何准备，这样的国家领导，不是颟顸误国吗？国家总理，把国家大事、国

际关系拿来胡说八道，不是丢全中国人的脸吗！朱还可笑到没话找话说，自称

当了四十年的总工程师，工厂没有美国高级技术。朱不是50年代被打成右派，60

、70年代文革下放，何来四十年总工程师履历？70年代前被美围堵，谈什么美

国技术？无论如何，这些话根本文不对题。朱卖弄聪明、自以为是的笑话，俯

拾皆是。朱被捧成精明强干，别的看不出，倒有几分当年旧上海的小开的气味。

捐款、人权

     谈到政治捐款，美国越来越变成金钱政治，向其傀儡看齐。印尼、台

湾出生的政治肩客精于此道者不乏其人，置此时际，当然如鱼得水。这些人在

美国、亚洲间两边拉拢，从中渔利，根本也不是政府行为，大概中间牵扯了中

国的高干子弟。所有对中国的指控，都是捕风捉影，毫无凭据。朱镕基本来可

简单指出，都是无稽之谈，中国早已否认。但朱又自作聪明，相当得意的说，

如果中国政府真要参与，手笔怎会只区区三十万美元，中国的外汇存底有一千

四百亿。这也算理由？你这次30万美元，下次可能就三百万美元，谁晓得？朱

总理大概不晓得，有些话，是不适宜出自国家领导之口的。

     说到人权，这是西方对付今天中国政权的法宝。也只有象现在中共这

样脓包的，为了讨好西方，与美国建立“战略伙伴”，装模作样在政治人权公

约上签了字。那知，这是美国有意布下的圈套。中国一签，海外、国内就展开

组党。此时，正值国内工人下岗、农民闹事，百姓反贪官污吏，经济危机等问

题一总爆发，中共霎时慌了手脚。稳定压倒一切，大抓重判，其借口之无理，

判刑之重，自己也很难辩解。照中共官方的说法，这不是政治人权是颠覆政府

，这样强词夺理当然说不通。朱镕基的方法是，承认中国有人权不足之处，但

是，希望美国人应看到，中国在人权上已经改进许多，假以时日，会达到标准

。朱的回答，等于是承认了西方的人权定义和标准，承认中国过去为了对付美

国所作的关于人权解释是假的。朱所要求的是，美国对中国的人权要求，不要

操之过急。也就是说，朱以向西方投降的方式，换取谅解。又是用丢国家的面

子，换自己的面子。

耐克经验

     从以上的谈话，怎么也看不出朱解释了什么“误会”或反驳了什么“

天方夜谭”，反倒教人感觉象中国法庭中受审者的“答辩”：不是含混过关，

能赖就赖，就是表悔过之心，祈高抬贵手。朱唯一能解释的了的“误会”，是

关于中美贸易差额的问题。在双方贸易问题上，朱是花了功夫有备而来的。

     朱最得意的，就是用关于耐克球鞋的“调查研究”，说明中国在贸易

出超上，被美方错怪了。谈其他问题，他躲躲闪闪，诉苦“舌头起茧”；谈耐

克调查，却是津津乐道。他从去年讲到进年，从国内讲到国外，大概因为无人

反驳，以为无懈可击。这次访美，一下飞机，他就同当地官员讲了个把小时，

离美之前最后的大轴MIT演说，又对耐克一事作了 “解释”如下：

     中国向美国的出口，绝大部分，百分之七十以上是加工贸易。。。。

中国的增值微乎其微。中国向美国的出口，实际上是日本韩国、台湾、香港、

新加坡向美国出口的转移。他们的劳动力成本太高，因此把原材料和零件转移

到中国来生产，然后出口美国，所以，他们对美贸易顺差减少了。

     我在1987担任中国国家经济委员会常务副主任时，对这个问题做过调

查。我调查了出口美国的运动鞋，耐克、阿迪达斯、锐步，这些运动鞋在中国

生产出口到美国来。因为这些工厂最多设在中国沿海的福建省，我在福建作了

调查。当时，福建的工厂，主要是台湾厂家办的，每双鞋出厂价格二十美元，

美国零售价格是一百二十美元。当时，我调查了这家工厂，这二十美元给重活

工人留下的，就是二美元。但是，从全年来说，可以养活两个工人。其他的原

材料，有的来自日本，有所来自美国，其中那个主要的气垫就值两美元，来自

美国，也许是个专利。所以看的很清楚，在美国卖一百二十美元，在中国出口

价只二十美元，中国只得到二美元，但是，确实养活了我们的工人，这是对中

国有利的。这是1987年的情况，现在呢？

     最近，我会见了一位台湾的鞋业大王。据他讲，全世界的运动鞋，他

的销售额第一，他的鞋都是在中国生产的。我问他，现在的情况跟1987年相比

怎么样？他说差不多。这次，我到美国以后，派我地秘书到芝加哥的各个百货

公司调查鞋子价钱。我发现你们美国商店卖的耐克、阿迪达斯、锐步，平均价

格是八十到一百二十元，跟当时差不多，便宜一点。把名牌拉开一看，都是MADE IN CHINA。所以，很清楚，这种劳动密集性的产品你们美国不会生产，从别的国家买很贵，只有在中国生产价廉物美，对美国人民是有利的，对我们中国也有好处，可增加就业。但是，其中大部分的价值都是别的国家对美国出口的价值的转移。所以，我很赞成你们 MIT一位著名教授保罗库格曼，我经常看他很有见解的

一些文章。他有一篇文章，就如此说：这不说明中国的市场不开放，是日本的

市场不开放。

     朱的一番大道理想证明的是什么？如果想证明中国进口造成美国物价

便宜，那以耐克为例，十分不妥。那些99分商店的中国制造才确实便宜，耐克

球鞋并未因在中国制造而便宜。一百多美元的球鞋谈何价廉？工资压低，只使

得利润增高，价格不但不降，反而逐年上升，美国消费者并未受益。朱如果想

说明，区区二十美元的出厂价格，与市面上售价一百多美元相较微不足道，但

这又解释不了双方何以有近六百亿美元的贸易差额。朱如果想证明，钱不是我

赚了，是台湾厂商赚的，那是你国家自愿让利，又和美国何干？朱镕基的十年

调查结果，不过是一个尽人皆知的事实：中国的外贸，实际是替台港、美国的

资本家效力，自己收入可怜。但是，开口闭口都是数字的朱总理，不知是有心

还是无意，却蒙混了一个重要数字：中国的工人每双鞋那来的两美元收入？一

个工人，少说每天也要生产上百双球鞋，如此岂不日入上千美元？中国的外资

加工工厂，特别是台商工厂，对工人的压榨恶名昭彰。工人被关在密不通风、

铁窗钢门的厂房，一天工作至少十二小时，连如厕也限时限次。一月休息最多

两天，每天所得不过两美元上下，每一双鞋只分得几分钱。朱总理把厂商的开

销、红包、地方的好处都算在工人的名义下！一个世界第一人口大国总理，一

个自称工人当家社会主义的共产党的领导，所津津乐道的，是如何引进血汗工

厂，他想说服的对象是谁呢？如果是资本家，那又何需朱多此一举，他们本是

血汗工厂的发明者；若对象是美国的政客，他们的职业就是巧言吝色，朱的辩

解还不到幼稚园程度，如何班门弄斧；如果对象是美国的学界报界，朱自己都

承认，他的论点正是来自他们，又缺乏他们的学术包装。剩下的对象应是工农

、学生和一般市民了。近二十年的全球化，对美国的工人来说，江河日下，处

境日蹙，工厂外移，行业淘汰。工人二十年来的实际工资下降，形成国内的第

三世界化。听到血汗工厂更是气上加气，还说什么消气？对农民和农业工人来

说，耐克经验有何相干？他们想的不是出气，是出路，利用美国的农业相对优

势扩张出口。至于学生和一般市民，不管事的居多，但普遍地对血汗工厂有反

感。如果朱和他的智囊稍微跟踪一下美国的民间活动，也就不会蠢到这个地步

，居然用血汗工厂来争取民意。前两年，美国民间发起杯葛跨国公司利用血汗

工厂牟利的运动，十分成功。运动的缘起，就是和朱镕基据的例子一模一样：

来自宏都拉斯的两个十多岁地女工，全美巡回控诉，其对象为年青人最时髦的GAP

公司。 GAP产品系向拉丁美洲的厂商下定单。在宏都拉斯，这二位女工的工厂

，厂主为台湾商人，勾结当地官员、恶势力，压榨、欺侮女工，卑鄙龌龊的行

为令人发指。工人被虐待凌辱，伤亡迭起，工资一小时一两毛美金。美国的学

生、市民，激于义愤，杯葛GAP商店。之后，揭发一起又一起的血汗工厂事件，

做球鞋的耐克公司也榜上有名。耐克起先以耐克同血汗工厂只是合同关系来卸

责。但最终迫于杯葛压力，同意定下劳工规范，承包工厂必须遵守规范，否则

不予发包。耐克事件记忆犹新，堂堂的中国总理，却在美国名校，大谈耐克经

验。这已经超过了笑话的程度，是十足的替国家丢脸。中国即使不说工人当家

作主，也至少保障工人的合理待遇和工资。中国的作法恰相反，压价倾销劳动

力，实行国际劳动市场的恶性竞争。照朱镕基的逻辑，这是天经地义之事。

朱在国内，以坦率著称。但朱在美的言行，只见谄媚，未见坦率。其

实，朱的“坦率”，不过是“赤裸裸”的代名。他在中国，威福由己，发号司

令惯了，将拍板美其名曰“坦率”；到了美国，极力巴结美方大佬，对美国资

本家惟命是从；在美国媒体前是唯唯诺诺；把美国MIT、HARVARD的经济学者奉

为神明。在他眼中，美国资本家就是美国人民，唯利是图就是人的天性。因此

，朱赤裸裸地展现其势利的本能。朱的出人头地，正是由于”赤裸裸“的彻底！

两眼向上，目无人民

     朱镕基九天六城，仆仆风尘。东西两岸两次会见华人，都误点、延期

。朱忙的是什么？他洛杉矶一下飞机，首先是向州长、市长解释他的耐克贸易

理论，又与狄斯耐总裁艾斯勒单独长谈；在华盛顿，他为世贸组织事心力交瘁

，与国会、商界、政界的大人物晤谈；在丹佛，他要参观早已过了季节的足球

冠军队球场，要学邓小平头戴牛仔帽，接受赠牛，见识西部大农场；在芝加哥

，他不放过替期货市场开市的殊荣；在纽约，不到纳斯得股市不算来美国，他

献牛华尔街，祝牛市年年。拜见掌世界经济牛耳的两大巨头：格林斯潘同鲁宾

，参加纽约财经界一千五百大亨的晚宴，盛况为戈巴乔夫以来所未见；在波士

顿，除了与商政学名流见面之外，要还他拜访麻州理工学院的宿愿，发表他的

学术消气演说。

     对于少数民族黑人、拉美、亚美，对于工运、农运、对于环保、草根

运动组织，进步团体、民间活动，乃至一般市民，朱无暇兼顾。朱的周围，除

了黄脸的中国人外，只见白人；白人之中，除了衣冠楚楚、派头十足的上流人

士外，也无其他闲人插足。朱的眼中，只有钱、权、势。朱在接受记者访问时

，表示中国要永远是社会主义国家，但他还强调，是具有中国特色的。

     目前，自称社会主义国家的所余无几，能够在国际舞台上亮相的有一

大一小：大的中国，小的古巴。中国是发展中国家亲美的榜样，古巴是发展中

国家反美的旗帜。同朱镕基访美表演成强烈对比的是古巴总统卡斯楚来美。几

年前，卡斯楚出席联合国到纽约，纽约市长、州长拒绝招待，多方给以难堪。

但卡的访问，还是新闻的热点，卡斯楚的演说，媒体不得不播。同朱镕基正相

反，卡斯楚的魅力，来自对美国超级大国的昂然不屈，古巴以弹丸之地，近水

之邻，承受了美国从出兵、偷袭、暗杀、破坏到经济灭绝、全面杯葛。古巴不

但不屈，而且在国际上参与一切可能的对美斗争，成为第三世界的英雄，连欧

洲人民都佩服他和古巴的勇气。在美国民间，他所吸引的观众，主流也无法忽

视。卡斯楚一下飞机，第一站就是到哈林区。在水泄不通的大厅，他说道：纽

约的资本家也替他安排了盛宴，但那不过是各打各的利益算盘。只有在这里（

哈林区），我感到回到自己家里一样亲切。朱镕基到了纽约，对哈林区避之唯

恐不及，只有在资本家的千人盛宴上，朱真觉得有宾至如归的无限亲切！

干瘪的幽默，恶心的献媚

     一付扑克脸的朱镕基，在中文媒体中变得机智幽默，在参观白宫林肯

睡房时，朱得意地背诵林肯盖茨堡演说中的“of the people, by the people and for the people

”赢得主人的掌声。从胡耀邦、方毅开始，就流行向外人背西洋名句，最负盛

名的，要数江总书记，以背独立宣言见长。这种无聊的炫耀，一次不少，二次

嫌多。洋人已经广为江泽民宣传过，朱的表演，何等无趣。国家领导，当然也

有个人喜好，但调弄英文，何其浅薄。中国的领导，不见治国的本事不见外交

的纵横，徒逞英语的卖弄，也难怪被洋人看扁。在回答中国男女平等问题上，

朱又搬出亚洲国家千篇一律的“幽默”：中国男女很平等，我家的经济大权全

在夫人手中。朱如果避免正面回答，难道一定要重复这尽人皆知的陈腔滥调？

当然，捧场的观众，又是拍掌哈哈哈。朱的机智幽默如此干瘪，他的献媚却是

真心，非假意。他对美国的先进五体投地。在说到中国威胁时，他不止一次说

：今天中国比美国差了十倍，即使五、六十年，中国还是赶不上美国；中国永

远不会成为美国的威胁，永远是美国的朋友，中国的市场对美国将越来越大。

美国的技术如此先进，还会保不住密？中国领导人，在国内不是象念经似的声

称二十一世纪是中国的世纪吗？怎么在美国人面前就缩成了侏儒呢？

     朱的这些高招，许多人一定感觉似曾相识，因为这都是过去国民党的

外交官标准。因此也难怪与国民党长久渊源的华人传媒，对朱如此赞不绝口。

说句公道话，比起新老国民党的匍匐在地，朱只是弯到膝盖，可算高了一截；

比起国民党官员见了洋人头不敢抬、诚惶诚恐，朱的五六十年赶不上美国也算

有志气了；比起李登辉的模样，朱的侃侃而谈是够体面了。朱是国民党想做而

做不到的榜样，如此，为什么在华侨界、留学生中，客气的说朱太软弱，不客

气的指责为汉奸、卖国贼，也不是无缘无故的了。

细心安排，保护过关

     国民党式的华人媒体的叫好，是气味相投。那怎解释美国传媒的呢？

只有了解此点，才能解答朱为何死不改期的奥妙。我们细心观察，不难发现，

美国从官方到大亨到媒体，极尽分工之妙，对朱照顾备至。朱一上美国领土，

一切反华的高调匿迹；朱一离开，又重新开始。间谍、捐款，甚嚣尘上。怎会

这么巧，原来，朱访美的日子，有意按排在国会休会期，没有反华新。PBS,CNN 等的访问，题目完全一样。而且一反美国记者特有的咄咄逼人，全是点到为止。大概，唯一出朱意料之外的，是CNN在TMD上，多问了一句话：如果美国执意要台湾加入，中国如何反应？朱一时愣住，干笑地说，那我们又能怎么办，只好反对了。朱当时既不敢说硬话，又不敢避不作答，慌张之下，软弱难堪之情，溢于言表。反华的右派暂不出台，民间左派不让见面，朱这场戏，能不轻松？除了戈巴乔夫之外，包括邓小平、江泽民，都没有受到如此厚待。仅此一点

，足以证明，美国在朱身上押下重注。

四、一个历史现象

误国与卖国：国家民族利益揣在囊中，廉价出让

     现在，朱的消气术已经展现无遗，还是老的招数：打不还手，骂不还

口，逆来顺受，有气尽管出。这就是做西方所谓的挨打孩子（whipping boy）

。当然，此招由来久矣，并非朱的发明。朱不过是青出于蓝胜于蓝，传邓小平

衣钵：“韬光养晦，决不当头”。见了美国人，如临深渊，如履薄冰，不能丝

毫唐突。但是，中国这十多年的韬光养晦，怎么还是随时被拿来出气呢？不仅

如此，邓小平早在1980年就用中国军人的生命、中越关系，去替美国“惩罚越

南”，如此血汗功劳，为何换不来将“功”抵“罪”呢？所以，消气哲学本身

是有问题的，越没骨气，越失国格，越被人欺；越是哀求，越是示弱，越遭鞭

笞。中国封建古训，娄师德的“唾面自干”，早已被汉奸、奴才作为乞讨的手

段，卖身的本领。

二十一世纪的李鸿章

     以“消气”作为外交法宝，从朱镕基追溯到邓小平，从邓小平追溯到

蒋介石、汪精卫，直到李鸿章。李鸿章消气的顶峰表现是在日本以身喂虎，吃

了暗杀的子弹。但日本气犹不消，还是将台湾抢去，逼订马关条约。反过来，

消气大师李鸿章发展了“消气治夷”术，用消气的方法以夷治夷，奔走于英美

法德俄日列强之间，为减少对日的损失，乞求英美，除了赔偿日本之外还要回

报英美，如此周而复始，乞怜于列强之间，丧权辱国却引以为荣。成为对外交

涉不可缺少的人物。列强与中国谈判，指名以李鸿章为对手。当年李消气的遗

风，又见诸于今天的朱消气。从表面上看，今天的中国同满清末年的中国怎能

相提并论？今天的朱总理，工程师出身、商学院院长、英文不绝于口，在西方

大资本家中谈笑风生，又那一点象当年剃了头发、戴着花翎、随地吐痰的李大

人呢？如果我们量子跳跃一百多年前，李鸿章的精通洋务只比今天的朱镕基高

明；李鸿章的富国强兵、洋务运动，同今天邓小平、朱镕基的改革开放、市场

经济、赶搭全球化列车，都同样是只见皮相不见实质，只服洋人不信自己的心

态。差别只是不同时代下全球化方式的不同，因此模仿、投降的形式不同。十

九世纪末，李鸿章慑于帝国主义的军威，企图引进洋枪洋炮，仿效西方之路；

邓小平、朱镕基慑于西方的繁荣先进，一头栽向改革开放，引进外资，纳入国

际循环。李想做的是中国特色的资本主义，他的特色是满清王朝体制；邓、朱

想做的也是中国特色的资本主义，其特色是共产党的专政体制。李鸿章的改革

开放是从洋枪洋炮开始，乃至洋教习、洋公司、洋制度；邓小平的改革开放从

洋技术、洋资本开始，到朱镕基的洋管理、洋规则、洋制度。满清政府在军事

上被缴了械；中共政府在经济上高竖白旗。李鸿章是帝国主义指定的交涉对手

；朱镕基是跨国资本家们的宠儿。两个时代对比中，真正具有重大差别的是：

今天中国人民重新建立起民族自尊自信。但是，即使这个优势，也面临危机。

官员的腐败史无前例；人民的自尊自信，判断是非的能力逐渐被改革开放下的

金钱、势利所腐蚀。当然，我们还不能将朱镕基和李鸿章完全等同。朱镕基的

师承，还有以俄为师的另一面。

朱何以得雀屏中选

     国际资本家、西方中国通从1991年朱一上台，就认定他是中国的戈巴

乔夫。这次在纽约，朱又被拿来同戈巴乔夫相比，他自己否认。其实，西方确

有知人之明，但朱的否认也不全是谦虚。朱的此次访美，表明一个新的里程：

中国的戈巴乔夫在国际舞台的亮相大典。资本家眼中的戈巴乔夫，意指在共产

国家的代理人。就这个意义而言，他们没有选江泽民，而选朱镕基，是选对了

人。而朱的否认，却是就角色的性格内容而言，朱、戈的确并不完全相象。

     西方之所以选中朱，照美国的中国问题专家说：因朱是中国最坚决的

走市场经济者，即使朱的作风，还是属于党政官僚的强人作风，说不上民主。

事实上，作美国傀儡的政权，有那一个不是强人式的专政？当初拉丁美洲的两

个民选总统（智利和海地），一个被CIA指使暗杀，一个被CIA伙同军人推翻。

强人是作为美方代理人的重要条件。没有邓小平这一强人，中国可能如此快一

面倒向美国吗？当然，最根本的是能够照顾维护国际资本家的利益，开放国内

市场正是当前跨国资本的意愿。朱镕基正是一他在国内的敢做敢为，不顾一切

地替国际资本铺路，向西方证明了作为代理人的能力。从“交差”此一标准来

说，朱又远胜戈巴乔夫。戈巴乔夫在政治上替西方搞垮了东欧集团和苏联，但

在经济开放上他还相当迟钝。俄国的政经文化全面向西方投降，还需要叶利钦

的继续。

是戈巴乔夫，还是叶利钦

     拿当年苏联的戈巴乔夫、李加切夫、叶利钦同今天中国的江泽民、李

鹏、朱镕基类比，倒有许多相似之处。不论在作风、性格和意识形态上，江戈

、李李、朱叶十分相配。所以说，不能把朱等同于戈巴乔夫。从性格、地位而

言，江应属中国戈巴乔夫的适当人选，江对西方、美国的邀好，不能说象朱如

此赤裸裸，但也只是五十步、百步之差。江的所以落选，是因为他四面想做好

人，变得四面不讨好，没有一面倒的魄力，也没有交差的能力。有朱镕基在，

在西方资本家的眼中，江变成了多余。如果我们回顾当年的历史，戈巴乔夫先

提拔叶利钦来平衡李加切夫，但立即感到叶已造成自己与西方关系的威胁，而

将叶整垮。到了西方势力打入苏联后，叶直接与西方挂钩，取代戈的角色。江

泽民和朱镕基的关系，已经不是第一阶段时的戈、叶关系，这倒不是江不娴于

内部斗争，恰恰相反，江十分善于内部平衡。而是由于外力已经进入中国，当

今的中共上层，希望全寄托在国际资本的强大动力，江即使察觉形形势不妙，

也无能为力，正象满清王朝的不能不依靠李鸿章一样。

     在今天江泽民身兼党主席、军委主席，成立武警部队，并同朱镕基结

成上海帮，现在地位看上去十分稳固，江口中常念道，社会主义不要在他手中

覆亡。难道有可能变成戈巴乔夫的下场，整垮了党，也整垮了自己？历史再度

重演，这决不是天方夜谭。当初，华国锋是毛泽东指定的接班人，身兼党政军

三大主席，与汪东兴结盟掌握8341部队，政治局有绝对多数，地位何尝不稳！

不到两年，垮得不亦乐乎；赫鲁晓夫在权威最盛时，被布列日列夫等变生肘

腋；邓小平如此威势，在六四前夕，险遭亲信赵紫阳倒戈。这些都在当事人意

料之外。中共开门揖盗，进入世贸组织后，内部的平衡立即打破，一个更彻底

的买办集团势力，必将聚集在朱镕基的周围，以庞大的外力为支柱，要求在中

国政坛的领导地位，看来不可避免。江泽民培养的班底：钱其琛、吴仪、唐家

璇等买办官僚，一个一个正倒向朱镕基。

邓小平路线下的必然产物

     戈巴乔夫、叶利钦同江泽民、朱镕基都不是个别的现象，而是一个历

史现象。苏联走资的历史，从赫鲁晓夫开始，经过布列日列夫等直到戈、叶，

企图又想背弃社会主义道路，又保持党的专政，从自上而下的体制内改革到体

制外的市场调解，从法西斯控制到政治开放，最后形成一批没有经过革命锻炼

，又未通过反侵略战争考验、又脱离群众的官僚、精英领导，价值观念搅拌在

社会主义、资本主义混乱已极的烂泥中，自欺欺人到了人格分裂状态，其颟顸

无能一代胜于一代。其中真正的清醒者，是那些看懂了这一团浆糊毫无出路，

而变得极端自私自利，毫无民族、国家、社会观念的糟粕，有意识的为最大限

度牟取利益，而采取全面牺牲工农。全面投靠西方，直到党亡国乱。戈巴乔夫

、叶利钦就在这样环境下或迟或早必然出现。中国走资的历史，在具体形式上

容或与苏联相异，但基本矛盾相同。邓小平的走资路线，从一开始，就更自觉

地与西方挂钩，但他还是不敢立即抛弃社会主义，得用“中国特色的社会主义

”掩人耳目。所以，一方面，整个党是同样地陷于精神分裂、多重人格；另一

方面，党中央的买办性质更浓，以美为师视为至理。过去的胡耀邦、赵紫阳，

就是第一梯次的戈巴乔夫、叶利钦；今天的江泽民、朱镕基是第二梯次的戈、

叶。而在经济上，邓所谓的让“改革开放不可逆转”，就是使中国的经济尽快

被国际资本主义体系吸住，有进无出。中国的经济走资问题越来越严重时，领

导的颟顸无能就越来越暴露，在束手无策下就更加想加快同国际资本接轨。越

是买办性重的，越是看出机遇。在外人看来，朱镕基为何如此卖国、如此屈膝

，对朱镕基一伙而言，却是机不可失，时不可再，磕头送礼，务必进入世贸组

织，务必当上中美的政治肩客。

     朱将民族的利益，作为进身之阶；损国格丧人格以奴颜取宠。但是，

朱有那么大胆子，能不经党中央的同意吗？朱的卖国政策，必然是党中央通过

，这正反映出当今中共的病入膏肓，整个上层领导的共同意识，都是同样眼看

美国，失去自信。

五、人民觉醒，还是第二次和平演变

     苏联瓦解后，中国共产党镇日担心的是“和平演变”。照中共的解释

，“和平演变”是不经暴力变社会主义为资本主义，似乎中国还是社会主义社

会。事实上，中国的资本主义政变早在邓小平上台时发生。邓的路线每向资本

主义推进一步，都使官僚内部腐化一步，使中国经济的对外依存度上升，内部

贫富差距扩大，国内阶级两极分化，政治同经济格格不入，政权加重高压手段

，人心愈益唯利是图。1997年邓去世时，江李朱接过摊子，恰值香港回归，兴

高采烈。到了97年底，就感受到亚洲经济危机的压力。之后，香港经济严重衰

退，中国的软着陆着地不起。国营企业整顿无效，大量工人下岗，农民不堪苛

捐杂税白条和地方党官横行霸道，民间痛恨贪污腐败，金融危机四伏，社会腐

烂，生态严重破坏，水利建设荒废，南北发生空前水灾。问题又多又严重，腐

烂的官僚系统应付不暇，话越说越满，心越来越寒。怎么办？现行的政治经济

结构无法适应，非改不可。重走社会主义路线？民族民主资本主义路线？还是

加速买办资本主义路线？江、李、朱也不可能有何选择，当然是朝买办资本主

义迈进。进入世贸，就是跨进买办道路的新里程。也就是说，中共第二次“和

平演变”的时刻来临。或是党被冲得四分五裂；或是党的领导换成彻头彻尾的

买办集团，江已是多余，朱镕基要当新集团的首脑。这一演变，将是阶级斗争

的进一步激化。第一次演变背叛社会主义，出卖工农利益；第二次演变背叛民

族主义，出卖全民利益。图穷匕首现，阶级斗争的现实让人民看清楚从邓小平

到朱镕基走的是什么样的道路。

1999年5月

五、

对老牌修正主义的回顾与前瞻

无套裤汉

自从毛主席于1976年逝世后，世界局势从国家要独立、人民要革命、民族要解放的群众运动和阶级斗争转向新、老修正主义回潮、资本主义复辟、世界资产阶级反对革命斗争和解放的反扑阶段；到了1991年底，前苏联在赫鲁晓夫、布列兹涅夫、叶利钦和戈尔巴乔夫等新修正主义反革命叛徒集团的摧残下而土崩瓦解了，世界无产阶级遭受到空前的挫败，从此，毛主席领导的第三世界人民的革命斗争和解放斗争进入了低潮和失声的阶段。

世界资本主义当权派在各国于是大喜过望，它们大兴利市、无往不利，利字当头、各显神通，真是千奇百怪、叹为观止。

但是，好景不长，各国的社会阶级矛盾不但越陷越深，广泛而频仍，资产阶级使用民主布幕笼络人民群众以维持其反动统治的陈旧技俩于是逐渐失效，尽管人民群众还没有达到完全觉醒的阶段，然而他们的觉悟程度随着世界资产阶级阵营的分裂与对立以至于战云密布而逐渐强化，甚至开始有了在一定程度上进行反抗的初步意识和警觉。

随着新修正主义的失败，取而代之的是老牌修正主义的借尸还魂。也就是说：新修正主义退而求其次，借助于旧的。

当前盛行于以北欧为主的欧洲各国多年的社会民主主义（social democracy），也就是由在一战前后的德国老牌或旧修正主义者爱德华·伯恩施坦(Eduard Bernstein, 1850-1932)所首创的在资本家阶级专政下施行点滴或所谓进化式的改良主义。由于当前处于晚期的资本主义世界已经到了大难当前而无路可走的总危机之下，因此即使曾经不可一世的美国也在逐渐仿效北欧，出现了社会民主主义的倾向-社会民主党人借助于资产阶级的民主党的名号推行其在资本主义下的点滴改良主义。美国社会民主党的未来充满了变量 ——一个即便如此体贴、无害而且温良恭俭让的资产阶级的友（或尾）党也不被当政者所认可，这不就导致特朗普总统痛斥之为所谓共产主义了吗？

新老修正主义的出现，在于它一方面收买部分工人，以至出现工人贵族，成为修正主义的社会阶级基础；另一方面借助于大批破产的农民、手工业者和其他小资产者（不是贫下中农而是没有改造好的的地主和富农阶层）涌入都市无产阶级队伍，参加所谓现代化建设和反对由于阶级斗争而出现的所谓混乱局面。于是无产阶级从自为阶段坠落并回到原来的自在阶段。无产阶级本身的“异化”导致了其革命党质变为修正主义党。即便原来属于革命党范畴的党于是也就成为“打着社会改造的幌子来进行欺骗的机会主义，是打着‘发展’和‘完成‘马克思主义’的外衣来偷运资产阶级社会主义，是打着’社会主义‘的招牌来维护剥削阶级对劳动群众的奴役和榨取，来更加狡猾地加强资本主义对劳动的统治。”

伯恩施坦还宣扬“唯生产力论”，反对马克思提出的“革命是历史的火车头”的正确论断。毛主席说：“革命就是解放生产力，革命就是促进生产力的发展”，这就说明：其他第三世界国家之所以落后，就在于不进行革命。

在修正主义制度下推行的公营企业一般地被认为是具有所谓社会主义性质的。这种看法并不正确，其实，它们仍然是以生产利润为目的，仍然使用雇佣劳动；这种公营企业实际上是掌握在资产阶级手中并进行阶级压迫、剥削和欺骗的国家资本主义（列宁称之为：地方公有资本主义）。

伯氏主张资本主义社会能够"和平长入"社会主义社会，这是过高估计了资本主义社会的和平性质了。资本主义社会充满了暴力——军队、警察、法院和监狱而且阶级斗争无时无地不在激烈地进行着。世界各国各地区的资本竞争空前地激烈和广泛而且深入并且激化，它们为了垄断的目的，不惜借助于战争。经过了乌克兰战争、美以伊战争的世界今天已经战云密布，并且正在朝着被制止了八十年的核战争的目标迈进。全球生物界趋向毁灭的核戰威胁正伴随着资本主义复辟与分裂逐渐固化。

起来！第三世界人民通过社会主义革命和胜利，孤立并催生第一和第二世界人民消灭作为战争祸源的资产阶级专政的斗争！

于2026年08月23日

六、

兩件事的啓思

文平

謝謝老董老黃召集了今天的座談會，因為上班而沒有機會參與，故寫下一些思考供大家批評指正。

數月前看了朋友介紹的電視歷史長劇，大秦賦。五年前的這個劇集，原版八十集，電視版七十六集，非常精彩，貼近歷史，一睹兩千多年前的秦始皇如何一統山河，一統度量衡，書同文，車同軌，行同倫，奠定了中國兩千多年的政治格局，為華夏民族的團結融合打下堅實的基礎。

毛主席說，他只做了兩件事。看了大秦賦之後，才領悟到毛主席說的第一件事的深意。我們緬懷毛主席，必須徹底地完成祖國统一台灣回歸的神聖任務。國家要統一，民族要團結，這是自古以來的神聖責任。

看看今天歐洲的政治亂局，源自四分五裂各行其政。假若兩千年前的歐洲有個秦始皇，今天的歐洲各國還會在打仗嗎？還會出現兩次世界大戰嗎？還會如此懼怕俄羅斯嗎？不能與美國平起平坐嗎？歐洲缺少人口、面積、科技創新發展嗎？千年前的歐洲，就是缺少了一個秦始皇。所以，論起政治認知，中國人領先世界至少兩千年，而且還有文字詳細記載，能不驕傲嗎？

毛主席說的第二件是文化大革命。這場運動牽涉甚廣，影響深遠。本想講些個人感受，親朋好友中有不少深受影響，甚至失去生命。限於個人水平不高資訊不足，希望有機會，多學習學習再說。

共和國的成立讓中國人民站起來，打下了一個紮實的基礎。改革開放推動了老百姓富起來，從騎單車到開汽車住豪宅。現在開始強起來了且影響了世界，除了一帶一路，更多的是堅決維護二戰結束後的國際安全秩序。然而，圍繞著共和國萬歲，  安的窑洞之問並沒有完全解決，羅剎海市仍有市場，歷史上的各種劇情仍在反覆上演。要是能夠分析這些現象，自然是認識文革的開始，自然明白文革的核心，就是為人民服務。

今天我們緬懷毛主席，牢記毛主席的教導，指導我們的工作和生活，繼續把兩件事辦好。謝謝各位，謝謝老董老黃。

七、

怀念敬仰毛主席

叶先扬

毛主席于 1976 年 9 月 9 日逝世已经 50 年了，但是毛主席影响了我们，作为中国共产党、中国人民解放军、中华人民共和国的主要缔造者，他的思想与精神一直深刻影响着一代代中国人。

毛主席带领中国人民把整个中华民族从绝望的边缘站了起来。建国以后修了八万多座水库，夯实了我国农业发展的根基，建立起独立完整的基础工业体系，为后来改革开放时期的快速腾飞筑牢了物质基础，还有就是扫除文盲，提高全国人民的基本素质，改造了整个社会的精神面貌。这都是很了不起的。

另外就是对全世界的影响，在他的领导之下新民主主义革命的胜利，真正改变了东方和世界的形势，我们说振兴中华，今天中华民族，不但在世界上有很大的影响力，而且为世界全人类未来的文明，公平合理的世界秩序立下了坚实的基础，对毛主席的怀念和敬仰，还有毛主席的教导永远放在自己的心里。

八、

毛泽东的外交战略和外交智慧

在纽约毛主席逝世50周年纪念会上的发言

花俊雄

毛泽东是中国外交事业的奠基人，他的外交战略和外交智慧，犹如一座巍峨的灯塔，闪耀着永恒的光芒，照耀新中国在风云变幻、艰难复杂的国际局势下，以高瞻远瞩的战略眼光、坚定无畏的斗争精神和灵活务实的外交策略，为新中国的外交奠定了广阔、坚实的基础，推动新中国在世界舞台上站稳脚跟并崭露头角。

新中国成立伊始，百废待兴，国际环境错综复杂。毛泽东果断地提出“另起炉灶”、“打扫干净屋子再请客”和“一边倒”的三大外交决策。“另起炉灶”就是不承认旧中国同各国建立的屈辱外交关系，使中国得以摆脱旧有的不平等条约的束缚，以崭新姿态重新构建对外关系，维护国家主权独立；“打扫干净屋子再请客”就是肃清帝国主义在华特权，为新中国的建设扫除外部干扰，营造健康的国内环境；“一边倒”就是向社会主义阵营靠拢，在美苏冷战、对峙格局下，为新生政权赢得了宝贵的支持与援助，保障了国家安全。这三大决策犹如定海神针，为新中国外交奠定了独立自主的的坚实基石，使中国在国际舞台上挺直脊梁，不再任人欺凌。1949年10月1日，毛泽东站在天安门城楼上，对着全世界庄严宣告：“新中国成立了！中国人民从此站起来了！”这句话犹如春雷，唤醒了世界，中国人不再是那个任人宰割的“东亚病夫”，而是一个独立自主的新生力量！

毛主席的外交，不仅有挺直的脊梁，更有广阔的胸怀，毕生为弱国撑腰，终身为和平奔走。50 年代，赫鲁晓夫企图通过联合舰队、长波电台控制中国，毛主席直言驳斥，哪怕面对苏联撤销援助的压力，也始终坚持“自力更生为主，争取外援为辅”。正是这份坚守，让中国没有沦为苏联的“卫星国”，而是靠自己的力量打造出独立自主的工业体系，造出了“两弹一星”，这份家底，成为如今中国大国底气的压舱石。毛主席的外交战略和外交智慧，从来都是原则问题寸步不让，主权问题绝无妥协，这是融入民族血脉和骨髓里的准则。

1950年朝鲜战争爆发，毛主席以无畏的斗争精神，打得一拳开，免得百拳来，毅然出兵，以“钢少气多”初生之犊不怕虎的新中国击败了“钢多气少”的不可一世的美国。1954年日内瓦会议，是新中国首次以大国身份登上国际舞台，面对美国的孤立与傲慢，毛主席与周总理运筹帷幄，盘活外交棋局；1955年万隆会议，面对亚非国家的疑虑，周总理按毛主席定调提出“求同存异”，不输出革命，只支持和平，打破了美国的封锁，也让世界看到了新中国的担当。毛主席曾幽默地说：我们这些“有色金属”总会膨胀起来。这份自信，源于对和平发展的坚守，更源于对人类共同利益的考量。

万隆会议上，在毛主席倡导下，周总理提出了互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则。这五项原则简结而深刻，超越了意识形态和社会制度的差异，为不同国家之间的交往提供了基本遵循。它是中国对国际关系理论与实践的重大贡献，彰显了中国追求和平、平等、公正的外交理念，赢得了国际社会的广泛认可与赞誉，逐渐成为处理国与国关系的基本准则，让世界看到了中国外交的智慧与担当，也为中国拓展外交空间、结交众多友好国家创造了有利条件。

毛泽东的外交战略和外交智慧还体现在他对美国的策略上。1956年，他对印尼总统苏加诺说：“帝国主义和一切反动派都是纸老虎。”毛泽东用“纸老虎”这个词，来比喻美国帝国主义，直接戳破了美国的心理优势。他告诉世界：美国虽然看起来强大，但其实并不可怕。这句话不仅鼓舞了中国人民，也让许多发展中国家看到了挑战霸权的希望。毛主席说，帝国主义和反动派是“纸老虎”并不是轻敌，而是战略上藐视、战术上重视的智慧。“纸老虎”理论的提出，标志着中国外交从“防守”转向“进攻”。毛泽东用这个比喻告诉世界：中国不拍美国，也不拍任何强权。这种自信和勇气，让中国在国际舞台上赢得了更多的尊重。

第二次世界大战后经过20多年的发展，到了20世纪60年代末至70年代初，国际形势发生重大变化。美苏两个超级大国争霸世界的矛盾日益加剧。苏联利用美国霸权地位的中落，加紧对外扩张，同美国争夺世界霸权，对世界和平构成极大威胁。中国在反对美国霸权主义的同时，也同苏联的霸权主义和大国沙文主义进行了坚决斗争。1969年，、中苏在黑龙江珍宝岛和新疆列克提爆发军事冲突，双方互有伤亡。此事发生后，苏联第一时间想到的不是与中方协商，而是直接对中国采取“外科手术式”的核打击，选中的目标包括西昌、酒泉等军事基地，以及北京、长春等工业城市。由于种种原因，中苏最终避免了核冲突，即便如此，苏联的霸道也给中方留下深刻印象。

为了应对苏联威胁，中国开始重新审视中美苏关系，在陈毅、叶剑英、徐向前、聂荣臻等四位老帅签署的《对战争形势的初步估计》中，中国认为：“中苏矛盾大于中美矛盾，美苏矛盾大于中苏矛盾。我们应该充分利用好美苏矛盾，与美国缓和关系。”这就成为联美抗苏的理论基础。此时美国也处于风雨飘摇之中，从1964年开始美国就陷入越战泥潭，军费开支急剧上升。由于庞大的贸易逆差，1971年美国停止美元与黄金兑换，[布雷顿森林体系] 瓦解，美元信用岌岌可危，当时有很多西方学者认为美国会输掉冷战。在这种背景下，美国也希望与中国缓和。

1971年，毛泽东巧妙运用“乒乓外交”，以小小的乒乓球为媒介，开启了中美关系正常化的大门。随后美国国务卿基辛格秘密访华，1972年尼克松总统访华，发表了上海《中美联合公报》，标志着中美关系迈出历史性一步。这一外交突破不仅改变了中美两国的关系，也深刻影响了世界政治格局，展示了毛泽东在外交上的灵活与睿智，让中国在国际舞台上的地位得到显著提升，为后续的改革开放和现代化建设创造了有利的国际环境。

这个时期国际形势的发展还有一个特点，就是广大的亚非拉国家反对两个超级大国的干涉、控制、压迫、反帝、反殖民、反霸权斗争风起云涌。国家要独立，民族要解放，人民要革命成为不可阻挡的历史发展潮流。这个大势毛泽东看得非常清楚。正是在这样的背景下，毛泽东形成关于“三个世界”划分的战略思想，对中国的外交战略作出重大调整。

1974年2月，毛泽东在同赞比亚总统卡翁达谈话时，初次提出关于“三个世界”划分的战略思想。这一思想的基本点是：美国、苏联是第一世界；亚非拉和其他地区的发展中国家是第三世界；处于这两者之间的发达国家是第二世界。这“三个世界”互相联系又互相矛盾。美苏两个超级大国都想以这样或那样的方式把发展中国家置于它们各自的控制之下，同时还要欺负实力不如它们的发达国家。处于超级大国和发展中国家之间的一些发达国家，既对第三世界国家保持着各种不同形态的殖民主义关系，又在不同程度上受着这个或那个超级大国的控制、威胁和欺负。而广大的发展中国家，都是以前的殖民地或半殖民地，它们在取得独立以后，都还面临着肃清殖民主义残余势力，发展民族经济，巩固民族独立的历史任务。中国作为第三世界的一员，要加强同广大第三世界国家的团结，争取第二世界国家，联合反对超级大国的控制和压迫；在与第一世界美苏两个超级大国的霸权主义展开斗争时，还特别注意联合威胁较小的一方，集中力量反对更加危险的苏联霸权主义。

  在当时的历史条件下，毛泽东关于“三个世界”划分的战略思想，对指导中国外交工作，努力建立和发展同第三世界各国以及其他类型国家的友好合作关系，坚持反对超级大国的霸权主义和战争威胁，都发挥了重要作用。毛泽东关于“三个世界”划分的战略思想提出已经50多年了，中国作为世界上最大的发展中国家，依然始终坚持反对超级大国的霸权主义和战争威胁，始终不渝地维护世界和平。

毛泽东的外交战略和外交智慧不仅在过去为中国的外交开辟了康庄大道，也对今天的中国外交有着重要启示。他的名言和策略告诉我们：外交不仅是实力的较量，更是智慧的博弈。如今的中国,有刺刀见红拼出来的立国尊严，有勒紧裤腰带造出来的“两弹一星”，有“虽远必诛”的边防铁拳，有经过几十年生聚教训的勤劳智慧人民，有经过淬炼，召之即来、来之能战、战之必胜铁血军魂，更有建立“人类命运共同体”的天下胸怀。我们始终坚持天下为公，像毛主席当年期盼的那样，既创造自身的文明幸福，也推动世界的和平自由，这是中国外交一以贯之的追求。

回望百年，新中国的每一次崛起，都是在惊涛骇浪中闯出来的。从毛主席时代的硬气外交，到如今的大国担当，不变的是对国家主权的坚守，对世界和平的追求。面对当下百年未有之大变局，我们无需恐慌，因为底气早已刻在骨子里，智慧早已融在发展中。经历过数十年哦岁月的中国人民，都见证了中国从积贫积弱到大国崛起的历程，毛主席的外交战略和外交智慧在如今的国际局势中，仍有深刻的现实意义，仍是照亮我们前程的指路明灯！

九、

紀念毛泽东主席逝世50週年

黃哲操

我懷著尊敬景仰的心情，於1972年8月訪問毛主席故居，他的故居在湖南韶山，一個縣級市，現有人口約10萬。毛主席故居是典型的農家建築，是當地中上層的大戶人家，屋前有一個大庭院，庭院前有一個水池塘，環境優美，毛主席在這裡出生，度過童年和幼年的生活。我參觀了毛主席故居的客廳，臥室，書房，廚房，農具房，豬圈，牛舍等等。我看到的農具如犁，鋤頭，畚箕，蓑衣，和台灣農家用的非常相似，甚至廚房掛著的茶葉竹葿簍，台灣1950年zhuxi代前也普遍使用，眼前所見，我感到非常親切。最讓我驚訝的是，牆上掛著的毛主席媽媽的照片，她叫文妹，取名「妹」是客家人的獨特傳統，她是不是客家人有待考泽东證，但是對我這個客家人來說，是揮之不去想得到答案的問題。

毛主席故居之外，我參觀上海，杭州，北京，瀋陽等地，我看到的大陸，方方面面都是非常落後，什麼時候能夠趕上美國呢？沒想到經過六、七十的努力建設，今日的中國在許多領域已經趕上、接近、或超過美國了，科技方面的發展也是如此。中國科技方面的快速發展是靠中國人民的聰明才智和辛勤努力幹出來的，但是，最重要的是有正確的指導思想, 這個正確指導思想就是毛澤東思想。

毛主席是一位曠古奇才的英雄人物，集革命家，軍事家，思想家，政治家，詩人，書法家於一身。他推翻長久壓在中國人民頭上的封建制度，帝國主義，官僚資本主義三座大山。他打敗日本侵略者，他打倒蔣介石，他建立中華人民共和國，帶領中國人民站起來了！他發動文化大革命。 這篇短短的紀念文，不可能說清楚毛主席的豐功偉績，因此，這裡只探討毛澤東思想為什麼是現階段中國國力最重要環節之一的科技發展的集結號。

毛澤東思想的基礎是唯物論，一切從實際出發，這也是唯物主乂認識論的基本前題。他的中國科學發展思想當然也是在唯物論知識論的基礎上發展出來的。毛澤東最早關於科學發展的講話是在1940年2月5日在延安一個研討會的講話，他說：“自然科學是人們爭取自由的一種武裝。” 1956年1月知識分子問題會議上他又明確地說：“科學也是生產力。” 毛主席的科學顧問周培源說，毛主席偉大的旗幟就是科學的旗幟。

毛主席說，除了科學以外，什麼都不要相信，不要迷信，不正確的不信，還要批評，這才是科學的態度。毛主席重視科學是全方位的，他把科學技術工作當成上層建築，既提高生產力，發展經濟，也把發展科學技術當作和建立政權，建立軍隊一樣重要的地位。 1958年6月21日在中央軍委擴大會上，他說；“我還是希望搞一點海軍，空軍搞得強一點，還有那原子彈，沒有那個東西，人家就說你不算數。那麼好，我們就搞一點，搞一點原子彈，氫彈，洲際導彈。” 毛主席的話，就是全中國發展科學技術的動力，是推動中國科學技術發展的集結號。他也擴大聲量，於1957年在莫斯科大學接見中國留學生，鼓勵他們說：“世界是你們的 ，也是我們的，但是歸根到底是你們的。你們青年人朝氣蓬勃，正在興旺時期，好像早晨八九點鐘的太陽，希望寄託在你們身上。” 青年學生所代表的技術和未來就像早晨的陽光一樣，有無限的生機和未來。難怪，下面談到的中國科技隊伍，以30-40歲年輕人為骨幹，例如北斗工程師平均年齡30歲，嫦娥探月工程工程師平均年齡33歲，是中外史無前例的。

中國科學技術取得下面12項巨大成就，都與毛主席的號召，息息相關：

1)      1964中國原子彈爆炸成功

2)      1967年氫彈爆炸成功

3)      1971年核潛艦海試成功

4)      1980年東風5號洲際飛彈發射成功

5)      2019年第一芐航母山東號海試成功（中國第一芐航母遼寧艦是從烏克蘭買 來瓦良格號半成品改裝建造的）

6)      2019年玉兔月球車登入月球背面成功

7)      2020年北斗導航系統成功投入使用

8)      2022年中國太空站建造完成使用

9)      2025年中國高鐵超過5萬公里，時速超過350公里，都是世界第一

10)2025年全球汽車銷售量9,190萬輛，中國佔35%以上

11)2026年核潛艦發射巨浪2或巨浪3模擬洲際核子飛彈

12)2026年C919 大飛機北京至庫倫國際航線首次飛行

中國老百姓對上述巨大科技成就，引以為傲，衷心感謝毛澤東思想指引發展道路，帶領中國人民從一窮二白，走向富強康樂，從受列強欺負，走向獨立自主，從小米加步槍，走向洲際導彈航空母艦，等等。因此，中國大陸有一段時間對毛吹冷風，但中國老百姓對毛主席的熱愛與尊敬，不但毫不動搖，更強化了毛主席在中國人民心中的崇高地位。

毛主席於1976年逝世，我們在紐約市中心的紐約市立大學恆特學院大禮堂舉行一場隆重的追悼會，2000多人參加，禮堂擠得水瀉不通。隔年，也就是1977年，我們開始在12月25日毛主席誕辰這一天舉辦活動，懷念他老人家，向他致敬，連續48年從未間斷。最近一次是2025年，每次參加人數15-30人。

紀念毛主席，不能不談，毛家滿門忠烈，為中國革命和國家建設，犧牲六位親人，他們是： 大弟毛澤民，47歲；妻子楊開慧，29歲；小弟毛澤覃，30歲；堂妹毛澤建，24歲；侄子毛楚雄雄（大哥的兒子過繼給毛主席），19歲；長子毛岸英，毛主席和楊開慧生的長子，中國抗美援朝志願軍在朝鮮犧牲，29歲。毛家為新中國的建立，拋頭顱，撒熱血，感動天地，令人傾佩和尊敬。

結論：毛澤東思想對中國科技發展的集結號潛力，將在未來15-20年，因為中美兩大科技強國的激烈競爭，發揮更大作用。

（全集完）

English Translation by Gemini.com

[Editor's Note] On October 1, 1949, Chairman Mao stood atop the Tiananmen Rostrum and proclaimed: "The People's Republic of China has been founded; the Chinese people have stood up!" In an instant, the Chairman's words instilled a profound sense of glory and national pride in the people of China. On his first day as the leader of the People's Republic, the Chairman accomplished a monumental task: he demonstrated to the entire nation the spirit and bearing befitting a premier civilization, and he awakened within every Chinese citizen a proper sense of national consciousness and dignity. Chairman Mao established a New China belonging to the working people and led the nation along a new path where workers and peasants became the masters of their own destiny. The Cultural Revolution was a mass movement explicitly championed by Chairman Mao, while the "rustication" of educated youth—sending them to the countryside—was a generational policy he personally prioritized. Today, marking the fiftieth anniversary of Chairman Mao's passing, we commemorate him by reflecting on the "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside" movement—a campaign that deeply impacted millions and was defined by fierce political struggle. The first piece in this commemorative collection is an account by a participant in that movement, describing a moment of utter despair amidst the political turmoil.

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I. Lao Xian: Reflections on "9-9"—Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Chairman's Passing

II. Han Dongping: Unforgettable September 9, 1976

III. Han Dongping: Chairman Mao Established the Most Advanced Social System in Human History

IV. Lao Dong: A Witness to History (Attachment) — "This anger cannot be dispelled; I bow my knee and offer a tribute" — A Critique of Zhu Rongji's Visit to the US

V. Sans-culottes: Retrospect and Prospect Regarding Old-School Revisionism

VI. Wen Ping: Reflections Inspired by Two Events

VII. Ye Xianyang: Cherishing the Memory of and Reverence for Chairman Mao

VIII. Hua Junxiong: Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Strategy and Wisdom

IX. Huang Zhecao: Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Chairman Mao Zedong's Passing

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September 14, 2026

I. Reflections on "9-9"—Written on the 50th Anniversary of the Chairman's Passing

Lao Xian

Time flies; in the blink of an eye, fifty years have passed since the Chairman left us, yet the scenes from those days remain vivid in my memory. When the strains of funeral music drifted from the radio, I was instantly overcome with a sense of desolation and utter despair.

I was an "old" educated youth from Shanghai who went to the countryside in late 1968. At that time, the Chairman’s directive—"Educated youth must go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants"—had not yet been issued; we went there driven by the desire to thoroughly transform the backward face of rural areas. Long before, in his essay *The Orientation of the Youth Movement* (delivered in Yan'an), the Chairman had proposed that intellectuals must integrate with workers and peasants and follow the path of such integration. After the founding of New China, in the book *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*—which he personally compiled—the Chairman wrote a commentary: "The countryside is a vast universe where much can be accomplished."

Subsequently, a host of exemplary figures like Xing Yanzi and Dong Jiageng emerged; the slogan "Go to the countryside, go to the borderlands, go to where the motherland needs you most" fully embodied the passionate spirit and sense of mission felt by the youth of that era. During the "Great Exchange of Revolutionary Experience" in 1966, some Shanghai middle school students had already put down roots in the rural areas they passed through; in 1967, a wave of enthusiasm for going to the countryside swept through Shanghai's middle schools; and by the end of 1968, we became the first group of educated youth from Shanghai to settle in rural villages—spots we had actively vied for. The situation changed after the Chairman’s directive on "accepting re-education" was issued; all middle school graduates from the classes of 1968, 1969, and 1970 in Shanghai were sent to the countryside—a movement known as "turning the whole area red." In hindsight, the foundation of this policy was flawed. When our first group of educated youth was sent down, local villagers worried that Shanghai students might be difficult to manage, and various production teams tried to pass the responsibility to one another. Our collective living quarters ended up being located in the production team led by the brigade Party secretary himself.

Not long after we arrived in the countryside, the Spring Festival approached. We proposed taking advantage of the agricultural off-season to dredge the pond in front of the village—removing the silt to boost production for the coming year. The water pumps of that era were incredibly heavy and cumbersome; to keep the intake pipe vertical within the pond, several of us male educated youth waded into the water wearing nothing but shorts in the dead of winter. A major county highway ran right past the pond, and the constant stream of travelers during the Spring Festival witnessed our spirited, industrious efforts. Suddenly, the reputation of the Shanghai students spread throughout the entire county. "The Shanghai students are truly outstanding!" Consequently, when the second batch of educated youth from Shanghai arrived in March 1969, every production team vied to recruit them. Unexpectedly, however, the underlying mindsets of these youths varied greatly; problems such as bitter homesickness, brawls, and petty theft soon emerged. Although most of the educated youth gradually settled down—thanks to the care and concern of local leaders and villagers, as well as our own assistance and guidance—the situation was far more serious for those sent to more remote and underdeveloped areas. This sparked widespread social discontent, and the sentiment that the program amounted to "disguised forced labor" resonated with many. This eventually led to Chairman Mao’s reply letter to Comrade Li Qinglin. As authorities sought comprehensive solutions, some educated youth were transferred back to the cities, a process accompanied by a general sense of restlessness and uncertainty among the remaining youth.

For those educated youth who remained steadfast in their original commitment, the question was: how should they proceed on this path of "going up to the mountains and down to the countryside"? In 1975, a proposal arrived from Shanghai; a resident delegation from the city began working with local leaders and the youth to promote the establishment of dedicated "educated youth production teams." At the time, the southern Jiangsu region—leveraging the industrial resources of the Yangtze River Delta—had seen significant growth in commune- and brigade-run enterprises. Farmers there were transitioning into dual roles as both industrial workers and agriculturalists, using industrial income to subsidize farming, and were the first to achieve prosperity; the Huaxi Production Brigade was a prime example of this. Shanghai authorities planned to adopt this southern Jiangsu model to address the issues facing the educated youth. The specific strategy involved organizing Shanghai youth into centralized production teams at the commune level. Shanghai would supply machinery phased out during its own industrial upgrades to support the development of these team-run enterprises, thereby enabling the educated youth to achieve prosperity as well. I was appointed head of the preparatory group for the educated youth team. I was delighted at the time, as I saw in this initiative the communist future envisioned by Chairman Mao in his "May 7 Directive"—a chance to take the lead in narrowing the disparities between workers and peasants, and between urban and rural areas. It was, in essence, what Wang Hongbin of Nanjie Village would later describe as building a "small communist community." Therefore, within the preparatory group, I repeatedly emphasized that we could not cut ourselves off from the surrounding rural communities. We needed to use industrial earnings to subsidize agriculture, accelerate the mechanization of farming, promote scientific techniques, and foster the comprehensive development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and sideline industries. By becoming a tangible model—something the locals could see and touch—we could inspire and guide them toward shared progress, thereby thoroughly transforming the area's backward state.

Regrettably, our vision met with resistance from the commune leadership; they were skeptical about the prospects of the "educated youth" and intended only to make temporary arrangements. Even more unsettling was the political backsliding that began in 1974, which gave me a premonition that the commune system might collapse. Fortunately, with Chairman Mao still at the helm, there was still hope.

Just as I was preparing to make a final push, the Chairman passed away. I withdrew from the preparatory group. In 1977, I was selected to participate in the commune’s centralized hybrid rice seed production project, laying the groundwork for the large-scale promotion of hybrid rice the following year. At the end of that year, I took the college entrance exam, and in early 1978, I returned to Shanghai. During my university years, a classmate handed me a copy of *China Youth Daily*; the official stance had shifted to repudiate the "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside" movement. Some time later, news arrived of the "red fingerprints" from Xiaogang Village. The only thing that truly gladdened me was the news from my former production team: the hybrid rice had yielded a bumper crop, with the output per *mu* surpassing the "National Program for Agricultural Development" target of 1,000 *jin*. That year, the dividend for a single day of labor reached two yuan. County leaders were delighted and rewarded every household with a bicycle purchase permit. After ten years of hard struggle, we had finally achieved the goal of exceeding the target yield; I couldn't help but weep tears of joy. Sadly, however, neither the excellent state of collective production nor the opposition from cadres and the masses could prevent the eventual dissolution of the commune.

Fifty years have passed, and it is heartening to see wave after wave of university students heading to the countryside to support agriculture and education. Even today, large numbers of university-graduate "village officials" are striving to alleviate poverty and build a new countryside—in them, I see echoes of my own younger self.

II. An Unforgettable Day: September 9, 1976

Han Dongping

In 1976, I was twenty-one years old and serving as the director of our village-run factory. At 3:50 PM on September 9, I was on my way back to the factory. As I passed through the only intersection in the county seat, the sound of mournful funeral music began to play from the loudspeakers, and a sense of foreboding washed over me. Then, the unforgettable obituary from the Chinese government came over the broadcast, announcing to the nation that Chairman Mao—the great leader of the Chinese people—had passed away in Beijing early that morning. At that moment, the air was filled with the sound of weeping. To this day, I cannot recall how I made my way home.

When I arrived home, my parents had not yet returned. My mother was working with the production team, and my father was still at the factory—the Jimo Agricultural Machinery Plant, the largest state-owned enterprise in our county. My father had not shed a tear even when his own father—my grandfather—passed away; yet, on that day, he wept the entire way home. The first thing he did upon returning was to gather the whole family—all of us in tears—for a meeting. He said, "Today, the sky has collapsed for us poor people. No one can predict what tomorrow will bring. But I demand that you always remember the benevolence of Chairman Mao. Without Chairman Mao and the Communist Party, our family would not exist. If any of you ever do anything to betray Chairman Mao, you shall no longer be considered my descendants."

My father was born in 1928. His family was originally a prominent clan from the Baoding area of Hebei Province. They owned businesses and inns for cart travelers in every county town along the route from Shijiazhuang to Beijing. However, his father—my grandfather—did not get along with his stepmother; at the age of sixteen, he secretly took some family money and two horses—riding one and leading the other—and ran away from home. He started an ironworks in Vladivostok with a friend, but the business was confiscated after the October Revolution in Russia. Later, he and a friend opened another factory in Manzhouli. After making money, he returned home to marry my grandmother, who also came from a wealthy local family. The "lucky money" my father and aunt received during the Lunar New Year was enough to purchase three *mu* of land. When my eldest aunt was four, my father two, and my uncle just a few months old, my grandfather returned home to bring the entire family to Manzhouli.

My grandfather was a businessman. In those days, businessmen often indulged in every vice—drinking, feasting, womanizing, and gambling. Realizing that my grandfather was not a reliable man—spending his days out indulging in these vices—my grandmother secretly took some family funds, hired a horse-drawn cart, and returned to their ancestral home in Hebei with the three children. She dared not tell her family that she had run back secretly, knowing that if they found out she had returned alone and without permission, she would be cast out. Her great-grandmother had been hoping her grandson would bring her a gift; instead, my grandmother returned empty-handed, which made the great-grandmother deeply dissatisfied with her. My grandfather later told my mother that he had been completely unaware of their departure, so how could he have possibly brought a gift for his grandmother? Later, when the family estate was divided, my grandmother received no share of the assets; it was claimed that the factory my grandfather ran in Manzhouli counted as our family's portion. She struggled to make ends meet, relying entirely on three *mu* of land she had purchased years earlier using the children's *hongbao* (lucky money) from the Lunar New Year. She received no support or care from the extended family. None of the three children had the chance to attend school; my eldest aunt was sent away at the age of eight to become a child bride. My father left home at twelve to work as a child laborer in Qingdao. The year after he left, his mother passed away from illness, yet he remained completely unaware of it. It was not until 1949—after the Liberation and the restoration of railway services—that he finally sought to return home to visit his mother. Only then did his aunt break the news that she had long since passed away.

My father later told me that within those pre-Liberation extended families, there was nothing but infighting and a complete lack of genuine affection. At twelve, he began an apprenticeship at a foundry in Qingdao owned by his aunt. He received only room and board, with no wages. He was allowed only six hours of sleep a day; the remaining eighteen hours were spent working in the workshop, doing odd jobs in the kitchen, emptying the boss's chamber pot, and babysitting the boss's children. He worked 365 days a year without a single day off. During the Lunar New Year, his uncle gave him two yuan, telling him to keep it a secret—claiming it was a special reward just for him because he helped look after the children. Later, my father discovered that every child laborer had received the same two yuan. He was constantly hungry and poorly clothed, and at a young age, he contracted tuberculosis. When he said, "Without the Communist Party and Chairman Mao, our family would not exist," he was speaking the absolute truth. Had the Communist Party not liberated him, he likely would not have lived past the age of thirty.

After the Liberation in 1949, his life improved immediately: he worked eight-hour days and had one day off a week. He benefited from free healthcare and free education. The factory organized night classes, and he was the most diligent student in his group. He was twenty-one at the time, and a teacher asked him why he hadn't gone to school as a child. He replied that he had a bad fate. When the teacher asked why his fate was bad, he said it was because he had done bad things in a past life. The teacher told him, "No one can change your past life, and no one can change your destiny. Yet, look at you now: you can attend school for free, work only eight hours a day, have a day off every week, and get holidays for the New Year and other festivals. None of this has anything to do with your past life or your fate." From that moment on, Dad stopped believing in fate; he believed only in the Communist Party and Chairman Mao.

Dad later graduated from night school, reaching the academic level of a high school graduate, and the factory subsequently sent him to the Shandong Institute of Technology for further training. He worked hard and became a deputy to the county People's Congress. Every year during the New Year holidays, he would volunteer to guard the factory. At the time, he suffered from tuberculosis; in the winter, a cold would make breathing difficult. I offered to go in his place, but he refused, insisting I go with him instead—he said he wouldn't feel at ease unless he went himself. Dad’s love for the factory—treating it like his own home—was not without reason; the factory cared for him in return. During holidays, he never went to visit the factory leadership; instead, the factory director, the Party secretary, and other leaders would come to visit him. When he was ill, the factory sent its own doctors to treat him at home and dispatched a large truck to take him to a major hospital in the city. The factory leadership genuinely cared about the workers' lives.

When Chairman Mao passed away, Dad said that the sky had fallen for the poor. As a twenty-one-year-old who had never experienced the old society, I couldn't imagine at the time that the situation would be so dire. Chairman Mao was gone, but the Communist Party remained; the sky hadn't actually fallen. Yet, a tragedy did occur. Not long after Chairman Mao’s death, the factory where Dad had worked his entire life was sold by "capitalist roaders" to a capitalist from Taiwan. This Taiwanese capitalist sold off all the factory's hundreds of lathes and other equipment, laid off the workers, and developed real estate on the factory grounds, making a fortune in the process. Meanwhile, the factory's more than two thousand workers found themselves out of a job. During the Mao Zedong era, Jimo County established thirty-six state-owned enterprises—starting from a base of virtually no industry—including an agricultural machinery plant, a light industry machinery plant, a chemical fertilizer plant, a sugar refinery, a grain and oil processing plant, a meat processing plant, a pastry factory, distilleries for *baijiu* and yellow rice wine, a sheet-metal workshop, a hardware factory, an anchor chain factory, a lace factory, a garment and bedding factory, a gunny-sack factory, a shoe factory, and a lock factory. Within just a few years, capitalist-roaders privatized every single one of these factories; today, like other counties across the country, Jimo no longer has a single state-owned enterprise.

III.

Chairman Mao established the most advanced social system in human history so far

Han Dongping

I would like to write this article to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, the great leader of the Chinese people.

On September 9, 1976, Chairman Mao Zedong, the great leader of the Chinese people and the mentor of the oppressed nations around the world, passed away. The Chinese people are in great sorrow. Later statistics showed that most Chinese people remembered the time and place when they heard the news, and what they were doing at the time. The essay topic of the 1977 College Entrance Examination was "An Unforgettable Day." Ninety-five percent of the candidates nationwide wrote about the day when Chairman Mao died. 

But who would have thought that Hua Guofeng, a seemingly honest man who claimed that Chairman Mao had told him "I can trust you to do things" and used this as a political liar that he was personally selected by Chairman Mao as his successor, actually collaborated with Wang Dongxing to use 24 security forces dedicated to protecting central leaders to arrest Chairman Mao's wife Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao's nephew and son of the martyr Mao Zemin, Mao Yuanxin, and other members of the so-called Gang of Four trusted by Chairman Mao, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan. Then, vigorous efforts were made across the country to arrest so-called cadres associated with the Gang of Four, such as Xie Jingyi, Chi Qun, Sun Yuguo, etc. Thousands of Chairman Mao's good cadres were killed, sentenced and imprisoned, expelled from the party, and dismissed from public office. 

In order to cover up the fact that they betrayed Chairman Mao, Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing used the so-called "two whatevers": We firmly support all decisions made by Chairman Mao, and we will unswervingly follow all Chairman Mao's instructions. This is completely a hypocritical trick used by Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing to deceive the Chinese people. If it were true as they claimed, they would not have arrested Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin, nor would they have arrested other good cadres loyal to Chairman Mao. What they did was entirely out of personal selfishness and a conspiracy to compete for the highest power in the country. Hua Guofeng shamelessly promoted himself as a "wise leader", but what he did was to destroy the Great Wall. He was extremely stupid. His hypocrisy was quickly exposed, and his opponents quickly took advantage of him. Deng Xiaoping launched a false proposition such as "Practice is the only criterion for testing truth" in the great debate, which caused Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing to be in chaos. Within two years, Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, Chen Yonggui and other Politburo members were forced to resign and completely withdraw from the political stage. Hua Guofeng became a veritable loner. He also naively thought that he had made a contribution to Deng Xiaoping's comeback, so Deng would let him continue in that position. He completely underestimated the cruelty of political struggle and was soon kicked out of the political arena by Deng Xiaoping.

After Deng Xiaoping and other capitalist roaders took control of China's political situation, they began an eight-year purge of the so-called three types of people. In addition to Hua Guofeng's purge of so-called people associated with the Gang of Four that began in 1976, it lasted for ten years. Tens of millions of cadres and people from the Mao Zedong era were killed, imprisoned, expelled from the party, and dismissed from public office. At the same time, those who had been punished under Mao Zedong were reinstated one by one and returned to high positions. In fact, most of them are speculators and capitalist roaders who have not been reformed well. Some of them are members of the Returning Home Corps, Zhongshan wolves who run rampant when they get their way. After they came to power, they carried out crazy retaliation against the people who had criticized them before. They took the opportunity of cleaning up the "three kinds of people" to punish the rebels who had criticized them before. I graduated from graduate school in the spring of 1985 and went to teach at Zhengzhou University. I once participated in verifying the experience of the former dean of Shandong Medical College and slandering a teacher of our school, a former teacher of Shandong Medical College. A teacher named Sang from the Foreign Languages Department of Zhengzhou University was a young teacher in the Foreign Languages Department of Shandong Medical College before the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, he once criticized the dean. Now the former dean has been reinstated, claiming that the teacher is a murderer and must be shot. I was dispatched by the school to go to Jinan to investigate and visit, but found no solid evidence and rejected his request. But he kept pestering me, saying that I favored the teacher, and the school had to send people to investigate again. The results of the second survey were the same as the first. The veteran cadre insisted on punishing the teacher. But we are in Henan Province, and he has no control ability, so in the end he had to let it go.

After Deng Xiaoping came to power, he engaged in corruption and increased wages for so-called veteran cadres at different levels. Veteran cadres who participated in the revolution 37 years ago will receive a three-level salary increase, fifteen months' salary per year, free medical insurance, one trip per year, and a nanny paid for by the state. Those who participated before 1945 received a two-level salary increase, fourteen months' salary per year, free medical insurance, one trip per year, and the state funded nannies. Those who started working before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 received a one-level salary increase, thirteen months' salary, free medical insurance, one trip per year, and a nanny hired by the state. And promote the children of these senior cadres to important and important positions. Governments at all levels have specially established veteran cadre bureaus to serve these veteran cadres. These capitalist roaders have completely betrayed the revolutionary principle of the Communists that they have no self-interest. He makes full use of his power to seek personal gain for himself and his family, and engages in corruption, causing anger and resentment. The social atmosphere is corrupted and the world is in decline.

During the Mao Zedong era, Chinese sociologists learned from Lei Feng, industry learned from Daqing, agriculture learned from Dazhai, and the country learned from the People's Liberation Army. Heroes emerged in large numbers, the atmosphere was pure and upright, and good people and good deeds emerged in endlessly. The crime rate is as low as ever in human history, with a crime rate of only 0.56 per 100,000 people. In a county with a population of one million, there are only 567 crimes a year. A county's public security bureau has only about thirty people, and most of them are civilians. I have investigated more than 20 rural areas in more than a dozen counties in Shandong, Henan, Anhui, and Hebei. During the Cultural Revolution, almost no crime occurred in these villages. They basically realized the ideal state of not picking up items on the road and not closing doors at night. After Deng Xiaoping came to power, he disbanded the people's communes and encouraged individuals to make fortunes, which led to the rise of thieves in rural areas and various criminal activities. From 1978 to 1983, the size of the Public Security Bureau increased nearly tenfold, and the crime rate increased twentyfold. Starting from September 1983, the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping had to carry out three so-called severe crackdowns. In the first severe crackdown alone, millions of people were arrested and tens of thousands were shot. The so-called severe crackdown means disregarding the law and completely following Deng Xiaoping's personal will to disregard human life. In a village in Henan that I visited, two farmers were executed for stealing two bags of fertilizer. A young man from my hometown in Shandong was shot to death for snatching a girl's scarf.

During the Mao Zedong era, the Chinese engaged in family planning and organized and educated farmers, which was very effective. Marriage was delayed and children were delayed, and couples had one child per couple. It was recognized by the United Nations as the most successful example of family planning. Deng Xiaoping disbanded the people's communes and broke the trust of the people. No one buys into family planning. Extreme fascist methods had to be adopted, forcing farmers to have abortions and sterilizations. If the farmers refused, they would cut off water and electricity, pull livestock, and move furniture. If the young people ran away, their parents would be arrested and beaten and sentenced to force the young people to submit. This one-child policy, implemented through fascist means, tore apart Chinese society. From 1980 to 1916, more than 400 million fetuses were aborted, and the ratio of men to women in Chinese society was imbalanced. Deng Xiaoping's one-child policy caused extreme harm to the Chinese nation that no external enemy could do. Its negative consequences have just begun to appear. Today's Chinese young people are unwilling to get married or have children. In fact, these are one of the sequelae of the one-child policy.

During Mao Zedong's era, the People's Liberation Army was a university that trained countless grassroots backbones for all walks of life in Chinese society. From party branch secretaries in rural areas to security departments in industrial and mining enterprises, veterans of the People's Liberation Army are the organizers and guardians of Chinese society. Deng Xiaoping let the army engage in business, and the army began to become corrupt. Military cadres began to become corrupt. Children from rural areas joined the army and had to spend hundreds of thousands of yuan to become soldiers. Deng Xiaoping engaged in capitulationism against the United States and allowed a large number of American spies to infiltrate Chinese universities and Chinese society as foreign teachers. This eventually led to the tragedy of 1989, and the People's Liberation Army had to be used to suppress it. Deng Xiaoping used the People's Liberation Army to shoot college students who opposed him, and in fact declared the bankruptcy of his policies. Deng Xiaoping caused harm to the people's army that no foreign enemy could do. If General Zhang Aiping had not resisted, turned the tide, and ended the army's business policy with the thunderous means of a strong man breaking his wrist, the fate of the people's army would have been ruined in the hands of Deng's thieves. Today, the problem of widespread corruption among senior generals in the Chinese military is also one of the consequences of Deng Xiaoping's bad governance of allowing the military to engage in business. This issue must not be taken lightly. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China should take a clear-cut approach to liquidate Deng Xiaoping’s evil deeds.

Zhu Rongji, who passed away on August 12, 2026, can be said to be a typical representative of the Deng Xiaoping era. During the Mao Zedong era, he was labeled as a rightist. Although his obituary did not mention this, he was also one of the people who was more touted by the capitalist roaders. He lived to the age of ninety-eight. Ordinary people should ask how he does it. He just enjoys unlimited medical protection, unlimited safe food security, and other unlimited health and safety protections. It is precisely because of the corporate reform policies promoted by this so-called selfless Prime Minister that a large number of state-owned enterprises went bankrupt. More than 50 million state-owned enterprise employees were laid off and lost their livelihood jobs. Many people were separated from their families and became homeless. Many laid-off female workers from state-owned enterprises became prostitutes. Thousands of women and children were abducted and trafficked. Drugs and underworld were rampant. The real estate reform implemented by this prime minister has caused skyrocketing housing prices, imbalanced development of the real estate industry, occupied a large amount of agricultural land, and many unfinished projects have turned into construction waste, jeopardizing China's future development prospects. The medical reform implemented by this prime minister has made the Chinese people unable to afford medical treatment and medicine. Doctors ask for red envelopes, and patients' families give them red envelopes. This is a social custom that violates medical ethics. The education reform implemented by this prime minister closed a large number of rural high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools, making it difficult for farmers' children to go to school. Because a large number of rural high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools were closed, farmers had to leave their hometowns and move to county towns so that their children could go to school nearby. The consequence was that most farmers left the countryside, a large number of rural houses were abandoned, and a large amount of farmland was abandoned.

Zhu Rongji had a slogan back then: to prepare a hundred coffins, ninety-nine for corrupt officials and one for himself. The result was that all the bank presidents he appointed, including their lackeys, went to jail. These people were all corrupt, with hundreds of millions or billions of corrupt officials, but none of them were killed. This shows that Zhu Rongji showed mercy to corrupt officials. I know the former vice president of the Bank of China in Singapore. I have received executives from the Chinese banking industry in Singapore many times. I have also been to Shanghai and Beijing, China, and contacted the presidents of major Chinese banks who were promoted and trained by Zhu Rongji. My Singaporean friend was astonished by the corruption of these bank presidents cultivated by Zhu and their subordinates. What you make from your investment belongs to you, and what you lose from your investment belongs to the country. Pornographic movies are shown when receiving foreign guests, and the entertainment standards are extremely luxurious. And the son of the former prime minister, Zhu Yunsongya, became the richest man in Asia. How similar is this to Deng Xiaoping? Nair? Chinese people should ask how the Deng Xiaoping family, Wen Jiabao family, and Zhu Rongji family became super rich. 

During the Mao Zedong era, we dared to be ruthless against corrupt officials. Why? First of all, Mao Zedong himself and the family members of his comrades took the lead in being honest and not taking advantage of the country and the people. Even if you drink a cup of green tea during a meeting in the Great Hall of the People, you have to pay 20 cents as required. The house where Chairman Mao lived and the furniture were all rented according to regulations, which accounted for more than a quarter of his salary. His monthly salary was more than 400 yuan, but the rent for his house and furniture was as high as 110 yuan. In order to prevent corruption, Chairman Mao launched the Three Antis Movement in 1951. Senior cadres Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, the former secretary and commissioner of the Tianjin Prefectural Committee, were exposed for corruption. Although many people interceded for them, Chairman Mao did not hesitate to execute them on February 10, 1952. As Chairman Mao said, kill them to save thousands of cadres. In order to prevent cadres from being separated from the masses and engaging in corruption, Chairman Mao took a series of measures to ensure that cadres participate in labor and realize the three comrades with the people, eating, living and working together. Cadres must go to the countryside regularly to implement the three policies with farmers. During the Cultural Revolution, every party and government agency established a "May 7th Cadre School". Cadres at all levels took turns to go to the cadre school for training, even his own youngest daughter Li Na was no exception. These measures protected thousands of state cadres. Among the 1,6114 founding generals of our country, not one of them had problems due to corruption. 

Since Deng Xiaoping came to power, almost all Chinese officials have been corrupt. The county magistrates and township magistrates I interviewed during my inspections in rural areas all frankly said that according to Chairman Mao's standards, they should have been shot a hundred times. Some farmers said that if all officials were shot, one or two out of a hundred people might be unjustly convicted. But if every other person is shot, a large number of corrupt officials will be able to escape. Various chaos in Chinese society, such as poisonous food, poisonous wine, poisonous cigarettes, drugs, the proliferation of gangs, the proliferation of prostitutes, and many other issues involving people's livelihood are inseparable from corrupt officials. Chairman Mao once said that to govern the country is to govern the officials. A country cannot govern its officials well if it cannot control its officials. The reason why Mao Zedong's era was the most successful and beautiful society in human history was because of the good governance of the country's cadres. Officials do not dare to be corrupt, do not want to be corrupt, and have no opportunity to be corrupt. They live among the masses, in the same house, in the same community, and their children go to the same school. Everything they say and do, the cost of clothing their children, and everything they say and do are all under the supervision of the masses. 

Since taking office in 2012, General Secretary Xi Jinping has held high the banner of anti-corruption. Every year, a large number of officials are investigated and sentenced for corruption. However, the corruption problem has not only not been solved, but has become more and more serious, with more and more people involved and higher and higher amounts of money involved. In 2025 alone, more than a million officials were punished, including a large number of central-level cadres and senior generals. According to some estimates, these corrupt officials stole more than US$22 trillion in national assets, and a large amount of their wealth has been transferred overseas. The existence of these corrupt officials is always a destabilizing factor, especially the corruption of senior military generals, which is a serious potential threat to the long-term stability of Chinese society. According to statistics, as many as 57 generals have been punished since the anti-corruption campaign. What a terrible number. The Chinese government and people cannot take the seriousness of this issue lightly. 

Deng Xiaoping vowed that practice is the criterion for testing truth. Now, after more than 40 years of social practice, Deng Xiaoping's so-called reform and opening up has completely gone bankrupt. Even according to the standards set by Deng Xiaoping himself, his reform and opening up was an evil path and a dead end. His haphazard reforms of crossing the river by feeling for stones created a divide between the rich and the poor, led to the emergence of a large number of corrupt officials, and the proliferation of underworld. Prostitution and drugs, which had been extinct for more than thirty years, reappeared. The evil of abducting children and women, which was eliminated by New China, has become rampant again because of Deng Xiaoping's reforms. 

More than forty years of social practice have thoroughly educated the Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping's perverse actions proved Chairman Mao correct. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, headed by Xi Jinping, should seize the historical opportunity in a timely manner, sum up historical experience in a timely manner, and make a convincing historical resolution on the history of the past forty years to lay the foundation for China's future.

During his visit to the United States, Premier Zhu Rongji gave two televised interviews—one with PBS and one with CNN—and delivered a major speech at MIT. These three events constituted the primary dialogue between Zhu, representing China as Premier, and the American public. The content of these three engagements was largely consistent, focusing on a few key issues: Kosovo, espionage allegations, political campaign contributions, human rights, and trade. Let us examine how Premier Zhu Rongji handled these matters:

The Kosovo Crisis

The bombing campaign in Kosovo represented a blatant use of force to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. The pretexts offered by the United States and NATO were utterly flimsy. The U.S. position was grounded in the conference held at Rambouillet, France—an initiative led by the U.S. to broker a ceasefire between the Yugoslav government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and to discuss the restoration of Kosovo's autonomy. Yugoslavia did not attend the conference; the KLA attended but did not sign the agreement. It was an "agreement" reached without the participation of the principal party involved; only after the U.S. had already decided to use force did it secure the KLA's signature, thereby attempting to coerce Yugoslavia into compliance. How could the Yugoslav government be expected to abide by an agreement it had never signed? Yet, NATO used this as a pretext to launch a bombing campaign, acting unilaterally without UN authorization or consultation with Russia or other nations. This bombing set international relations back to the era of imperialist powers that predated World War II. It sparked widespread international opposition. For China, this signaled that while the U.S. spoke of a "strategic partnership," it effectively disregarded the world's most populous nation when dealing with major international issues. Furthermore, this precedent undermined the fundamental international principle of non-interference in internal affairs; it raised the alarming possibility that separatist movements within any country could appeal to the U.S. for intervention. Other nations were watching China's stance on the Kosovo crisis, and separatists in Taiwan and Tibet were observing closely to see if China dared to confront the United States. Consequently, China had to make a clear choice between the U.S. and Yugoslavia and articulate its position unequivocally, leaving no room for ambiguity.

Logically, China's initial move should have been to cancel Zhu's visit to the U.S. to signal its dissatisfaction. There were indeed voices within China—as well as among Chinese students and scholars overseas—advising against the trip; yet, Zhu insisted on visiting the United States. Since the visit was proceeding, he should have been well-prepared to articulate China’s position using compelling arguments and convincing data, thereby winning the understanding of the American people. When speaking on television, he needed to maintain his stance as the nation's Premier while simultaneously presenting facts and reasoning to the American public. Yet, here is how Zhu actually answered the reporters' questions:

On China’s attitude: "People back home opposed my visit because of the Kosovo issue, but I told them I was coming anyway."

On why China opposed the U.S.: "President Jiang Zemin has already stated that one should not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations."

On whether China was siding with Yugoslavia against NATO: "We are simply addressing the specific issue at hand."

On whether China was aware of the "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo: "I do not know exactly what has happened. I have seen two conflicting accounts: one speaks of an armed conflict, while the other claims Yugoslavia is suppressing the ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo. I cannot judge which version is correct."

On the reliability of reports coming from Kosovo: "Secretary of State Albright said she would provide me with materials to review, but I haven't seen them yet, so I cannot make a judgment."

On the opposition to armed intervention: "No war ever yields a good outcome."

These questions presented excellent opportunities for Zhu to point out that China opposed NATO’s unilateral military action because it undermined respect for the United Nations; China has consistently opposed any nation or bloc appointing itself as the "international police." He could have emphasized that the principles of non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs form the only foundation for establishing international order and maintaining peace. Solutions should be sought only on this basis—through internationally recognized bodies such as third parties, regional organizations, and the UN—using measures like consultation, negotiation, arbitration, and sanctions. He could have further noted that the use of economic and military sanctions requires extreme caution, as the ultimate victims are innocent local civilians. Zhu could have cited a wealth of material—such as data from UN Food and Agriculture Organization reports showing that the embargo against Iraq caused over 100,000 deaths annually among women and children due to malnutrition and medical shortages—to substantiate the suffering of the populace. He could have drawn upon China’s own bitter history of interference by foreign powers to illustrate the Chinese people's firm opposition to external meddling in domestic affairs. Regarding the term "ethnic cleansing," Zhu should have pointed out that it cannot be defined arbitrarily or used at will as a pretext for interfering in other nations. He could have cited various international sources—including interviews conducted by Chinese and other neutral parties regarding Kosovo—to show that there was no consensus that Yugoslavia had implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing there. He could also have cited the infamous "incubator incident" (in which the daughter of Kuwait’s ambassador to the U.S. posed as a Kuwaiti hospital worker before the U.S. Congress, falsely claiming to have witnessed Iraqi troops removing infants from incubators and killing them during the occupation—testimony that helped secure Congressional approval for military action against Iraq) to demonstrate that individual eyewitness accounts are not necessarily reliable. Zhu could have highlighted the West's inconsistent handling of racial issues across different countries, arguing that "ethnic cleansing" fails to explain the current situation and that other strategic interests are at play. Furthermore, he could have addressed current global realities by explaining that armed intervention not only fails to resolve conflicts but actually escalates them, harming the parties involved and undermining world peace. NATO launched this military action without even exhausting avenues for a political solution; it has merely enraged the Yugoslav people, made the problem harder to solve, and deepened animosity—reasons why China naturally opposes it. 

The U.S. lacked a legitimate cause for intervention; its position was fundamentally untenable. Yet, in his responses during the visit, Zhu appeared timid and unsure of himself—hardly the demeanor of a premier representing a major power. Instead, he came across like a second-rate salesman terrified of offending a customer and jeopardizing China's WTO accession. There was a stark contrast between the stern statements issued domestically—where official reports depicted the Yugoslav people’s morale in their resistance against aggression as soaring—and Premier Zhu’s own stance: "I don't know; there isn't enough information." Does China actually have a position or not? Why this vacillation? China dislikes American overbearingness yet fears offending the U.S.; it speaks of the Yugoslav people’s united resistance while worrying about its own predicament should NATO succeed. It adopts a sanctimonious, "stick-to-the-facts-only" attitude. Little wonder, then, that even domestic experts on Yugoslavia criticized Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji for saying too little about the Kosovo issue during his U.S. visit. Such inconsistency between words and deeds at home and abroad has led to China being perceived as a "major power" that tells people what they want to hear—pandering to anyone—and is utterly weak and impotent on the international stage. If China genuinely wishes to alleviate the local population's suffering caused by war, it should act as a major power by actively engaging in international affairs, resisting U.S. hegemony, and taking the initiative to seek diplomatic avenues—joining forces with other nations to find alternatives to NATO’s military intervention and to de-escalate the Kosovo conflict. China needs to reflect on the fact that it is not without the power to make a difference internationally. Had China withstood the pressure during the Gulf War and prevented the UN Security Council from authorizing U.S. military action, Iraq would not be subject to arbitrary U.S. bombing today; had China successfully advocated for exempting food and medical supplies from embargoes, countless lives could have been saved. It is precisely because the U.S. was allowed to act with impunity that it has become increasingly brazen—openly sidelining the UN and positioning NATO as the world's policeman. 

China has historically distinguished between the government and the people, yet today's Premier fails to see that beyond U.S. officials, business leaders, and the media, there is also the American public. Last year, when the U.S. mobilized for military action to inspect Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, three key administration figures—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Advisor—faced such tough questioning from university students in Ohio that they were left speechless and embarrassed; since then, government officials have not dared to debate policy on college campuses. It was precisely during Zhu's visit to the U.S. that major American campuses were actively debating the Kosovo issue. When Noam Chomsky and Edward Said—both staunch opponents of NATO's military action—spoke at Columbia University in New York, students who could not get into the packed hall refused to leave. There are indeed enlightened individuals among the American public who do not approve of their government's actions. This was precisely the opportunity for China to win back the American people; yet,

was it really that segment of the American public that Premier Zhu feared offending? 

The Kosovo crisis was the most significant event in international politics at the time and a potential turning point for China to restore its international standing. Zhu Rongji’s visit to the U.S. during this period amounted to a tacit acceptance of NATO’s aggression. When facing the American public, he appeared spineless and evasive; his conduct once again exposed a discrepancy between China’s words and deeds, causing him to lose the stature befitting a Chinese premier. Naturally, the American press applauded him: Zhu was interested in economics. Unlike Jiang Zemin—who would at least attempt to offer justifications regarding politics or ideology—Zhu was entirely pragmatic, steering clear of such topics altogether.

The Espionage Issue

Nations routinely gather intelligence on one another—whether openly or covertly—with a tacit mutual understanding. This practice is as old as history itself, though it has intensified in modern times. In Western nations, the figure of the secret agent or spy has been romanticized and woven into the cultural fabric. A breach of one’s own national secrets is, of course, a deeply embarrassing affair. Accusations and denials are exchanged back and forth, regardless of their veracity. One of the most notorious recent espionage cases in the U.S. involved Jonathan Pollard, a CIA analyst who provided top-secret national intelligence to Israel over an extended period. Interestingly, when President Clinton invited Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Camp David for negotiations last year, Netanyahu actually made Pollard’s release a condition for the talks; while Clinton did not agree outright, he did consent to consider the request. Despite the magnitude of this espionage scandal, it did not trigger an anti-Israel backlash; instead, Israel was able to bargain with the U.S.

In contrast, the U.S. made a massive issue out of the case of Wen Ho Lee. In this instance, Lee’s sole "offense" was a violation of Department of Energy regulations—specifically, failing to file a report after a trip to China, an incident that likely occurred back in the 1980s. Lee had been under surveillance for years without any evidence of wrongdoing surfacing; he was fired from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the regulatory violation but has never been formally charged with a crime. Around 1995, based on reports from spies embedded in China, the U.S. discovered that China had developed the capability to manufacture miniaturized nuclear warheads. It then brazenly claimed that this technology originated from the highly classified U.S. W88 design—information allegedly provided by [Wen Ho] Lee. Yet, what is so surprising about China achieving by 1995 a technological feat that the U.S. had mastered in the 1970s and 80s? After all, China had previously managed to produce a state-of-the-art atomic bomb entirely on its own in just four years. It is absurd to suggest that, despite allegedly stealing intelligence, it would still take China over a decade to produce a miniaturized warhead. Such accusations hold no water, whether viewed through the lens of fact or logic. The allegations stemmed from U.S. spies operating within China—confirming that the U.S. was indeed conducting espionage there—yet the U.S. turned around and accused China of spying in America. This uproar served multiple U.S. agendas: beyond internal factional infighting and anti-China forces seizing the opportunity to make trouble, it was used to gain leverage in WTO negotiations. Most malicious of all, however, was the attempt to portray China’s achievements as mere plagiarism of U.S. technology. This mirrors the 1950s narrative that the Soviet atomic bomb design came from the Rosenbergs—a smear tactic akin to calling a deer a horse, yet one that cost the Rosenbergs their lives. 

Consequently, for China, these espionage accusations constitute an insult in disguise; they touch upon national dignity, rendering any detailed explanation or defense unnecessary. As Premier, one should retort: "We have no intention of interfering in your country's internal investigations. If the matter involves China, a formal diplomatic note should be submitted through proper channels, and we will respond accordingly. To bypass formal diplomatic procedures while the media sensationalizes claims of Chinese espionage is both irresponsible and discourteous. Furthermore, characterizing China's achievements as plagiarism from other nations constitutes an insult to our country. The foundation of friendly U.S.-China relations lies in mutual respect; we hope the U.S. side takes note of this." Zhu Rongji answered the question this way: "I don't know; I truly don't know. I specifically asked Jiang Zemin, and he was completely in the dark; Jiang even asked the military, and they didn't know either. We are willing to cooperate with the U.S. side to help clarify the matter; if the U.S. agrees to let us investigate, we agree to let them investigate as well. China has absolutely no espionage activities aimed at stealing U.S. intelligence. With U.S. technology being so advanced, how could there even be a leak? I served as a chief engineer for forty years, and not a single piece of advanced technology in my factory came from the U.S.; I get scared the moment I hear [about this]..."

Zhu Rongji tried to be clever but offered a feeble defense: "I don't know, Jiang doesn't know, the military doesn't know." What is the implication of such an explanation? It is a classic bureaucratic tactic for shirking responsibility, creating the impression that he is evading the issue. Fearing his explanation wasn't enough, Zhu went further and promised to assist the U.S. investigation. Who has ever heard of a national premier voluntarily offering to cooperate with another country to investigate allegations that their own nation stole that country's intelligence? The implication is that the leadership didn't steal anything—if theft occurred, it was done by subordinates acting on their own initiative! In offering to assist the investigation, was Zhu Rongji acting as an official of China or of the U.S.? Such cooperation amounts to a total surrender of sovereignty and a national humiliation. If this was merely diplomatic rhetoric, it treated national sovereignty as a joke and came across as insincere—wasn't that a loss of national dignity? Zhu's statements became increasingly absurd; finally, he simply claimed that China engaged in no espionage activities against the U.S. at all, asserting his country's innocence. Zhu wanted Americans to believe that China collected absolutely no U.S. intelligence. If a nation does not collect foreign intelligence, how can it prepare for major events? Is a national leader who holds such a view not incompetent and a detriment to the country? For a premier to spout nonsense regarding major national affairs and international relations—isn't that a disgrace to all Chinese people? Zhu even went so far as to make ridiculous, irrelevant claims, asserting that he had served as a chief engineer for forty years and that his factory used no advanced U.S. technology. Yet, given that Zhu was labeled a "Rightist" in the 1950s and sent down to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, where did this forty-year career as a chief engineer come from? Before the 1970s, China was encircled by the U.S.—so how could there be any talk of American technology? In any case, such remarks were completely beside the point. Examples of Zhu trying to be clever or acting smug abound. While he is hailed as shrewd and capable, what stands out—aside from that—is an air reminiscent of the "young playboys" of old Shanghai.

**Donations and Human Rights**

When it comes to political donations, the U.S. is increasingly succumbing to the politics of money, mirroring the practices of its own puppet regimes. There is no shortage of political brokers born in Indonesia or Taiwan who are adept at this game; naturally, they thrive in this environment. These individuals cultivate connections on both sides of the Pacific to profit from the situation—activities that are not state-sponsored, though they likely involve the children of high-ranking Chinese officials. All accusations leveled against China were baseless and unsubstantiated. Zhu Rongji could have simply dismissed them as nonsense—claims China had already denied. Instead, he tried to be clever, smugly remarking that if the Chinese government had truly intended to intervene, the sum wouldn't have been a paltry $300,000, given China's foreign exchange reserves of $140 billion. Is that really a valid argument? It might be $300,000 this time and $3 million the next—who knows? Premier Zhu likely fails to realize that some things simply should not be said by a national leader.

As for human rights, this is the West's favorite weapon against the current Chinese regime. Only a spineless administration like the present-day CCP—eager to curry favor with the West and establish a "strategic partnership" with the U.S.—would have gone through the motions of signing political and human rights covenants. Little did they know, it was a trap deliberately set by the U.S. No sooner had China signed than movements to form opposition parties sprang up both at home and abroad. This coincided with a simultaneous eruption of crises—mass layoffs of industrial workers, rural unrest, public outrage against corrupt officials, and economic instability—leaving the CCP in a state of panic. With "stability overriding everything," the party resorted to mass arrests and harsh sentencing; yet, the flimsiness of their pretexts and the severity of the punishments made it difficult to justify their actions. The CCP's official line was that these were not issues of political rights but acts of subversion against the government—a sophistical argument that naturally fails to hold water. Zhu Rongji’s approach was to acknowledge China’s shortcomings regarding human rights while urging Americans to recognize the significant improvements China had already made and the fact that, given time, it would meet the required standards. In effect, Zhu’s response conceded the validity of Western definitions and standards of human rights and admitted that the interpretations China had previously advanced to counter the U.S. were disingenuous. What Zhu sought...

What Zhu asked for was that the U.S. not be too hasty in pressing its human rights demands on China. In other words, Zhu sought to gain understanding by effectively capitulating to the West. Once again, he was willing to sacrifice the nation's dignity to save his own face.

The Nike Experience

Judging by the conversation described above, it is impossible to see how Zhu clarified any "misunderstandings" or refuted any "tall tales." Instead, his remarks felt like the "defense" offered by a defendant in a Chinese courtroom: either trying to muddle through with vague answers and denials, or feigning contrition in hopes of leniency. The only "misunderstanding" Zhu was able to effectively address concerned the U.S.-China trade imbalance. He had clearly put in the effort to prepare for the discussion on bilateral trade. 

Zhu took particular pride in using his "research" on Nike sneakers to argue that China had been unfairly blamed regarding its trade surplus. While he was evasive on other topics—complaining that his "tongue had grown calluses" from repeating himself—he spoke with great relish about the Nike study. He had been talking about it since the previous year, both at home and abroad; perhaps because no one had ever challenged him, he believed his argument was watertight. During this U.S. visit, he spent an hour discussing the matter with local officials immediately after landing, and in his final, climactic speech at MIT before leaving the country, he once again offered this "explanation" regarding Nike:

The vast majority of China's exports to the U.S.—over 70 percent—consist of processing trade... The value added within China is negligible. China's exports to the U.S. are, in reality, a transfer of exports that would otherwise come from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Because their labor costs are too high, they ship raw materials and components to China for assembly and subsequent export to the U.S.; consequently, their own trade surpluses with the U.S. have decreased. 

I conducted an investigation into this issue back in 1987, when I was serving as the Executive Deputy Director of the State Economic Commission. I looked into athletic shoes—Nike, Adidas, and Reebok—that were manufactured in China for export to the U.S. Since most of these factories were located in Fujian Province along the coast, I conducted my investigation there. At that time, factories in Fujian were primarily operated by Taiwanese manufacturers; the ex-factory price of a pair of shoes was twenty dollars, while the retail price in the United States was one hundred and twenty dollars. I investigated one such factory and found that out of that twenty dollars, only two dollars remained for the workers performing the heavy labor. Yet, on an annual basis, that amount was enough to support two workers. As for the raw materials—some came from Japan and others from the United States; the key air-cushion component alone cost two dollars and was sourced from the U.S., likely protected by a patent. The picture was clear: a shoe sold for $120 in the U.S. had an export price of only $20 from China, with China retaining just $2 dollars. Nevertheless, it did indeed support our workers, which was beneficial for China. That was the situation in 1987—but what about now? 

Recently, I met a Taiwanese footwear tycoon. He told me that he ranks first globally in sports shoe sales, and all his shoes are manufactured in China. I asked him how the current situation compares to 1987; he said it is much the same. After arriving in the U.S. this time, I sent my secretary to various department stores in Chicago to check shoe prices. I discovered that the average price for Nike, Adidas, and Reebok shoes in American stores was between eighty and one hundred and twenty dollars—roughly the same as before, or perhaps slightly cheaper. When I checked the labels, they all read "Made in China." It is evident that the U.S. does not manufacture these labor-intensive products; importing them from other countries is expensive, whereas producing them in China offers high quality at a low price. This benefits the American people and also benefits China by boosting employment. However, the majority of the value involved actually represents a transfer of value from other countries exporting to the U.S. Therefore, I strongly agree with a prominent MIT professor, Paul Krugman—I often read his insightful articles. In one piece, he argued precisely this point: the situation does not indicate that China’s market is closed, but rather that Japan’s market is closed. 

What exactly was Zhu trying to prove with this line of reasoning? If the aim was to demonstrate that Chinese imports make goods cheaper for Americans, then citing Nike as an example is highly inappropriate. It is the Chinese-made goods sold in "99-cent stores" that are truly cheap; Nike sneakers have not become inexpensive simply because they are manufactured in China. How can a pair of sneakers costing over a hundred dollars be considered "low-priced"? Suppressing wages served only to boost profits; prices did not fall but instead rose year by year, leaving American consumers with no benefit. If Zhu intended to argue that a factory-gate price of a mere twenty dollars is negligible compared to a retail price exceeding one hundred dollars, that fails to explain the nearly sixty-billion-dollar trade deficit between the two sides. If he sought to prove that the profits went to Taiwanese manufacturers rather than himself, one might ask: if your country voluntarily ceded those profits, what does that have to do with the United States? The findings of Zhu Rongji’s decade-long investigation revealed nothing more than a well-known fact: China’s foreign trade essentially serves the interests of capitalists from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the U.S., while China itself earns a pittance. Yet Premier Zhu—who constantly cited figures—whether intentionally or inadvertently, glossed over one crucial number: where exactly did the two-dollar income per pair of shoes for Chinese workers come from? A single worker produces at least a hundred pairs of sneakers a day; by that logic, wouldn't they be earning over a thousand dollars daily? Foreign-invested processing plants in China—particularly those owned by Taiwanese businessmen—are notorious for exploiting workers. Workers are confined in poorly ventilated factories with barred windows and steel doors, toiling for at least twelve hours a day, with strict limits on the frequency and duration of bathroom breaks. They get at most two days off a month, earn only around two dollars a day, and receive just a few cents for each pair of shoes produced. Premier Zhu lumped manufacturers' expenses, kickbacks, and local payoffs all under the heading of "worker income"! Here was the premier of the world's most populous nation—a leader of a Communist Party that claims the working class is the master of the state—gleefully discussing the introduction of sweatshops. Whom was he trying to persuade? If it was capitalists, his efforts were superfluous; they were the very inventors of the sweatshop model. If it was American politicians—whose profession relies on glib rhetoric—Zhu’s defense was too childish to even attempt such a contest of wits. If it was the American academic and media communities, Zhu himself admitted his arguments originated with them, yet his lacked their sophisticated academic packaging. That leaves only the workers, farmers, students, and the general public as his intended audience. Over the past two decades of globalization, American workers have seen their fortunes decline and their circumstances deteriorate as factories relocated overseas and industries vanished. Real wages have fallen, leading to a "Third-Worldization" of the domestic economy. Hearing about sweatshops only adds insult to injury; how could anyone expect that to win people over? For farmers and agricultural workers, the "Nike experience" is irrelevant; what they seek is not a way to vent frustration but a way forward—specifically, expanding exports by leveraging America's comparative advantage in agriculture. As for students and the general public, while many remain disengaged, there is widespread aversion to sweatshops. Had Zhu and his advisors paid even the slightest attention to grassroots activism in the U.S., they would not have been foolish enough to cite the "Nike experience" in an attempt to curry public favor. A couple of years ago, a highly successful grassroots movement emerged in the U.S. to boycott multinational corporations profiting from sweatshops. The movement was sparked by a scenario identical to the one Zhu Rongji cited: two teenage female workers from Honduras toured the U.S. to denounce GAP—a brand highly popular among young people—for its practices. GAP sourced its products from manufacturers in Latin America. In Honduras, the factory employing these two young women was owned by a Taiwanese businessman who colluded with local officials and criminal elements to exploit and abuse the female workers; their vile, sordid conduct was truly appalling. Workers suffered abuse and frequent injuries, all while earning a mere ten to twenty cents an hour. Driven by righteous indignation, American students and citizens boycotted GAP stores. Subsequently, a succession of sweatshop scandals came to light, with the sneaker giant Nike also implicated. Nike initially tried to evade responsibility by claiming it merely had a contractual relationship with the sweatshops. However, ultimately bowing to the pressure of the boycott, the company agreed to establish labor standards that its contractors were required to meet or risk losing their contracts. The memory of the Nike scandal was still fresh, yet the Premier of China stood at a prestigious American university and spoke glowingly of the "Nike experience." This went beyond a mere joke; it was a source of utter embarrassment for the nation. China ought to, at the very least, guarantee fair treatment and wages for its workers, even if it does not go so far as to claim they are the "masters of the country." China’s approach is precisely the opposite: it engages in the dumping of labor at depressed prices, thereby fueling cutthroat competition in the international labor market. By Zhu Rongji’s own logic, this is only natural and right. 

At home, Zhu is known for his candor. Yet, his words and actions in the United States revealed only sycophancy, not frankness. In reality, Zhu’s "candor" was merely a euphemism for "nakedness"—a lack of all pretense. Accustomed to wielding absolute authority and issuing commands in China, he rebranded his arbitrary decision-making as "candor." In the U.S., however, he fawned over American power brokers and acted in total subservience to U.S. capitalists; he was obsequious before the American media and revered economists from MIT and Harvard as if they were deities. To him, American capitalists *were* the American people, and the pursuit of profit was simply human nature. Thus, he laid bare his snobbish instincts. Indeed, his rise to prominence was driven precisely by this thoroughgoing "nakedness."

Eyes Fixed Upward, Oblivious to the People

Zhu Rongji’s whirlwind tour took him to six cities in nine days. On both the East and West Coasts, his scheduled meetings with the Chinese community were delayed or postponed. What was keeping him so busy? Upon landing in Los Angeles, his first order of business was explaining his "Nike trade theory" to the governor and mayor and holding a private, lengthy discussion with Disney CEO Michael Eisner. In Washington, he exhausted himself over WTO negotiations, meeting with heavyweights from Congress, the business world, and the political establishment. In Denver, he insisted on visiting the stadium of a championship football team—even though the season was long over—and, emulating Deng Xiaoping, donned a cowboy hat, accepted the gift of a live steer, and toured a massive Western ranch. In Chicago, he seized the honor of ringing the opening bell at the futures exchange. In New York, he felt a trip to the U.S. wouldn't be complete without visiting the Nasdaq; there, he presented a bull statue to Wall Street, wishing for a perpetual bull market. He met with the two titans who hold the reins of the global economy—Greenspan and Rubin—and attended a banquet for 1,500 financial tycoons in New York, an event of a scale unseen since Gorbachev’s visit. In Boston, beyond meeting with luminaries from the business, political, and academic worlds, he fulfilled a long-held wish to visit the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and deliver an academic address.

Zhu had no time to attend to minority groups—Blacks, Latinos, or Asian-Americans—nor to labor and agrarian movements, environmental and grassroots organizations, progressive groups, civic activists, or the general public. Surrounding Zhu, aside from fellow Chinese, one saw only white people; and among those whites, there was no room for anyone other than the impeccably dressed, imposing members of the upper crust. Zhu’s eyes were fixed solely on money, power, and influence. In interviews with the press, he stated that China would remain a socialist country forever, though he emphasized that it would be socialism "with Chinese characteristics."

At present, few nations still claim to be socialist, and only two—one large and one small—command the international stage: China (the large one) and Cuba (the small one). China serves as a model of a pro-American developing nation, while Cuba stands as the standard-bearer for anti-American sentiment among developing nations. Cuban President Fidel Castro’s visit to the United States stood in stark contrast to Zhu Rongji’s tour. Years earlier, when Castro came to New York for a United Nations summit, the city’s mayor and the state governor refused to host him and subjected him to various indignities. Yet, his visit remained a hot news topic, and the media was compelled to broadcast his speeches. Unlike Zhu Rongji, Castro’s charisma stemmed from his unyielding defiance of the American superpower; despite being a tiny nation on America’s doorstep, Cuba had withstood everything from military intervention, covert attacks, assassination attempts, and sabotage to economic strangulation and total boycotts. Far from submitting, Cuba actively engaged in every possible international struggle against the U.S., becoming a hero to the Third World; even the people of Europe admired the courage shown by him and his country. Among the American public, the crowds he drew were too significant for the mainstream to ignore. Upon stepping off the plane, his very first stop was Harlem. In the jam-packed hall, he remarked: New York capitalists had arranged a lavish banquet for him, but that was merely a matter of calculating mutual interests. Only here—in Harlem—did he feel the warmth of being back home. Yet when Zhu Rongji arrived in New York, he went out of his way to avoid Harlem; it was only at the capitalists' banquet for a thousand guests that he truly felt the boundless warmth of being treated like an honored guest!

**Stale Humor and Nauseating Sycophancy**

Zhu Rongji, usually known for his poker face, was portrayed by the Chinese-language media as witty and humorous. While touring the Lincoln Bedroom at the White House, he proudly recited the phrase "of the people, by the people, and for the people" from Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, earning applause from his hosts. The practice of reciting famous Western quotes to foreigners dates back to the days of Hu Yaobang and Fang Yi; General Secretary Jiang Zemin was perhaps the most notorious for this, particularly for his penchant for reciting the Declaration of Independence. Such tedious showing-off is tolerable once, but twice is too much. After the extensive publicity Jiang Zemin had already received for this, Zhu’s performance seemed incredibly dull. National leaders certainly have personal preferences, but playing around with English comes across as terribly shallow. Chinese leaders—showing no real skill in governance or diplomatic maneuvering, yet indulging in the ostentatious display of English—can hardly blame foreigners for looking down on them. When asked about gender equality in China, Zhu trotted out the same tired "joke" common to many Asian nations: "Men and women in China are very equal; my wife holds the purse strings in our household." If Zhu wished to avoid a direct answer, did he really have to resort to such a well-known cliché? Naturally, the audience played along with applause and laughter. While Zhu’s wit and humor were stale, his sycophancy was genuine. He was utterly awestruck by America's advanced state. When the topic of the "China threat" arose, he stated repeatedly: China currently lags ten times behind the United States, and even in fifty or sixty years, it still won't catch up; China will never pose a threat to the U.S. but will always remain a friend, with a market that grows increasingly important to America. With technology as advanced as America's, surely they are capable of keeping secrets? Don't Chinese leaders back home constantly proclaim—almost like a mantra—that the 21st century belongs to China? Why, then, do they shrink to the stature of a dwarf when facing Americans?

Many people surely find these "masterstrokes" of Zhu's familiar, as they mirror the standard diplomatic style of the old Kuomintang (KMT). It is hardly surprising, then, that Chinese-language media with deep historical ties to the KMT heap such praise upon him. To be fair, compared to the way the KMT—both old and new—would grovel on the ground, Zhu merely bends at the knees; he stands a cut above. Compared to KMT officials who dared not lift their heads and trembled with fear before Westerners, Zhu shows some backbone by acknowledging that China lags fifty or sixty years behind the U.S. And compared to Lee Teng-hui’s demeanor, Zhu’s articulate and confident manner is certainly dignified. Zhu embodies the ideal that the KMT aspired to but never achieved. Given this, it is no mystery why the overseas Chinese community and international students—to put it politely—view him as too weak, or—to put it bluntly—accuse him of being a traitor and a sellout.

**Careful Orchestration and Protective Handling**

The applause from KMT-aligned Chinese media stems from a shared mindset. But how do we explain the reaction of the U.S. media? Only by understanding this can we unravel the mystery of why Zhu adamantly refused to change the dates of his visit. A close observation reveals that everyone in the U.S.—from government officials and business tycoons to the media—coordinated their roles perfectly to ensure Zhu was well looked after. The moment Zhu set foot on U.S. soil, all strident anti-China rhetoric vanished; the moment he left, it resumed. Issues like espionage and campaign donations had been making a huge noise, yet suddenly went quiet. How could it be such a coincidence? It turns out the visit was deliberately scheduled during a congressional recess, ensuring no new anti-China legislative moves would arise. Interviews with outlets like PBS and CNN followed identical scripts. Moreover, the journalists abandoned their characteristically aggressive style, keeping their questions restrained. Perhaps the only thing that caught Zhu off guard was a follow-up question from CNN regarding TMD (Theater Missile Defense): "How would China react if the U.S. insisted on including Taiwan?" Zhu was momentarily stunned; he gave an awkward laugh and replied, "What else could we do? We would simply have to oppose it." Zhu dared neither to speak toughly nor to evade the questions; in his agitation, his weakness and awkwardness were plainly visible. With anti-China right-wingers holding back for the moment and grassroots leftists barred from meeting him, how could Zhu possibly find this scenario easy to handle? Apart from Gorbachev, no other figure—including Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin—had ever received such lavish treatment. This fact alone is sufficient proof that the United States was placing its bet on Zhu.

IV. A Historical Phenomenon

**Undermining and Betraying the Nation: Pocketing National Interests and Selling Them Off Cheaply**

Zhu’s strategy of "venting anger" (appeasement) has now been fully revealed, and it relies on the same old tactics: taking blows without fighting back, enduring verbal abuse without retort, meekly accepting whatever comes one's way, and allowing others to vent their rage at will. This is the role of the so-called "whipping boy" in Western parlance. Of course, this tactic has a long history and was not invented by Zhu. Zhu simply took it to new heights, carrying on Deng Xiaoping’s mantle of "biding one's time and never taking the lead." When facing Americans, he acted as if standing on the edge of an abyss or walking on thin ice, terrified of causing the slightest offense. Yet, despite more than a decade of China "biding its time," why is it still constantly used as a target for others to vent their frustrations? Furthermore, back in 1980, Deng Xiaoping sacrificed the lives of Chinese soldiers and damaged Sino-Vietnamese relations to "punish Vietnam" on behalf of the United States; why did such a sacrifice—paid for in blood and sweat—fail to earn enough credit to offset the perceived "offenses" for which China was being punished? Clearly, the philosophy of appeasement is fundamentally flawed: the less backbone one shows, the more national dignity is lost, and the more one is bullied; the more one pleads and displays weakness, the more one is lashed. The ancient feudal maxim—exemplified by Lou Shide’s practice of letting spit dry on his face without wiping it off—has long since been adopted by traitors and sycophants as a means of begging and a skill for selling out their country.

**The Li Hongzhang of the Twenty-First Century**

Tracing the diplomatic "magic weapon" of appeasement—or "venting anger"—leads us from Zhu Rongji back to Deng Xiaoping, then to Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, and finally to Li Hongzhang. The pinnacle of Li Hongzhang’s appeasement efforts occurred in Japan, where he literally "fed himself to the tiger" by taking an assassin's bullet. Yet, Japan’s anger was not assuaged; it still seized Taiwan and forced the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In turn, Li Hongzhang—the master of appeasement—developed a strategy of "managing barbarians through appeasement," shuttling between the Great Powers (Britain, the US, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan) to play them against one another. In a desperate bid to minimize losses to Japan, he would beg Britain and the US for help, offering them rewards in exchange for their assistance in dealing with Japan. This endless cycle of groveling before the Great Powers resulted in the loss of sovereign rights and national humiliation—outcomes he nonetheless regarded with a sense of pride. He became an indispensable figure in foreign diplomacy; when the Great Powers negotiated with China, they specifically named Li Hongzhang as their counterpart. The legacy of "Li the Appeaser" from that era is mirrored today in "Zhu the Appeaser." On the surface, how could the China of today possibly be compared to the China of the late Qing Dynasty? Premier Zhu, an engineer by training and a former business school dean, speaks fluent English and converses with ease among Western tycoons—how does he resemble the likes of "His Excellency Li," with his shaved head, peacock-feathered cap, and habit of spitting wherever he pleased? Yet, if we make a "quantum leap" back over a century, we find that Li Hongzhang’s mastery of "Western affairs" was, if anything, more sophisticated than that of Zhu Rongji today. Li’s efforts to enrich the state and strengthen the military—the Self-Strengthening Movement—share the same fundamental flaws as the "Reform and Opening Up," market economy, and globalization drive championed by Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji: a focus on superficial appearances rather than substance, and a mindset that defers to Westerners while lacking faith in oneself. The only difference lies in the nature of globalization across the two eras, which dictated different forms of imitation and capitulation. In the late 19th century, Li Hongzhang, intimidated by imperialist military might, sought to import Western firearms and artillery and emulate the Western path; Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji, awestruck by Western prosperity and advancement, plunged headlong into "Reform and Opening Up," attracting foreign capital and integrating into the international economic cycle. Li sought to build a form of capitalism with "Chinese characteristics"—specifically, those of the Qing dynastic system; Deng and Zhu also sought a capitalism with "Chinese characteristics"—this time, those of the Communist Party’s authoritarian regime. Li Hongzhang’s reforms began with Western weaponry and expanded to include Western instructors, companies, and institutions; Deng Xiaoping’s reforms started with Western technology and capital, evolving under Zhu Rongji to encompass Western management practices, rules, and institutional frameworks. The Qing government was militarily disarmed; the CCP government has raised the white flag economically. Li Hongzhang was the designated negotiating partner for imperialist powers; Zhu Rongji is the darling of multinational capitalists. Yet, when comparing these two eras, the truly significant difference is this: the Chinese people today have rebuilt their national self-respect and confidence. However, even this advantage faces a crisis. Official corruption has reached unprecedented levels; the people's self-respect, self-confidence, and ability to distinguish right from wrong have been gradually eroded by the money-worship and snobbery that accompanied the Reform and Opening-up. Of course, one cannot simply equate Zhu Rongji with Li Hongzhang; Zhu’s background also includes a formative period of learning from the Soviet model.

**Why Zhu Was Chosen**

From the moment Zhu took office in 1991, international capitalists and Western "China hands" identified him as China's Gorbachev. During his recent visit to New York, he was once again compared to Gorbachev—a comparison he himself rejected. In truth, the West demonstrated keen insight, yet Zhu’s denial was not merely a matter of modesty. His US visit marked a significant milestone: the debut of "China's Gorbachev" on the international stage. To capitalists, the label "Gorbachev" signifies an agent operating within a communist state. In this sense, by choosing Zhu Rongji over Jiang Zemin, they made the right choice. However, Zhu’s denial was based on the nature of the role itself; in terms of personality and character, he and Gorbachev are indeed not entirely alike.

The West selected Zhu—according to American China experts—because he was the most staunch advocate of a market economy in China, even though his leadership style remained that of a "strongman" bureaucrat rather than a democrat. In fact, what regime acting as an American puppet has ever been anything other than a strongman-style dictatorship? Consider the two democratically elected presidents in Latin America (in Chile and Haiti): one was assassinated at the behest of the CIA, while the other was overthrown by the CIA in collusion with the military. Being a "strongman" is a key prerequisite for serving as a US proxy. Without a strongman like Deng Xiaoping, could China have tilted so rapidly and decisively toward the United States? Ultimately, of course, the decisive factor is the ability to safeguard the interests of international capital; opening domestic markets is precisely what transnational capital desires. Through his bold domestic actions—relentlessly paving the way for international capital—Zhu Rongji proved his mettle as an agent to the West. By the standard of "delivering results," Zhu far surpassed Gorbachev. Gorbachev politically dismantled the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union for the West, yet he remained rather sluggish regarding economic liberalization. Russia’s total capitulation to the West—across political, economic, and cultural spheres—required Yeltsin to carry the process forward.

**Gorbachev or Yeltsin?**

Drawing parallels between the Soviet Union’s Gorbachev, Ligachev, and Yeltsin and China’s Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji reveals striking similarities. In terms of style, personality, and ideology, the pairings of Jiang with Gorbachev, Li with Li, and Zhu with Yeltsin are remarkably apt. Thus, one cannot simply equate Zhu with Gorbachev. Regarding personality and status, Jiang was the more suitable candidate for the role of "China’s Gorbachev." While Jiang’s overtures to the West and the US were perhaps not as brazen as Zhu’s, the difference was merely a matter of degree—a case of "fifty steps versus a hundred steps." Jiang failed to secure that role because he tried to please everyone but ended up pleasing no one; he lacked the resolve to commit fully to one side and the capability to deliver results. With Zhu Rongji in the picture, Jiang became superfluous in the eyes of Western capitalists. Looking back at history, Gorbachev initially promoted Yeltsin to counterbalance Ligachev but soon realized Yeltsin threatened his own relationship with the West, leading him to crush Yeltsin. Once Western forces penetrated the Soviet Union, Yeltsin forged direct ties with the West and supplanted Gorbachev. The relationship between Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji differs from the initial Gorbachev-Yeltsin dynamic. This is not because Jiang lacks skill in internal power struggles—quite the contrary; he is adept at internal balancing. Rather, it is because external forces have already entered China, and the current CCP leadership pins its hopes entirely on the powerful momentum of international capital. Even if Jiang senses the situation is precarious, he is powerless to change it—much like the Qing Dynasty, which had no choice but to rely on Li Hongzhang.

Today, Jiang Zemin holds the titles of Party Chairman and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has established the People's Armed Police Force, and has formed the "Shanghai Gang" with Zhu Rongji; his position appears highly secure. Yet, he frequently voices the hope that socialism will not collapse on his watch. Could it be that he might meet the same fate as Gorbachev—bringing down both the Party and himself? History repeating itself is by no means a fantasy. Consider Hua Guofeng: he was Mao Zedong’s designated successor, simultaneously holding the top chairmanships of the Party, the State, and the Military; he allied with Wang Dongxing to control the elite 8341 Unit and commanded an absolute majority in the Politburo—his position seemed unassailable! Yet, in less than two years, he suffered a spectacular collapse. Khrushchev, too, was blindsided by Brezhnev and others just as his authority was at its peak. Even Deng Xiaoping, with all his immense power, nearly faced a betrayal by his close protégé Zhao Ziyang on the eve of the June 4th incident. None of these events were foreseen by the individuals involved. Once the CCP "opened the door to the wolf" by joining the WTO, its internal balance was immediately shattered; a more thoroughgoing "comprador" faction—backed by massive external forces—was bound to coalesce around Zhu Rongji and demand a leadership role in Chinese politics; this outcome appeared inevitable. The very team Jiang Zemin had cultivated—comprador bureaucrats like Qian Qichen, Wu Yi, and Tang Jiaxuan—began defecting to Zhu Rongji’s camp one by one.

An Inevitable Product of the Deng Xiaoping Line

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, like Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, are not isolated cases but rather manifestations of a broader historical phenomenon. The Soviet Union’s trajectory toward capitalism—spanning the eras of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and finally Gorbachev and Yeltsin—was characterized by attempts to simultaneously abandon the socialist path and preserve the Party’s dictatorship. This evolution moved from top-down systemic reform to market-based mechanisms, and from fascist-style control to political liberalization. Ultimately, it produced a leadership class of bureaucrats and elites who lacked revolutionary tempering, had never been tested by wars against foreign aggression, and were utterly detached from the masses. Their values were mired in a chaotic sludge of socialism and capitalism; they engaged in such profound self-deception that they suffered a kind of split personality, with each successive generation proving more inept and obtuse than the last. The truly "clear-eyed" among them were those who realized that this chaotic mess offered no way out; consequently, they devolved into the dregs of society—utterly selfish, devoid of any sense of nation, state, or social responsibility. Consciously seeking to maximize their own gain, they adopted a strategy of completely sacrificing the workers and peasants and fully aligning with the West, even at the cost of the Party’s collapse and national chaos. Figures like Gorbachev and Yeltsin were bound to emerge, sooner or later, in such an environment. While the specific forms of China’s shift toward capitalism may have differed from those of the Soviet Union, the fundamental contradictions remained the same. From the outset, Deng Xiaoping’s capitalist-oriented path involved a more deliberate alignment with the West; yet, he dared not immediately abandon socialism, resorting instead to the smokescreen of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Thus, on one hand, the entire Party was gripped by a form of schizophrenia or multiple-personality disorder; on the other, the Party leadership exhibited an increasingly pronounced comprador nature, regarding the United States as the ultimate model to emulate. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang represented the first wave of Gorbachev- and Yeltsin-like figures, while Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji constituted the second wave. Economically, Deng’s insistence on making "reform and opening up irreversible" was essentially a move to rapidly bind China’s economy to the international capitalist system—a one-way street with no exit. As the problems associated with China’s capitalist shift intensified, the leadership’s incompetence and muddled thinking were increasingly exposed; finding themselves at a loss, they sought all the more to accelerate integration with international capital. Those with the strongest comprador tendencies were the ones who saw the greatest opportunities. To outsiders, Zhu Rongji’s actions appeared to be blatant treason and servile kowtowing; to Zhu and his clique, however, it was a golden opportunity not to be missed—a chance to curry favor through kowtowing and gift-giving, ensuring entry into the WTO and positioning themselves as political brokers between China and the US.

Zhu used the nation's interests as a stepping stone for his own advancement, sacrificing national dignity and personal integrity to ingratiate himself through servility. Yet, could Zhu have possessed the audacity to act without the Party Central Committee's approval? His treasonous policies must have been sanctioned by the Central Committee; this reflects the terminal state of the contemporary CCP, where the collective mindset of the entire top leadership is fixated on the United States, having lost all self-confidence. V. Awakening of the People or a Second "Peaceful Evolution"?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lived in constant fear of "peaceful evolution." According to the CCP's interpretation, "peaceful evolution" refers to the transformation from socialism to capitalism without the use of violence—implying that China remained a socialist society. In reality, however, a capitalist coup had already occurred in China when Deng Xiaoping rose to power. Every step Deng’s line took toward capitalism deepened bureaucratic corruption, increased the economy's external dependency, widened the wealth gap, polarized social classes, created a disconnect between politics and the economy, intensified the regime's reliance on high-pressure tactics, and fostered a public mentality increasingly driven by profit. When Deng passed away in 1997, the leadership trio of Jiang, Li, and Zhu took over just as Hong Kong was being returned to China—a time of great jubilation. Yet, by the end of 1997, they were already feeling the pressure of the Asian financial crisis. Subsequently, Hong Kong’s economy suffered a severe recession, and China’s "soft landing" failed to stabilize. Efforts to restructure state-owned enterprises proved ineffective, leading to mass layoffs; farmers groaned under the burden of exorbitant taxes, arbitrary levies, and the tyranny of local Party officials; the public loathed the rampant corruption; financial crises loomed; society decayed; the ecosystem suffered severe damage; water conservancy infrastructure fell into disrepair; and unprecedented floods ravaged both the north and the south. Faced with this multitude of grave problems, the corrupt bureaucracy was overwhelmed; rhetoric grew increasingly grandiose while confidence plummeted. What was to be done? The existing political and economic structure was no longer viable; change was inevitable. Should they return to the socialist path? Adopt a path of national democratic capitalism? Or accelerate the path of comprador capitalism? Jiang, Li, and Zhu had little real choice; naturally, they moved toward comprador capitalism. Joining the WTO marked a new milestone on this comprador path. In other words, the moment for the CCP’s second "peaceful evolution" had arrived. Either the Party would be torn apart, or its leadership would be replaced by an out-and-out comprador clique—with Jiang becoming superfluous and Zhu Rongji poised to head the new group. This evolution would entail a further intensification of class struggle. The first evolution betrayed socialism and sold out the interests of workers and peasants; the second evolution betrayed nationalism and sold out the interests of the entire nation. The mask has slipped, revealing the dagger beneath; the reality of class struggle has enabled the people to see clearly the path taken by leaders from Deng Xiaoping to Zhu Rongji.

May 1999

V.

A Retrospective and Prospective View of Old-School Revisionism

Sans-culottes

had been already translated. See https://blog.creaders.net/user_blog_diary.php?did=NTY0NjQ1 

VI.

Reflections on Two Matters

Wen Ping

I would like to thank Lao Dong and Lao Huang for organizing today’s symposium. Since I was unable to attend due to work commitments, I am writing down some thoughts here for everyone’s critique and correction.

A few months ago, I watched a long-form historical TV drama recommended by a friend: *Qin Dynasty Epic* (Da Qin Fu). Originally an 80-episode series (with 76 episodes in the broadcast version), it is a magnificent production that stays true to history. It offers a glimpse into how Qin Shi Huang—over two millennia ago—unified the realm, standardized weights and measures, unified the written script, standardized axle lengths for carriages, and harmonized social norms. These actions laid the foundation for China’s political structure for the next two thousand years and established a solid basis for the unity and integration of the Chinese nation.

Chairman Mao once said that he accomplished only two things. It was only after watching *Qin Dynasty Epic* that I truly grasped the profound significance of the first of those two things. To honor Chairman Mao’s legacy, we must fully accomplish the sacred mission of national reunification and the return of Taiwan. National unity and ethnic solidarity are sacred responsibilities that have existed since ancient times.

Look at the political chaos in Europe today; it stems from fragmentation and a lack of unified governance. Had Europe possessed a figure like Qin Shi Huang two thousand years ago, would the European nations still be at war today? Would the two World Wars have occurred? Would they live in such fear of Russia? Would they be unable to stand on equal footing with the United States? Does Europe lack population, land area, or technological innovation? What Europe lacked a millennium ago was a Qin Shi Huang. In terms of political insight, the Chinese people were at least two thousand years ahead of the rest of the world—a fact documented in detail in our written records. How can we not be proud of this?

The second matter Chairman Mao spoke of was the Cultural Revolution. This movement was far-reaching and had a profound impact. I had intended to share some personal reflections—many of my friends and relatives were deeply affected by it, and some even lost their lives—but given my limited knowledge and information, I hope to learn more before discussing it further.

The founding of the People's Republic allowed the Chinese people to stand tall and laid a solid foundation. The policy of Reform and Opening-up enabled the common people to prosper, transitioning from riding bicycles to driving cars and living in luxury homes. Now, the nation is growing strong and influencing the world; beyond the Belt and Road Initiative, this influence is most evident in our firm commitment to upholding the international security order established after World War II. However, even as we hail the Republic, the questions raised during the Yan'an era remain unresolved; the "Market of Rakshasa" still finds a market, and historical scenarios continue to play out in cycles. Analyzing these phenomena is the starting point for understanding the Cultural Revolution—and for grasping its core essence: serving the people.

Today, we cherish the memory of Chairman Mao and keep his teachings close at heart to guide our work and lives, as we continue to do two things well. Thank you all; thank you, Old Dong and Old Huang.

VII.

Cherishing and Revering Chairman Mao

Ye Xianyang

It has been nearly fifty years since Chairman Mao passed away on September 9, 1976, yet his influence endures. As a principal founder of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the People's Republic of China, his ideology and spirit have profoundly shaped generations of Chinese people.

Chairman Mao led the Chinese people in lifting the entire nation from the brink of despair. After the founding of the People's Republic, over 80,000 reservoirs were constructed, solidifying the foundation for agricultural development; an independent and comprehensive industrial system was established, laying the material groundwork for the rapid economic takeoff during the subsequent era of Reform and Opening-up. Furthermore, illiteracy was eradicated, the general quality of the population was raised, and the spiritual outlook of society was transformed. These are truly remarkable achievements.

Moreover, his impact extended globally. The victory of the New Democratic Revolution under his leadership fundamentally altered the landscape of the East and the world. When we speak of the rejuvenation of China, we see that the Chinese nation today not only wields significant global influence but has also laid a solid foundation for the future of human civilization and a fair, equitable world order. We shall forever cherish the memory of Chairman Mao, revere him, and hold his teachings close to our hearts. VIII.

Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Strategy and Wisdom

Remarks at the New York Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of Chairman Mao’s Passing

Hua Junxiong

Mao Zedong was the founder of China’s diplomatic enterprise. His diplomatic strategy and wisdom stand like a towering lighthouse, radiating an eternal glow that illuminated the path for New China amidst a turbulent and complex international landscape. With far-sighted strategic vision, a steadfast and fearless fighting spirit, and flexible, pragmatic diplomatic tactics, he laid a broad and solid foundation for New China’s diplomacy, enabling the nation to gain a firm foothold and emerge prominently on the world stage.

At the inception of New China, the country faced the monumental task of national reconstruction amidst a labyrinthine international environment. Mao Zedong decisively put forward three major diplomatic policies: "starting anew" (or "setting up a new kitchen"), "cleaning the house before inviting guests," and "leaning to one side." "Starting anew" meant refusing to recognize the humiliating diplomatic relations established by the old China with other nations; this allowed China to break free from the shackles of past unequal treaties, reconstruct its foreign relations with a fresh image, and safeguard its sovereignty and independence. "Cleaning the house before inviting guests" meant eradicating imperialist privileges within China, thereby clearing away external interference for national construction and fostering a healthy domestic environment. "Leaning to one side" meant aligning with the socialist camp; amidst the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, this secured invaluable support and assistance for the nascent regime and guaranteed national security. These three decisions served as a stabilizing force, laying a solid cornerstone of independence and autonomy for New China’s diplomacy and enabling the nation to stand tall on the international stage, no longer subject to bullying. On October 1, 1949, standing atop the Tiananmen Rostrum, Mao Zedong solemnly declared to the world: "New China has been founded! The Chinese people have stood up!" These words rang out like a spring thunderclap, awakening the world; the Chinese people were no longer the "Sick Man of East Asia," vulnerable to the whims of others, but an independent and autonomous rising force!

Chairman Mao’s diplomacy was characterized not only by an unyielding backbone but also by a magnanimous spirit; throughout his life, he championed the cause of weaker nations and tirelessly advocated for peace. In the 1950s, when Khrushchev attempted to control China through proposals for a joint naval fleet and long-wave radio stations, Chairman Mao flatly rejected the idea. Even under pressure from the Soviet withdrawal of aid, he steadfastly adhered to the principle of "self-reliance as the foundation, with external assistance as a supplement." It was this unwavering stance that prevented China from becoming a Soviet "satellite state"; instead, the nation built an independent industrial system through its own efforts and achieved the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" milestone. This foundation has become the ballast ensuring China's confidence and strength as a major power today. Chairman Mao’s diplomatic strategy and wisdom were defined by an uncompromising stance on matters of principle and sovereignty—tenets deeply ingrained in the nation's very blood and bones.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Chairman Mao—driven by a fearless fighting spirit and the strategic insight that "one punch thrown now wards off a hundred blows later"—resolutely committed troops to the conflict. The New China, characterized by "little steel but abundant spirit" and the fearlessness of a newborn calf, defeated an arrogant United States that possessed "much steel but little spirit." At the 1954 Geneva Conference, New China stepped onto the international stage as a major power for the first time; facing American isolationism and arrogance, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai skillfully orchestrated diplomatic maneuvers to turn the tide. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, addressing the concerns of Asian and African nations, Premier Zhou—guided by the tone set by Chairman Mao—proposed the principle of "seeking common ground while reserving differences." By pledging not to export revolution and by championing peace, China broke through the U.S. blockade and demonstrated its sense of responsibility to the world. Chairman Mao once remarked with humor that "we 'non-ferrous metals' will inevitably expand." This confidence stemmed from a steadfast commitment to peaceful development and a deep consideration for the shared interests of humanity.

At the Bandung Conference, under Chairman Mao's advocacy, Premier Zhou put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Concise yet profound, these five principles transcended differences in ideology and social systems, providing a fundamental framework for interactions between nations. It represents a significant contribution by China to the theory and practice of international relations, embodying a diplomatic philosophy that pursues peace, equality, and justice. Having garnered widespread recognition and acclaim from the international community, it has gradually become a fundamental norm for state-to-state relations. It has demonstrated to the world the wisdom and sense of responsibility inherent in Chinese diplomacy, while also creating favorable conditions for China to expand its diplomatic reach and forge friendships with numerous nations.

Mao Zedong’s diplomatic strategy and acumen were also evident in his approach to the United States. In 1956, he remarked to Indonesian President Sukarno, "Imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." By using the term "paper tiger" to characterize American imperialism, Mao directly punctured the psychological advantage the U.S. held. He conveyed to the world that while the United States appeared formidable, it was not truly to be feared. This statement not only inspired the Chinese people but also offered hope to many developing nations that challenging hegemony was possible. Mao’s characterization of imperialism and reactionaries as "paper tigers" did not imply underestimating the enemy; rather, it reflected a strategic wisdom of "despising the enemy strategically while taking him seriously tactically." The articulation of the "paper tiger" theory marked a shift in Chinese diplomacy from a defensive posture to an offensive one. Through this metaphor, Mao signaled to the world that China feared neither the United States nor any other powerful entity. Such confidence and courage earned China greater respect on the international stage.

Following more than two decades of post-World War II development, the international landscape underwent profound changes between the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rivalry for global dominance between the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—intensified. Capitalizing on the relative decline of U.S. hegemony, the Soviet Union accelerated its external expansion and vied with the U.S. for global supremacy, posing a grave threat to world peace. While opposing American hegemonism, China also waged a resolute struggle against Soviet hegemonism and great-power chauvinism. In 1969, military clashes erupted between China and the Soviet Union at Zhenbao Island on the Heilongjiang River and at Tielieketi in Xinjiang, resulting in casualties on both sides. In the wake of these events, the Soviet Union’s immediate impulse was not to negotiate with China but to contemplate a "surgical" nuclear strike against the country; targets selected for such an attack included military bases like Xichang and Jiuquan, as well as industrial cities such as Beijing and Changchun. For various reasons, China and the Soviet Union ultimately avoided a nuclear conflict; nevertheless, the Soviet Union's domineering behavior left a deep impression on the Chinese side.

To counter the Soviet threat, China began to re-evaluate the trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In a document titled *Preliminary Assessment of the War Situation*—signed by four veteran marshals: Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—China concluded that the conflict between China and the Soviet Union was more acute than that between China and the U.S., while the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was more acute than that between China and the Soviet Union. The assessment argued that China should fully exploit the U.S.-Soviet rift to ease relations with the United States. This reasoning formed the theoretical basis for the strategy of aligning with the U.S. to counter the Soviet Union. At the time, the United States was also in a precarious position; it had been mired in the Vietnam War since 1964, leading to a sharp rise in military spending. Due to a massive trade deficit, the U.S. suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971, causing the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and undermining confidence in the U.S. dollar; many Western scholars at the time believed the U.S. would lose the Cold War. Against this backdrop, the United States also sought to improve relations with China.

In 1971, Mao Zedong skillfully employed "Ping-Pong Diplomacy," using the humble table tennis ball as a medium to open the door to the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. Subsequently, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to China, followed by President Richard Nixon's visit in 1972 and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué, marking a historic step forward in relations between the two nations. This diplomatic breakthrough not only transformed the relationship between China and the U.S. but also profoundly influenced the global political landscape. It demonstrated Mao Zedong's diplomatic flexibility and wisdom, significantly elevated China's status on the international stage, and created a favorable international environment for the subsequent era of Reform and Opening-up and modernization.

Another characteristic of the international situation during this period was the surging struggle of nations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the interference, control, and oppression of the two superpowers—a movement defined by opposition to imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism. The quest for national independence, national liberation, and popular revolution became an unstoppable historical trend—a major current that Mao Zedong clearly recognized. It was against this backdrop that Mao Zedong formulated the strategic concept of the "Three Worlds," leading to significant adjustments in China's diplomatic strategy. In February 1974, during a conversation with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, Mao Zedong first articulated the strategic concept of the "Three Worlds." The core of this theory was as follows: the United States and the Soviet Union constituted the First World; developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions made up the Third World; and the developed nations situated between these two groups formed the Second World. These "Three Worlds" were interconnected yet fraught with contradictions. Both superpowers—the U.S. and the USSR—sought to bring developing nations under their respective control in various ways, while also bullying developed nations that were less powerful than themselves. Certain developed nations, positioned between the superpowers and the developing world, maintained various forms of colonial-style relationships with Third World countries while simultaneously being subjected—to varying degrees—to the control, threats, and bullying of one superpower or the other. Meanwhile, the vast number of developing nations—formerly colonies or semi-colonies—faced the historic tasks of eradicating the remnants of colonialism, developing their national economies, and consolidating their national independence after gaining sovereignty. As a member of the Third World, China sought to strengthen solidarity with other Third World nations, win over Second World countries, and unite against superpower control and oppression. In the struggle against the hegemonism of the First World superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR), China paid particular attention to uniting with the side that posed less of a threat, thereby concentrating its efforts on opposing the more dangerous hegemonism of the Soviet Union.

Under the historical conditions of the time, Mao Zedong’s strategic concept of the "Three Worlds" played a pivotal role in guiding China's diplomacy. It helped China establish and develop friendly, cooperative relations with Third World nations and other countries, while steadfastly opposing superpower hegemonism and threats of war. More than fifty years have passed since this concept was first proposed; yet today, as the world's largest developing nation, China remains unswerving in its opposition to superpower hegemonism and war threats, and steadfast in its commitment to upholding world peace.

Mao Zedong’s diplomatic strategy and wisdom not only paved a broad path for China's diplomacy in the past but also offer significant insights for China's diplomatic endeavors today. His famous words and strategies remind us that diplomacy is not merely a contest of strength, but a strategic game of wisdom. Today’s China possesses a national dignity forged through fierce, life-and-death struggle; the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" achievements realized through immense sacrifice and frugality; an iron-fisted border defense that ensures retribution against any aggressor, no matter how distant; a diligent and wise people tempered by decades of hard work and learning; an iron-willed military spirit—battle-hardened and ready to answer the call, fight, and triumph; and, above all, a vision for the world that champions a "community with a shared future for mankind." We steadfastly uphold the ideal of the common good; just as Chairman Mao once envisioned, we strive to create our own civilization and prosperity while simultaneously advancing global peace and freedom—a pursuit that has remained the consistent hallmark of Chinese diplomacy.

Looking back over the past century, every step of New China’s rise has been forged amidst turbulent challenges. From the unyielding diplomacy of the Mao era to the sense of responsibility befitting a major power today, what remains constant is our unwavering defense of national sovereignty and our pursuit of world peace. Faced with the profound, once-in-a-century changes unfolding globally, we need not panic; our confidence is ingrained in our very bones, and our wisdom is woven into our development. The Chinese people have witnessed the nation’s journey from a state of deep poverty and weakness to its rise as a major power. Chairman Mao’s diplomatic strategies and wisdom retain profound practical significance in today’s international landscape, continuing to serve as a guiding beacon that illuminates our path forward.

IX.

Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Chairman Mao Zedong’s Passing

Huang Zhecao

Filled with deep respect and admiration, I visited Chairman Mao’s former residence in August 1972. Located in Shaoshan, Hunan—a county-level city with a current population of approximately 100,000—the residence is a typical farmhouse belonging to a well-to-do family of the local upper-middle class. It features a large courtyard with a pond situated just in front, set amidst a beautiful landscape; this is where Chairman Mao was born and spent his early childhood. During my visit, I toured the living room, bedroom, study, kitchen, tool shed, pigsty, and cattle shed, among other areas. The farming tools I saw—such as plows, hoes, dustpans, and straw rain capes—bore a striking resemblance to those used by farming households in Taiwan; even the bamboo tea baskets hanging in the kitchen were of a type commonly used in Taiwan prior to the 1950s. The scene before me evoked a deep sense of familiarity. What surprised me most was a photograph hanging on the wall: a picture of Chairman Mao’s mother, Wen Mei. The inclusion of "Mei" (meaning "younger sister") in her name is a distinctively Hakka naming convention...Giving a female child the name "Mei" (meaning "younger sister") is a unique Hakka tradition; while it remains to be verified whether she was Hakka, for me—a Hakka myself—this is a question to which I have long sought an answer.

Beyond visiting Chairman Mao’s former residence, I traveled to places like Shanghai, Hangzhou, Beijing, and Shenyang; the mainland I witnessed was, in every respect, extremely backward. I wondered when it might ever catch up with the United States. Yet, after six or seven decades of dedicated construction, today’s China has—in many fields—caught up with, neared, or even surpassed the United States; the same holds true for technological development. China’s rapid technological progress is the result of the Chinese people's ingenuity and hard work, but above all, it stems from a correct guiding ideology: Mao Zedong Thought.

Chairman Mao was a hero of extraordinary genius, embodying the roles of revolutionary, military strategist, thinker, statesman, poet, and calligrapher. He toppled the "three great mountains"—feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism—that had long weighed upon the Chinese people. He defeated Japanese aggressors, overthrew Chiang Kai-shek, founded the People's Republic of China, and led the Chinese people to stand tall. He also launched the Cultural Revolution. It is impossible to fully recount Chairman Mao’s monumental achievements in this brief commemorative piece; therefore, I will focus here on how Mao Zedong Thought serves as a rallying call for technological development—a crucial component of China's national strength in the current era.

The foundation of Mao Zedong Thought is materialism—proceeding from reality in all matters—which is also the fundamental premise of materialist epistemology. Naturally, his ideas regarding scientific development in China were also cultivated upon this materialist epistemological foundation. One of Mao Zedong’s earliest speeches concerning scientific development was delivered on February 5, 1940, at a seminar in Yan'an, where he stated: "Natural science is a weapon for people to strive for freedom." Later, at a conference on the question of intellectuals in January 1956, he explicitly declared: "Science is also a productive force." Zhou Peiyuan, Chairman Mao’s scientific advisor, remarked that Chairman Mao’s great banner was, in fact, the banner of science. Chairman Mao advocated a scientific attitude: one should believe in nothing but science, reject superstition, refuse to accept what is incorrect, and engage in critical inquiry. His emphasis on science was comprehensive; he viewed scientific and technological work as part of the superstructure—serving to boost productivity and develop the economy—while also regarding the advancement of science and technology as being just as crucial as establishing state power or building an army. On June 21, 1958, at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission, he stated: "I still hope we can develop a navy and strengthen our air force. And then there is the atomic bomb; without it, others won't take you seriously. So, let us develop some—let us build atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and intercontinental ballistic missiles." Chairman Mao’s words served as the driving force and a rallying call for the development of science and technology across China. He also voiced his encouragement directly to Chinese students studying abroad; during a 1957 meeting at Moscow University, he told them: "The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the final analysis, it is yours. You young people are full of vigor and in the prime of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hopes rest on you." The technology and future represented by these young students are akin to the morning sun—full of boundless vitality and promise. It is no wonder, then, that the Chinese scientific and technical workforce—with young people aged 30 to 40 forming the backbone—displays such characteristics; for instance, the average age of engineers on the BeiDou project is 30, and for the Chang'e lunar exploration project, it is 33—figures that are unprecedented in both Chinese and international history. The following twelve major achievements in Chinese science and technology are all closely linked to the call issued by Chairman Mao:

1)      1964: Successful detonation of China’s first atomic bomb.

2)      1967: Successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb.

3)      1971: Successful sea trials of a nuclear submarine.

4)      1980: Successful launch of the Dongfeng-5 (DF-5) intercontinental ballistic missile.

5)      2019: Successful sea trials of the *Shandong*, China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier (China’s first carrier, the *Liaoning*, was a refitted, partially completed hull named the *Varyag* purchased from Ukraine).

6)      2019: Successful landing of the *Yutu* (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover on the far side of the moon.

7)      2020: Successful commissioning of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.

8)      2022: Completion and operation of China’s space station.

9)      2025: China’s high-speed rail network exceeds 50,000 kilometers with speeds surpassing 350 km/h—ranking first in the world in both categories.

10)    2025: Global automobile sales reach 91.9 million units, with China accounting for over 35%.

11)    2026: Nuclear submarine launch of a simulated intercontinental nuclear missile (JuLang-2 or JuLang-3).

12)    2026: Maiden international flight of the C919 large airliner on the Beijing-Ulaanbaatar route.

The Chinese people take great pride in these monumental scientific and technological achievements. They are deeply grateful to Mao Zedong Thought for guiding the path of development—leading the nation from a state of extreme poverty and backwardness to prosperity and well-being; from being bullied by great powers to achieving independence and self-reliance; and from relying on "millet and rifles" to possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers. Although there was a period when criticism of Mao circulated in mainland China, the people's love and respect for Chairman Mao remained unshaken; indeed, these sentiments only served to reinforce his exalted status in their hearts.

Following Chairman Mao’s passing in 1976, we held a solemn memorial service in the Great Hall of Hunter College (part of the City University of New York) in downtown New York City; the event drew over 2,000 attendees, packing the hall to capacity. The following year—1977—we began holding events on December 25th, Chairman Mao’s birthday, to honor and pay tribute to him; we have done so without interruption for 48 consecutive years. The most recent event took place in 2025, with attendance ranging from 15 to 30 people.

One cannot commemorate Chairman Mao without acknowledging the extraordinary sacrifices made by the Mao family—a family defined by its utter devotion to the cause. Six family members sacrificed their lives for the Chinese revolution and national construction: his younger brother Mao Zemin (aged 47); his wife Yang Kaihui (29); his youngest brother Mao Zetan (30); his cousin Mao Zejian (24); his nephew Mao Chuxiong (the son of his eldest brother, who had been adopted by Chairman Mao; aged 19); and his eldest son Mao Anying (born to Mao and Yang Kaihui), who died in Korea while serving with the Chinese People's Volunteers during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (aged 29). The Mao family’s willingness to shed their blood and sacrifice their lives for the founding of New China was truly moving—an act that commands deep admiration and respect.

Conclusion: Over the next 15 to 20 years, amidst the fierce technological rivalry between the two major powers of China and the United States, Mao Zedong Thought will play an increasingly significant role in rallying and mobilizing China’s scientific and technological development.

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