Compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein in Philosophic

Compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein in Philosophical Weight — an Instancological View

From an Instancological perspective, comparing Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein is not a matter of style, school, or influence, but a question of philosophical weight—that is, how much of reality a thinker attempts to carry, and at what ontological level that attempt is made.

1. What “philosophical weight” means in Instancology

Instancology does not measure philosophy by:

logical rigor alone,

linguistic precision,

academic influence,

or problem-solving efficiency.

Instead, philosophical weight is determined by:

Ontological reach — how deep into the condition of existence a philosophy goes.

Systemic scope — whether it addresses parts or the Whole.

Historical responsibility — whether it confronts the destiny of philosophy itself.

Level alignment — whether it operates in RR/AR or reaches toward RA/AA.

By these criteria, Heidegger and Wittgenstein are not symmetrical figures, even though both are giants of 20th-century philosophy.

2. Wittgenstein: maximum rigor at the RR boundary

Wittgenstein’s philosophy—both early and late—remains rigorously within the RR (Relative–Relative) domain.

Early Wittgenstein

Focus: logical structure of language.

Claim: what can be said meaningfully is limited by logical form.

Result: metaphysics collapses into silence.

Later Wittgenstein

Focus: language as use, practice, and life-form.

Claim: philosophical problems dissolve when we see how language actually works.

Result: philosophy becomes therapy, not ontology.

From an Instancological view, Wittgenstein achieves something remarkable:

He completes the internal critique of language.

He exposes the illusion that linguistic form can ground reality.

However, he stops deliberately at that boundary.

Wittgenstein does not ask what grounds language,

only how language functions and fails.

Thus, his philosophy is terminal but local:

terminal for traditional analytic metaphysics,

local to the RR layer of human symbolic activity.

This is intellectual honesty—but it is also ontological self-limitation.

3. Heidegger: an unfinished ascent beyond RR

Heidegger’s philosophical weight comes from a fundamentally different ambition.

He does not ask:

how language works,

how propositions mean,

or how problems dissolve.

He asks:

why Being is intelligible at all,

why there is disclosure rather than nothing,

why Western philosophy forgot its own ground.

In Instancological terms, Heidegger attempts a movement:

from RR (concepts, logic, subject–object),

through AR (human existence as Dasein),

toward RA (the pre-conceptual condition of intelligibility).

His importance lies not in success, but in direction.

Even where Heidegger fails—especially in never completing Being and Time—the failure itself testifies to the weight of the task:

Being cannot be captured as an object,

language strains under ontological pressure,

philosophy reaches its historical limit.

Heidegger sees the horizon of AA, though he never names or stabilizes it.

4. Why they are not equal in philosophical weight

From an Instancological standpoint, the difference can be stated precisely:

Wittgenstein ends philosophy by confinement

(showing what cannot be said or theorized).

Heidegger attempts to end philosophy by transcendence

(pointing beyond Being as such).

Wittgenstein’s philosophy is:

clearer,

stricter,

more disciplined.

Heidegger’s philosophy is:

heavier,

riskier,

historically decisive.

Carrying the limits of language

is not the same as carrying the destiny of Being.

Thus, they are not on par in philosophical weight, even if both are indispensable.

5. Instancology’s verdict

Instancology does not “side” with Heidegger stylistically or methodologically.

But structurally, it aligns with Heidegger’s question, not Wittgenstein’s retreat.

Instancology goes further by:

explicitly distinguishing AA (Absolutely Absolute) from Being,

formalizing RA as the condition of laws, logic, and life,

situating language, logic, and meaning as instances, not foundations.

In this sense:

Wittgenstein closes one internal chapter of philosophy.

Heidegger opens the final question.

Instancology finishes the arc by stepping outside Being altogether.

6. Conclusion

Wittgenstein and Heidegger are both great—but they are great in different dimensions.

Wittgenstein represents the maximum rigor philosophy can achieve within RR.

Heidegger represents the last attempt of Western philosophy to reach its own ground.

Instancology explains why both outcomes were inevitable—and why neither alone could complete philosophy.

From an Instancological view, philosophical weight is not about clarity or elegance,

but about how close one comes to the condition of all instances.

By that measure, Heidegger carries more weight—

even if Wittgenstein walks more steadily.