A Casual Reflection on U.S.–China–Russia Relations

A Casual Reflection on U.S.–China–Russia Relations

Peter Lee

Some observers like to describe the triangular dynamic among the U.S., China, and Russia with a metaphor from everyday life: the U.S. and China as a married couple, and Russia as the disruptive “third party.”

For years, the “marriage” between Washington and Beijing worked remarkably well. Their cooperation was envied around the world, and together their influence kept expanding. By contrast, former empires such as Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, and Russia gradually declined. Of course, no marriage is free of friction. Even this once-harmonious partnership between the U.S. and China was bound to face challenges.

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. adopted the “America First” strategy. To correct its massive trade deficit, Washington imposed tariffs on multiple countries. In retrospect, this was not entirely unreasonable: no economy can sustain a huge trade imbalance forever without threatening the stability of the dollar system itself. Initially, the U.S. imposed tariffs on just $40 billion worth of Chinese goods — a cautious move. Yet that step triggered a sharp deterioration in U.S.–China relations. What followed was a series of escalating reactions that drove the two powers apart, leaving space for Russia to insert itself and complicate matters.

Russia’s international reputation has long been problematic: its neighbors view it with suspicion, and its militarism is notorious. The invasion of Ukraine has only deepened this negative image, with Moscow frequently issuing threats to other countries. After drifting away from the U.S., China moved closer to Russia. But Russia is no ordinary “third party.” Once entangled, disentanglement becomes extremely difficult. For Beijing, one of the most pressing challenges today is precisely how to manage this dependency.

China now finds itself in a dilemma:

      ?    Getting too close to Russia risks being branded as the aggressor’s ally, provoking technology and market sanctions from the U.S., Europe, and Japan — costs China cannot afford.

      ?    But drifting too far risks retaliation. Moscow could reveal confidential deals or even pivot toward the West, leaving China isolated.

This bind creates what looks like a no-win situation. The longer it drags on, the more it drains China’s resources and finances. In the Ukraine war, Kyiv enjoys the backing of the wealthiest and most technologically advanced countries in the world, while Moscow is supported mainly by China, North Korea, and Iran. Modern warfare hinges on technology and supply chains; China, still a developing country, cannot sustain such open-ended commitments.

The September 3rd military parade may mark another turning point. Until now, Beijing has maintained the fa?ade of “neutrality,” calling for peace talks. Western governments, for their own reasons, tacitly went along with this narrative. But after the parade, where China stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, the alignment became too obvious to ignore. It is likely that the U.S. and Europe will respond with fresh tariffs on Chinese exports — another heavy blow to China’s economy.

What once was a mutually beneficial “marriage” between the U.S. and China has collapsed. By becoming entangled with Russia — this unusually destructive “third party” — Beijing has ended up in a predicament: unwilling to publicly acknowledge the partnership, yet unable to walk away. And that is the no-win puzzle China now faces.