2026年开始第三次世界大战?

2026年开始第三次世界大战?

对于2026年的未来，保加利亚灵媒“盲眼龙婆”巴巴万加（Baba Vanga）过去的预言也被外媒重新检视，她也预言地缘政治、气候危机、人工智能的三重打击，将破坏2026年的和平，甚至提到“中国并吞台湾”引发世界强国大规模战争。

据英国镜报报导，“盲眼龙婆”巴巴万加对2026年做出不祥预言，她预见到地缘政治力量的转变、气候危机和人工智能的崛起将破坏来年的和平。巴巴万加过去曾预言“黛妃去世”等事件，获得人们敬畏，虽然她对明年的预言尚未被证实，但仍引发许多人恐慌。

“丙午战争”这个词在历史上并非指一场特定的著名战争，而更多是指丙午年（60年一循环，如1906, 1966, 2026）在干支命理上被认为是“火旺”之年，常伴随“赤馬紅羊劫”的讖語，預示著動盪、革新與戰爭，歷史上多發生政權更替和重大變故，例如1906年有香港風災，1966年有文革。

第三次世界大战（World War III），简称三战（WWIII），为继第二次世界大战后未来可能爆发的下一次世界大战，目前仅处于幻想中而尚未爆发。但常见于政治论题、大众文化、民众之间茶余饭后的讨论内。该术语至少早在1941年就开始使用，有些角度将其宽其术语应用于有限或更轻微的国际冲突，例如冷战或反恐战争。相比之下，其他角度则假想战争的破坏性影响将超过以前的世界大战。

由于曼哈顿计划中核武器的发展，以及二战接近尾声在广岛与长崎原子弹爆炸中使用核武器，在随后被许多国家获取和部署后，第三次世界大战猜测的共同主题一直围绕在核灾难的潜在风险或是地球文明和生命的毁灭。或是由核武器的引起的世界末日事件可能使地球表面无法居住。在1939年第二次世界大战开始之前，第一次世界大战（1914-1918年）被认为是“结束‘所有’战争的战争”。当两场战争结束后，人们普遍认为世界再也不可能发生如此规模的全球冲突，然而随着冷战的到来以及核武器技术在苏联的部署，第三次世界大战的可能性变得更加合理。在冷战时期，许多国家的军事、市民和政府当局都预见或计划第三次世界大战的可能性。使第三次世界大战的严重性反映人类对大战的不安与担忧。

许多评论员担心2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰可能升级为第三次世界大战。2022年4月，俄罗斯国家电视台则声称第三次世界大战现已开始，并告诉俄罗斯人“认识到”该国现在正在乌克兰与北约基础设施作战。

1914, 1938, 2026: War as a result of political cowardice

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/war-political-cowardice/

Comment by Prince Michael of Liechtenstein

地缘政治情报服务(GIS)创始人列支敦士登亲王迈克尔 (Prince Michael of Liechtenstein)于2025年12月23日《地缘政治情报服务》杂志发文认为，1914年和1938年的政治懦弱，分别导致第一和第二次世界大战。 2025年与1914年和1938年类似，可能导致2026的大规模战争:

降临节(Advent)本应是和平的时期，人们期待着圣诞节、爱与和平的季节以及新年的到来。然而，不仅在降临节期间，实际上整个2025年都被战争的阴影笼罩，并在年底达到高潮。

最可怕的悲剧正在苏丹发生，但东刚果、缅甸和中东地区的冲突和内战仍在肆虐。乌克兰战争直接威胁着欧洲。混合战争已成为全球常态。委内瑞拉马杜罗政权的活动及其与中国和俄罗斯的密切合作可能迫使美国进行军事干预。

在欧洲，尽管口头上说了很多，但对俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争采取的措施似乎缺乏协调且态度冷淡。我们现在正在讨论西方对乌克兰战争的态度是否类似于1938年慕尼黑会议上英法两国的犹豫不决和软弱，或者像剑桥大学教授克里斯托弗·克拉克所描述的1914年梦游般地走向战争。这两次不作为都导致了世界大战。虽然从历史中吸取教训总是好的，但有必要根据当前的实际情况来评估局势。

冷战后时代欧洲对俄罗斯的态度

自苏联解体以来，已经发生了许多重大失误。莫斯科，这个曾经是俄罗斯帝国和苏联的骄傲继承者，在其经济和内部危机中，受到了美国和西欧居高临下的说教，这让它感到屈辱。这种以强制推行西方民主制度和生活方式为目标的说教，引起了俄罗斯的强烈不满，并在巴拉克·奥巴马总统执政期间达到顶峰。我们现在正在讨论西方对乌克兰战争的处理方式是否类似于1938年慕尼黑会议上英法两国的犹豫不决和软弱，或者类似于1914年梦游般地走向战争。

幸运的是，从波罗的海国家到罗马尼亚的这一系列国家——核心是波兰、匈牙利、捷克共和国和斯洛伐克——能够利用这一历史性的权力真空加入西方联盟。然而，令人遗憾的是，这次扩张没有包括乌克兰和格鲁吉亚。像奥托·冯·哈布斯堡这样有远见的政治家曾指出，如果在20世纪90年代不将这些国家纳入西方联盟，最终会导致战争，但他们的警告却无人理会。

当时平庸的政客们沉浸在一种舒适的幻想中，认为包括俄罗斯在内的整个世界都将变得和平民主。问题在于，为什么当时的政客们会忽视这些事实？答案可能是精神上的懒惰、犹豫不决、缺乏知识和勇气。

将俄罗斯转变为民主国家的尝试必然失败。对西方而言，民主化是一个很好的借口，可以忽略俄罗斯的目标和挫折感。这反过来又加剧了俄罗斯的担忧，担心西方可能会试图影响其内部治理。

西方对俄罗斯扩张主义的反应乏力

2014年，俄罗斯袭击了克里米亚和顿巴斯。美国的反应是不赞成，并发出制裁的信号，同时声明排除军事介入。除了这种软弱的反应之外，奥巴马总统还侮辱俄罗斯，称其“只是一个地区大国”。总统忽视了一个基本原则：对待对手应该既要展现实力，也要给予尊重。这是西方犯下的双重错误。欧洲国家缺乏勇气，退缩到一种天真而舒适的信念中，认为制裁是有效的。

不幸的是，这种政治上的不足至今仍然存在。当俄罗斯军队在乌克兰边境集结时，西方再次缺乏有效的威慑。乔·拜登总统警告说会发生一些事情，然后他侮辱弗拉基米尔·普京总统是杀人犯，但却没有采取任何真正的威慑措施。

现在，我们即将迎来全面战争的第四个年头。华盛顿目前正在以更直接的方式与莫斯科进行谈判，绕过欧洲国家，试图迫使莫斯科和基辅接受和平。现在或许是结束冲突的合适时机，尽管这会对乌克兰不利。

欧洲各国政府已经开始意识到危险。不幸的是，尽管他们宣称团结一致、进行军事重整并支持乌克兰，但在落实自身防务方面却缺乏足够的信誉。华盛顿和莫斯科都不把欧洲人放在眼里。莫斯科利用欧洲内部的分歧，成功地在欧美联盟内部制造了分裂。

德国总理弗里德里希·梅尔茨的功劳在于，他促成了财政濒临崩溃的乌克兰获得900亿欧元的信贷额度，这笔款项将从2026年1月开始支付。然而，围绕这项决定的种种情况却令人质疑。

首先，提出的方案是动用存放在比利时欧洲清算银行（Euroclear）的被冻结的俄罗斯资金，这一方案本身就存在诸多疑问。鉴于该方案的法律合法性存疑，比利时政府说服其合作伙伴放弃了这一想法。最终，各方同意由欧盟委员会在资本市场上筹集资金。这已经是欧盟第三次违反其自身规定的“不得举债”原则。不幸的是，这又朝着建立欧洲共同债务体系迈出了一步，而这一体系主要受到法国等已负债累累的欧洲国家以及信奉中央集权和债务融资的社会主义者的支持。

这种通过借贷来帮助乌克兰避免破产的策略虽然必要，但对于财政状况不佳的欧洲来说却显得目光短浅。此外，欧洲在这一融资机制上的犹豫不决以及试图参与美俄谈判的无力尝试，都招致了克里姆林宫的嘲笑。

尽管梅尔茨总理展现了领导力，但欧洲过去——以及在某种程度上现在——在国防方面的疏忽，加上令人难以信服的策略和软弱的领导力，仍然是欧洲大陆在不久的将来面临的主要危险。

欧洲的安全问题在于：尽管俄罗斯理论上在短期内缺乏发动进一步攻击的潜力，但它拥有果断的领导层。克里姆林宫最大的优势在于欧洲那些目光短浅、优柔寡断的政客。这与1914年和1938年的情况如出一辙。    

Advent’s promise of peace contrasts starkly with 2025’s wars, exposing Europe’s indecision and strategic complacency.

Advent should be a peaceful time in expectation of Christmas, the season of love and peace, and the turn of the year. Yet not only during Advent, but actually the entire year 2025 was overshadowed by wars, which is culminating now at the year’s end.

The most terrible tragedy is happening in Sudan, but conflicts and civil wars rage on in Eastern Congo, Myanmar and the Middle East. War in Ukraine threatens Europe directly. Hybrid warfare has become a global permanence. The activities of the Maduro regime in Venezuela and its close cooperation with China and Russia might force the United States to intervene militarily.

In Europe, the approach toward Russia’s war in Ukraine appears uncoordinated and lukewarm, despite plenty of lip service. We are now witnessing discussions on whether the West’s approach to the Ukraine war corresponds to the British-French indecisiveness and weakness at the Munich Conference in 1938, or the sleepwalking into war in 1914 as described by Cambridge professor Christopher Clark. Both moments of inaction led to world wars. Although it is always good to learn from history, it is necessary to assess the situation from today’s facts.

Europe’s approach to Russia in the post-Cold War era

Major missteps have already taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow, the once-proud successor of the former Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was – in its economic and internal crises – humiliated by paternalistic lecturing from the U.S. and Western Europe. This school-mastering with the objective to enforce Western-style democracy and way of life in Russia was deeply resented and reached a peak during the administration of President Barack Obama.

    We are now witnessing discussions on whether the West’s approach to the Ukraine war corresponds to the British-French indecisiveness and weakness at the Munich Conference in 1938, or the sleepwalking into war in 1914.

It was fortunate that the belt of nations from the Baltics to Romania − with the core being Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia − could use that historical power vacuum to join the Western alliances. It was, however, tragic that this enlargement did not include Ukraine and Georgia. Far-sighted politicians such as Otto von Habsburg, saying that not including these countries into the Western alliances in the 1990s would lead to war at a later stage, were not heard.

Mediocre politicians then clung to the comfortable illusion that the whole world – including Russia – would become peaceful and democratic. The question remains why politicians at that time ignored the facts. The answer might be a combination of mental laziness, indecisiveness, a lack of knowledge and no courage.

The attempt to convert Russia to democracy failed by necessity. For the West, democratization was a good reason to ignore Russian aims and frustrations. Then it gave way to concerns in Russia that the West might try to influence its internal governance.

The West’s underwhelming response to Russian expansionism

In 2014 Russia attacked Crimea and the Donbas. The U.S. reaction was disapproval and a message of sanctions coupled with the declaration that military involvement was excluded. On top of that weak reaction, President Obama insulted Russia by declaring the country “just a regional power.” The president ignored the basic rule that you should encounter an adversary with force, but also with respect. A Western double blunder. The European countries − lacking courage − retreated into a naive and comfortable belief of the effectiveness of sanctions.

Unfortunately, this political insufficiency prevails to this day. When Russia’s troops amassed on Ukraine’s border, there was – again − a lack of credible deterrence from the West. President Joe Biden warned that something would happen, then he insulted President Vladimir Putin as a murderer while putting no real deterrence in place.

Now we are approaching the completion of the fourth year of full-scale war. Washington is currently negotiating in a more direct way with Moscow, ignoring the Europeans and trying to force peace on Moscow and Kyiv. It might be the right moment to end the fighting, although it will be to the detriment of Ukraine.

European governments have started to sense the danger. Unfortunately for them, they are − despite declarations of unity, military rearmament and support for Ukraine − not credible enough in implementing their own defense. Neither Washington nor Moscow takes the Europeans seriously. Moscow, helped by European inconsistency, is successfully driving a wedge in the Euroatlantic alliance.

It is to the credit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that financially broken Ukraine received an 90 billion-euro credit line to be paid from January 2026. The circumstances around the decision, however, were doubtful.

First, the very questionable plan put forward was to use frozen Russian funds held by Euroclear in Belgium. The Belgian government, in light of the legal dubiousness of the idea, convinced its partners to abstain. Instead, it was agreed that the European Commission would raise the funds on capital markets. This is now the third incidence of the EU breaking its own rule that the bloc must not incur debt. Unfortunately, this is yet another step towards a system of common European debt, a movement embraced mainly by already highly indebted European countries, such as France, and by socialist followers of centralism and debt financing.

This strategy of borrowing to help Ukraine avoid insolvency is necessary, though it is shortsighted for a financially broken Europe. Additionally, European uncertainty around this financing mechanism and helpless attempts to include themselves in the American-Russian talks gives rise to ridicule from the Kremlin.

Although Chancellor Merz has provided leadership, Europe’s past − and partially still its present − negligence on defense, coupled with unconvincing maneuvering and weak leadership remain the main danger for the continent in the near future.

Europe’s security problem is the following: Although Russia in theory lacks the potential for a further attack in the near future, it has determined leadership. The Kremlin’s biggest assets are the shortsighted, indecisive politicians of Europe. This is an analogy to 1914 and 1938.